Shanfelter v. City of Baltimore
Decision Date | 28 February 1895 |
Citation | 31 A. 439,80 Md. 483 |
Parties | SHANFELTER v. MAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore city court.
Action by John J. Shanfelter, trading as C. Duffy and Co., against the mayor and city council of Baltimore, for damages for delay in completing purchase and condemnation of property of plaintiff designated by ordinance to be condemned for the erection of a new courthouse. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before ROBINSON, C.J., and BRYAN, McSHERRY, FOWLER, BRISCOE PAGE, ROBERTS, and BOYD, JJ.
Wm Pinkney Whyte and Jos. Whyte, for appellant.
Wm. S Bryan, Jr., for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment of the Baltimore city court sustaining a demurrer of the appellee, the defendant below to the declaration. The appellant, who was the plaintiff below, alleges that he is the lessee "for a long term of years" of a property known as the "Imperial Hotel," on the square bounded by Calvert, St. Paul, Fayette, and Lexington streets, in the city of Baltimore, which square had been selected by the city authorities, under certain ordinances passed in pursuance of an act of the general assembly of Maryland, for the erection of a new courthouse, and that, although all interests, except the plaintiff's, in said square, had been obtained for the purposes mentioned in the act of assembly and in the ordinance, "the building committee of the new courthouse" neglected, delayed, and failed to complete the purchase or condemnation of his interest in said property from the 1st day of May, 1893, to the time of the institution of the suit, although repeatedly requested and warned so to do. He avers that he has been greatly damaged, injured, obstructed, and prejudiced in his business as hotel keeper, by reason of the delay, in the use and enjoyment of his property. The claim intended to be presented by the declaration is the right to recover damages for what is alleged to be an unreasonable delay in acquiring plaintiff's property after the passage of the ordinances selecting as a site for the new courthouse the square which includes the said hotel property, notwithstanding the requests and warnings of the plaintiff. It is contended, however, on the part of the city that the declaration is technically defective in not setting out at least the legal import of the ordinances upon which appellant bases his right to recover. They are only referred to by number and dates, and not even the substance of them is given. The court cannot take judicial notice of their contents, and hence it is not informed by the declaration what duties are imposed or powers conferred by them. Without the provisions of the ordinances on which the plaintiff relies being before the court, it is impossible for it to determine whether they impose such duties on the defendant, or render it liable for failure to perform them. We do not think, therefore, that the references to said ordinances are sufficient to comply with the well-established rules of pleading adopted in this state. But, as we would have the power to remand the case so that the declaration could be amended to meet our view as to mere matter of form, which we need not state more fully, we will determine the main question intended to be presented, as it has been fully argued, and the ordinances have been, for the purpose of the argument, treated as if before us. The appellee, having been authorized by an act of assembly, passed Ordinance No. 100, approved October 7, 1892, by which the commissioners of finance were authorized and directed to issue bonds of the city to the amount of $6,000,000 from time to time, as the same might be required, for the purposes therein mentioned. $1,750,000, or so much thereof as might be required, of the proceeds of the sales of said bonds, were directed to be used for the purchase of ground, erecting thereon and properly furnishing a new courthouse and record office. By Ordinance No. 81, approved April 20, 1893, the square above mentioned was selected as the site, and the mayor, comptroller, and register were directed to acquire title to a portion of the property included within the bounds of the square, on which John F. Carter held an option for the sum of $132,500 to be paid out of the $1,750,000. Ordinance No. 83, approved April 20, 1893, authorized the building committee of the new courthouse (to be thereafter appointed), in case it could not agree with the owner or owners of any lot or portion of this square, or any interest therein, or if the owners were under age, etc., to condemn the same, and then minutely prescribed the course of proceeding in the event of condemnation. The second section of that ordinance limited the total amount to be expended by the building committee to $1,617,500, to be paid out of the sum appropriated for the new courthouse, and directed the commissioners of finance to sell from time to time, as the same were needed, as many of said bonds as should be required to supply the said sum. Ordinance No. 108, approved May 1, 1893, named the building committee of the new courthouse, and authorized them to advertise in Baltimore and other cities, inviting the submission of drawings, plans, and specifications. Ordinance No. 187, approved May 25, 1893, further defined the duties and powers of the building committee. It authorized them to employ a competent architect, gave them power to provide for the erection of the new courthouse upon the site already selected, when it shall have been acquired, and to do all acts and make all contracts essential in their judgment to the best and most successful accomplishment and carrying out of the design of building the new courthouse, provided that the full amount expended for all purposes should not exceed $1,617,500, which sum, it will be observed, is the difference between the total amount appropriated and the amount paid for the property held under the John F. Carter option. The above are all the ordinances referred to in the declaration and cited in argument, and hence we need not refer to any others. It is apparent from an examination of them that it was contemplated to erect a large and expensive building. Considerable time was necessarily required to perfect the plans for the building, and the only money at the command of the building committee must be raised by the commissioners of finance from sales of the bonds authorized for the purpose. The members of the committee were only named in the ordinance approved the 1st day of May, 1893. The delay complained of by the plaintiff was from that date until a day not later than the 7th day of April, 1894, at...
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