Shamso K. v. Saul

Decision Date28 September 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 19-cv-1531 (TNL)
PartiesShamso M. K., Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
ORDER

Edward C. Olson, Disability Attorneys of Minnesota, 331 Second Avenue South, Suite 890, Minneapolis, MN 55401; and Karl E. Osterhout, Osterhout Berger Disability Law, LLC, 521 Cedar Way, Suite 200, Oakmont, PA 15139 (for Plaintiff); and

James Sides, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Social Security Administration, 1301 Young Street, Suite 340, Mailroom 104, Dallas, TX 75202 (for Defendant).

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shamso M. K. brings the present case, contesting Defendant Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The parties have consented to a final judgment from the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c).

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 13, 19. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is denied and the Commissioner's motion is granted.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB in 2015, asserting that she has been disabled since December 31, 2010, due to kidney failure, rheumatoid arthritis, acid reflux, "[s]troke in 2012," and high blood pressure.1 Tr. 44; see also Tr. 10, 55. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. Tr. 10, 51-52, 61, 63. Plaintiff appealed the reconsideration of the DIB determination by requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 10, 78. Prior to the hearing, Plaintiff submitted approximately 800 pages of kidney-treatment records dating back to 2011. Tr. 10; see Tr. 677-1477. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935 (submitting written evidence to ALJ), .1512(a) (claimant's responsibility to submit evidence).

The ALJ held a hearing on June 20, 2018. Tr. 10, 26, 28. After receiving an unfavorable decision from the ALJ, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which denied her request for review. Tr. 1-5, 246; see Tr. 146-48. Plaintiff then filed the instant action, challenging the ALJ's decision. Compl., ECF No. 1. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 13, 19. This matter is now fully briefed and ready for a determination on the papers.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard

This Court reviews whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). "[T]hethreshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high." Id. "It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted); see Boettcher v. Astrue, 652 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Substantial evidence means less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to support the decision.").

This standard requires the Court to "consider both evidence that detracts from the [ALJ's] decision and evidence that supports it." Boettcher, 652 F.3d at 863. The ALJ's decision "will not [be] reverse[d] simply because some evidence supports a conclusion other than that reached by the ALJ." Id.; accord Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012). "The court must affirm the [ALJ's] decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Chaney v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Thus, "[i]f, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision." Perks, 687 F.3d at 1091 (quotation omitted); accord Chaney, 812 F.3d at 676.

Disability benefits are available to individuals who are determined to be under a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.315. An individual is considered to be disabled if she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). This standard is met when a severe physical or mental impairment, or impairments, renders the individualunable to do her previous work or "any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" when taking into account her age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).

Disability is determined according to a five-step, sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

To determine disability, the ALJ follows the familiar five-step process, considering whether: (1) the claimant was employed; (2) she was severely impaired; (3) her impairment was, or was comparable to, a listed impairment; (4) she could perform past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether she could perform any other kind of work.

Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010). In general, the burden of proving the existence of disability lies with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).

B. Nature of DIB

In order to be entitled to DIB, Plaintiff must establish that she was disabled before her insurance expired. Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006)). "[T]he date of last insurance is the last date an individual is eligible to receive DIB in view of her earnings record. Thus, the claimant must establish disability on or before that date in order to be entitled to DIB." Michelle P. v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-4286 (HB), 2019 WL 1318352, at *1 n.4 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2019), aff'd, 798 F. App'x 44 (8th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff was last insured on June 30, 2011. See, e.g., Tr. 12; Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. at 2 n.2; Comm'r's Mem. in Supp. at 1, ECF No. 20. Thus, Plaintiff must prove that she was disabled before June 30, 2011.

C. ALJ's Decision

The ALJ reviewed and admitted the approximately 800 pages of kidney-treatment records, noting "the need for records required to meet the remote onset date and [date last insured]." Tr. 10. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of rheumatoid arthritis, chronic kidney disease with microscopic hematuria, "normal diagnosed as history of [n]ephrotic syndrome"; and anemia secondary to kidney disease. Tr. 13. The ALJ determined that none of these impairments when considered individually or in combination met or equaled a listed impairment, specifically considering, among other listings, Listings 6.03 (chronic kidney disease) and 7.18 (repeated complications of hematological disorders, including anemia). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work with additional limitations as follows:

lifting and carrying 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; sitting for 6 hours, standing for 2 hours, and walking for 2 hours; push/pull as much as can lift/carry. [Plaintiff] can climb ramps and stairs occasionally, never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, balance occasionally, stoop occasionally, kneel occasionally, crouch occasionally, and crawl occasionally. [Plaintiff] can never work at unprotected heights, never with moving mechanical parts, never operating a motor vehicle, and never in humidity and wetness. NO USE OF HAND POWER TOOLS OR DIRECT CONTACT WITH HEAVY VIBRATING MACHINERY.

Tr. 14. In reaching this residual-functional-capacity determination, the ALJ gave "great weight" to the opinions of the state agency medical consultants. Tr. 16.

D. Duty to Develop the Record

The thrust of Plaintiff's argument is that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record in her case. "[S]ocial [S]ecurity hearings are non-adversarial." Snead v. Barnhart, 360F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004). "Well-settled precedent confirms that the ALJ bears a responsibility to develop the record fairly and fully, independent of the claimant's burden to press [her] case." Id.; see, e.g., Combs v. Berryhill, 787 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2017); Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010). "Failing to develop the record is reversible error when it does not contain enough evidence to determine the impact of a claimant's impairment on [her] ability to work." Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2012).

An ALJ does not, however, "fail in his [or her] duty to develop the record if substantial evidence exists to allow the ALJ to make an informed decision." Hey v. Colvin, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1046 (D. Minn. 2015) "A [claimant] seeking to reverse an ALJ's decision due to the failure to adequately develop the record bears a heavy burden: a [claimant] must show both a failure to develop necessary evidence and unfairness or prejudice from that failure." Id.; see Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 994 (8th Cir. 2005). "There is no bright line rule indicating when the [ALJ] has or has not adequately developed the record; rather, such an assessment is made on a case-by-case basis." Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008); accord Smith v. Astrue, 232 F. App'x 617, 619 (8th Cir. 2007). And, in the end, "the burden of persuasion to prove disability and demonstrate [residual functional capacity] remains on the claimant." Vossen, 612 F.3d at 1016; accord Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff argues that, although the ALJ reviewed and admitted the additional kidney-treatment records, the ALJ did not obtain review of the entire medical record—i.e., inclusive of those 800 pages—by a medical expert "or return the significantly updated caserecord to the State Agency for a new review of the new evidence by one of its medical consultants." Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. at 3....

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