Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan
| Decision Date | 22 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-6326.,01-6326. |
| Citation | 338 F.3d 535 |
| Parties | Ali SHAMAEIZADEH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joel CUNIGAN et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: David R. Marshall, Lexington, Kentucky, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Bryan H. Beauman, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Defendant-Appellees.
ON BRIEF: David R. Marshall, Lexington, Kentucky, for Defendant-Appellees.
Bryan H. Beauman, Douglas L. McSwain, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees.
Before: MOORE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; KATZ, District Judge.*
Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. Ali Shamaeizadeh ("Shamaeizadeh") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants-Appellees with respect to Shamaeizadeh's § 1983 claims and his state law malicious prosecution claim. On March 14, 1994, the Richmond Police Department received a call reporting the burglary of Shamaeizadeh's residence ("the residence"). An officer responded to the call and searched the residence for the burglar. The officer then called for assistance and conducted a second search with one of his supervisors. After discovering evidence of drug paraphernalia during the second search, the two officers called narcotics experts to the scene to participate in a third search. Based on the evidence discovered, the officers secured and executed two search warrants for the residence. Shamaeizadeh was indicted for federal drug violations, but the charges were dismissed after the district court suppressed the evidence seized from the basement of the residence.
Shamaeizadeh filed a § 1983 action including federal claims and a state law malicious prosecution claim against the City of Richmond, Kentucky, the Richmond Police Department, and five individual officers ("the officers") in their individual and official capacities. Shamaeizadeh argues that he is entitled to damages for the following reasons: (1) the second and third warrantless searches were unconstitutional; (2) there was no probable cause for either search warrant; (3) the officers exceeded the scope of the first search warrant; (4) the officers included misrepresentations in the affidavit supporting the second warrant; (5) the officers arrested him without probable cause; (6) he was maliciously prosecuted; and (7) the City of Richmond failed properly to train and supervise its police officers. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all grounds.
We REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the second and third warrantless searches, and with respect to Shamaeizadeh's claim that the officers exceeded the scope of the first search warrant. We AFFIRM the district court on all other grounds.
Shamaeizadeh owned a one-story house with a basement, located at 121 Millstone Drive, Richmond, Kentucky. He occupied the main floor of the residence with his fiancee, Theresa Schmitt ("Schmitt"), and rented the basement to Brian Reed ("Reed") and Joe Ford ("Ford"). All four residents of the house regarded the basement as a separate apartment.
On March 14, 1994, Schmitt placed an emergency call to the Richmond Police Department, reporting a possible burglary of the residence. Officer Mark Wiles ("Wiles") was dispatched and arrived five minutes later. Schmitt met Wiles at the front door, invited him into the residence, and walked into the kitchen. She told Wiles that she had left the back door open for her cats, and then had passed out on the kitchen table after taking muscle relaxants and consuming a beer. When Schmitt awoke, she noticed that her room key was missing from her pocket. She went into another room and, while she was there, someone allegedly reentered the house and broke the glass top of the kitchen table. Wiles observed broken glass on the kitchen floor.
Schmitt asked Wiles to search the residence with her, and he proceeded to walk through the main floor of the residence. Wiles discovered a locked door, but did not attempt to open it because Schmitt said that it was Shamaeizadeh's room and that Shamaeizadeh kept it locked when he was away. Wiles also discovered a broken door, which led to the basement. He did not examine the broken door because Schmitt said she had kicked it open to use the telephone a few days earlier. Wiles later said that during this search he detected the odor of growing marijuana.
After searching the main floor of the house, Wiles moved onto a deck overlooking the backyard and searched the rear of the premises. Meanwhile, Schmitt entered the basement through the broken door, walked out through the back door of the basement apartment, and met Wiles in the backyard. Explaining that the occupants of the basement apartment were away on spring break, she asked Wiles to check the basement. Wiles proceeded to search the basement.
During his search, Wiles noticed that the basement contained several rooms. Many of the doors were locked, and Wiles did not attempt to open them. He did smell what he thought was growing marijuana. After walking through the basement, Wiles called Assistant Chief of Police Wayne Grant ("Grant") because he believed he needed the assistance of a supervisor.
Wiles and Schmitt returned to the kitchen and waited for Grant to arrive.1 Schmitt never asked Wiles to leave. While they were waiting, Schmitt told Wiles that she believed the "government" was the burglar. Wiles was thus inclined to discredit Schmitt's allegations of burglary. When Grant arrived, Wiles briefed him about his activity thus far. Schmitt participated in the conversation, informing the officers that she would retrieve a key for the locked doors in the basement.
Wiles and Grant then conducted a second search of the basement apartment. They did not ask Schmitt's permission to conduct the search. When they entered the basement, Wiles again smelled what he suspected was marijuana. The officers discovered small marijuana cigarette butts, known as "roaches," in an ashtray. They also found boxes of fluorescent light bulbs under the apartment stairway and observed fluorescent lighting in one of the locked rooms turn on and off intermittently. They suspected that the fluorescent lighting was being used to grow marijuana because it is often used for that purpose. Schmitt arrived with a ring of keys, but none of them fit the locked doors.
Wiles and Grant then called Assistant Chief of Narcotics Bill Jesse ("Jesse"). They related their observations to him and requested the assistance of an officer experienced in detecting narcotics. Jesse dispatched Sergeant Joel Cunigan ("Cunigan") to the scene. Cunigan arrived at 9:20 p.m., approximately the same time that Wiles's immediate supervisor, Sergeant Sam Manley ("Manley"), arrived. Wiles and Grant briefed Cunigan and Manley on the situation. Then all four officers conducted a third search of the basement apartment. They did not explicitly ask Schmitt's permission to conduct the third search, but Schmitt participated in the walk-through of the basement.
When the officers entered the basement during the third search, Cunigan smelled a strong odor that he believed to be growing marijuana. The officers discovered a hemostat; rolling papers; a plastic bag of what was suspected to be marijuana, but was actually catnip; and a bag containing a variety of pills. At this point, they advised Schmitt of her rights. Schmitt stated her belief that Reed and Ford were growing marijuana in their basement apartment. According to Schmitt, although she never saw marijuana, the scent was so strong that she covered her vents to avoid it, particularly at nighttime.
Cunigan called a state prosecutor and submitted a sworn affidavit in support of his application for a search warrant. A state court judge issued a warrant for the search and seizure of "[a]ny and all illegally possessed controlled substances including marijuana, both growing and processed, and any drug paraphernalia, also any and all illegally possessed prescription drugs." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 584 (1st Warrant).
At 11:19 p.m., Cunigan returned to the residence with other officers and an agent from the Drug Enforcement Agency to execute the search warrant, conducting a fourth search of the residence. The officers forcibly opened locked doors in the basement apartment, finding and seizing 393 marijuana plants and various pieces of growing equipment. In addition to the drugs and drug paraphernalia, the officers indicated that they seized "assorted paper records, receipts, bank records, insurance records, tax papers, personal ledgers, jewelry." J.A. at 585 (1st Warrant) (notes on warrant).
On March 15, 1994, Detective John Telek ("Telek") signed an affidavit in support of a second warrant to search the house and two vehicles found there. According to the warrant, Telek was permitted to search for the following items:
1. Any and all illegally possessed controlled substances to wit: Marijuana and any drug paraphernalia;
2. Any and all tax records or documents reflecting the income and/or sources of income of any of the above named persons[;]
3. Any documents reflecting the purchase of drug paraphernalia including the receipts for grow lights, potting soil, fertilizer, plant pots, fans[.]
J.A. at 589 (2d Warrant). Shamaeizadeh claims that this search warrant was drafted in an attempt to cover up the illegal seizure of items during the execution of the first warrant.
Upon the recommendation of the local Commonwealth Attorney and a representative of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Richmond Police Department turned over the evidence and prosecution of this matter to the United States government....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Crisp
...States v. Salvucci 448 U.S. 83, 91, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d at 421; see also Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 544 (6th Cir.2003); Ramos, 12 F.3d at 1023; United States v. Dyar, 574 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.1978).11 Additionally, the mere possessi......
-
Rogers v. Detroit Police Dept.
...by that body's officers ...." Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Ed., 470 F.3d 250, 261 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 556 (6th Cir.2003)). In this case, as to the City of Detroit, a city government is not responsible for "every misdeed of [its] employees and......
-
U.S. v. Garcia
...names. The officers thus "required far more than an instant" to connect the map to Garcia's involvement in criminal activity. See Shamaeizadeh, 338 F.3d at 555 (finding that the plain view doctrine is not satisfied where "the officers would have required far more than an instant to conclude......
-
Kinkus v. Village of Yorkville
...police officers. This dearth of training amounts to a deliberate indifference on the part of Yorkville. See, e.g., Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 557 (6th Cir.2003) ("The need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result the violation of const......
-
Searches of the home
...Cir. 1993). Consent to enter a home to search for a burglar does not include subsequent searches for drugs. Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan , 338 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2003). Nor does consent to enter the home grant permission to search any area of the house. United States v. Castellanos , 518 F. 3d 9......
-
Searches of the home
...Cir. 1993). Consent to enter a home to search for a burglar does not include subsequent searches for drugs. Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan , 338 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2003). Nor does consent to enter the home grant permission to search any area of the house. United States v. Castellanos , 518 F. 3d 9......
-
Searches of the Home
...Cir. 1993). Consent to enter a home to search for a burglar does not include subsequent searches for drugs. Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan , 338 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2003). Nor does consent to enter the home grant permission to search any area of the house. United States v. Castellanos , 518 F. 3d 9......
-
Searches of the Home
...Cir. 1993). Consent to enter a home to search for a burglar does not include subsequent searches for drugs. Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan , 338 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2003). Nor does consent to enter the home grant permission to search any area of the house. United States v. Castellanos , 518 F. 3d 9......