Shands v. State

• Decision Date: 17 May 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 398.)
• Citation: 177 S.W. 18
• Parties: SHANDS v. STATE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 18

177 S.W. 18

SHANDS v. STATE.

(No. 398.)

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 17, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sevier County; Jeff. T. Cowling, Judge.

Monroe Shands was convicted of crime, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. L. Moose, Atty. Gen., and Jno. P. Streepey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SMITH, J.

This appeal has been prosecuted from a judgment pronounced upon the verdict of a jury finding appellant guilty of the crime of carnal abuse and fixing his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the period of one year. Appellant has not favored us with any brief in the case, but we have carefully considered the errors assigned in the motion for a new trial.

The principal question in the case appears to be whether or not the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the conviction. The girl upon whom the offense was alleged to have been committed was evidently not responsible for nor in sympathy with the prosecution. Indeed, a consideration of her evidence makes it very apparent that she did not desire his conviction. However, upon her direct examination she did testify that appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, and she stated the time and place where the act was said to have occurred; and there was some evidence upon the part of the state which tended to corroborate this statement in regard to the time and place. Upon her cross-examination, however, she repudiated this statement and denied that the appellant had ever at any time or place had sexual intercourse with her. She asserted that the prosecuting attorney had told her she would be fined $25 and put in jail if she did not testify against appellant, and she stated that she had testified against him because she was afraid not to do so. She was called upon to state, and did state, the time and place and circumstances under which these representations were made to her by the prosecuting attorney; and evidence was offered by the state in rebuttal, which was sufficient to show that the statement in regard to the intimidation of the witness by the prosecuting attorney was without foundation. Appellant denied that he had ever had sexual intercourse with the girl, and stated that he had never been in company with her on more than three occasions. He admitted, however, that he had had sexual intercourse with the sister of the prosecuting witness, who was over the age of consent; and there was proof of certain statements made by him which, if true, amounted to an admission that he had had sexual intercourse with both of the sisters. It was further shown that at the preliminary trial appellant admitted that he had been with the prosecuting witness on many occasions, and the officer who arrested him testified that appellant stated, when the arrest was made, that "he was up against it," and said "he might as well go ahead and take his medicine." The prosecuting witness admitted, upon her cross-examination, that she had been talked with about her evidence and advised what to say, but she refused to state who had advised her what to testify.

The instructions fairly submitted the case to the jury, and no objections were made to any of them; but the motion for a new trial assigns error in the admission of certain evidence, and the action of the court in this respect appears to be the only question in the case in addition to that of the sufficiency of the evidence.

The evidence complained of consists in the testimony of Robert Edwards, the deputy sheriff to whom the defendant stated that "he was up against it and might as well go ahead and take his medicine." But it is not shown in what respect this evidence was incompetent. There is no intimation that the statement was not freely and voluntarily made, and its relevancy is,...