Shank v. Sappington, 489
| Decision Date | 12 July 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 489,489 |
| Citation | 247 Md. 427,231 A.2d 712 |
| Parties | Lillian Grove SHANK and Grace Grove Sappington, Co-Ex'xs u/w of Jessie B. Grove v. R. Francis SAPPINGTON, Trustee u/w of Jessie B. Grove. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Edward L. Blanton, Jr., Baltimore, (W. Jerome Offutt, Frederick, on the brief) for appellants.
Glenn C. Michel, Frederick, (Mathias, Mathias & Michel, Frederick, on the brief) for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER, BARNES, McWILLIAMS and FINAN, JJ.
In this case involving the construction of the last will and testament of Eugene A. Grove, late of Frederick County, deceased, the question on appeal is whether the estate in remainder vested as of the time of the death of the testator or at the time of the death of the life tenant. The chancellor determined the identity of those entitled to the remainder by reference to the date of the death of the testator. We think he was right.
At the time of his death on October 17, 1929, the testator was survived by his wife, Jessie B. Grove, and four daughters, Rebecca Clagett Grove, Mary Louise Grove, Grace Grove Sappington and Lillian Grove Shank. The will, a short one, provided:
'Being of sound mind I hereby make my last will and testament as follows:
To my wife Jessie B. Grove I leave everything I may possess as long as she remains my widow. Should she decide to marry I allow her what is due according to law. The balance I leave to my children share and share alike.
I appoint my wife Jessie B. Grove my executrix without bond.'
Upon completion of administration, the shares of stock in the M. J. Grove Lime Company, appraised at $22,280, and other assets of limited value, were distributed to the widow 'for and during her life or widowhood.' The widow never remarried and before she died some thirty years later, the value of the shares of stock, as the result of stock splits, stock dividends and the acquisition of the Lime Company by the Flintkote Company, had increased to a considerable fortune.
In an apparent effort to give effect to the life estate, the widow caused the stock certificates of the Grove and Flintkote companies to be registered in her name and that of her daughters as joint tenants and occasionally, although erroneously, as tenants by the entireties. Upon the death of Mary in 1946, intestate and unmarried, her jointly-owned shares were equally divided among the three surviving daughters but were still held as 'joint tenants' with their mother. And when Rebecca died in 1960, also intestate and unmarried, her jointly-owned shares were given outright by the mother to the two surviving daughters and their families. These two daughters, Grace and Lillian, survived their mother.
The widow died testate in 1962. After providing for the payment of debts, funeral expenses and inheritance and estate taxes and costs, she divided the 'rest, residue and remainder' of her estate into 'two equal parts or shares.' One share was given to R. Francis Sappington in trust for Grace. The other share was given outright to Lillian. The two daughters were appointed executrices of the will.
The federal estate tax return filed by the executrices, besides including the gift of the Rebecca Grove shares given to Grace Sappington and Lillian Shank, also listed all of the shares of stock then held jointly by the widow and her two surviving daughters. And the estate taxes were not apportioned as required by Code (1965 Rep. Vol.), Article 81, § 162. As a result, the solely owned property of the testatrix, consisting of approximately $50,000, was entirely exhausted in making payment of the estate taxes. The trustee of Grace, having questioned the executrices as to their failure to give effect to the trust created by the will of the testatrix (Jessie B. Grove) and advised them not to make a distribution to him until the will of the testator (Eugene A. Grove) had been judicially construed, filed this proceeding.
The trustee, as complainant below, contended, firstly, that the will of the testator Eugene gave his widow no more than a life estate in the shares of stock owned by her husband, that upon the death of the widow all of such shares vested in the two surviving children of the testator Eugene, that none of such shares were includable in the estate of the testatrix Jessie for estate tax purposes and that, if some of the shares were taxable, the estate tax liability should have been prorated between the solely-owned and the jointly-owned shares; secondly, that the gift of the remainder by the testator Eugene 'to my children share and share alike' created a class gift which did not vest until the termination of the life estate; and, alternatively, that in the event the gift vested on the death of the testator, the children took as joint tenants and in that event the two survivors took the estate as a result of the joint tenancy rather than from the joint interests created by the widow.
The executrices, as respondents, besides claiming that they were ill-advised as to what should be included in the federal estate tax return, also contended that the jointly-owned shares of stock should not have been included in the estate of the testatrix Jessie.
When the case was submitted on bill and answer, the chancellor (Schnauffer, C. J.), filed an opinion and decree holding that the widow took a life estate in all of the property of her husband; that the estate in remainders vested in his children at the time of his death; that the mother was the sole heir of the two unmarried and intestate daughters who predeceased her; that the remainder interest of the two surviving daughters passed to them under the will of their father and not as a result of the attempt of the mother to convert her life estate into a joint tenancy with her daughters; that proration of the estate taxes against such remainder interests (not being properly includable as an asset in the estate of the mother) was not required; that the gifts of the property, inherited by the mother from the deceased duaghters, to the surviving daughters and their families were valid gifts in joint tenancy; and that proration of the estate taxes was required against...
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