Shankle v. Texas City
| Decision Date | 04 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. G-95-114. |
| Citation | 885 F. Supp. 996 |
| Parties | Aaron and Yvette SHANKLE, Henry L. and Bobbie Rhodes, Rhonda Alcorn, Gary Paul Rhodes, Anthony Gayden, Alvin Phillips Milton Bowers, Beverly Spencer, Sheree Ford, John Drisdale, Zaki Saleh, Rodney Turpin, Ronald Marshall and Thomas Hayes v. TEXAS CITY and the following persons individually and in their official capacities, Mayor Chuck Doyle, Police Chief Jerry Purdon, and other Unknown Police Officers. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
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Anthony P. Griffin, Galveston, TX, for plaintiffs.
William Scott Helfand, Hirsch Glover Robinson & Sheiness, Houston, TX, for defendants.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Texas City, Mayor Chuck Doyle, individually and in his official capacity, Chief of Police Jerry Purdon, individually and in his official capacity, and unknown police officers' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request for an order enjoining Texas City from establishing unconstitutional roadblocks pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 is rendered MOOT, and is thereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs bring this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants have deprived, and threatened to deprive, Plaintiffs of their rights to assemble, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to due process and equal protection of the law, and to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, contrary to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants' actions have deprived, and threatened to deprive, Plaintiffs of their rights under § 3, § 3a, § 9, § 19, and § 27 of Article I of the Texas Constitution.
Plaintiffs allege that during the summer of 1994, in disregard of the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution, Texas City's Police Department repeatedly and randomly blockaded all roads leading into the South Acres residential subdivision on selected Sunday afternoons and evenings. The South Acres subdivision is a predominantly African-American neighborhood in Texas City which lies between two parallel streets, FM 1765 (also known as Texas Avenue) and Monticello Drive. Connecting these streets, running perpendicularly, is Vauthier Road. Vauthier Road runs down the middle of South Acres and is therefore the central conduit for travel within South Acres. Access to Vauthier Road is necessary in order to drive into South Acres. This is possible at only three places. Two of these are at FM 1765 and Monticello Drive. The third is located at Carver Avenue. Each of these entrances was allegedly blockaded on a repeated basis during the summer of 1994.
These roadblocks allegedly caused the residents of South Acres, their family members, friends, and business associates grievous harms by denying them entrance to the subdivision, despite the fact that none of the Plaintiffs had done anything wrong. Plaintiffs assert that their daily activities were disrupted, and many were not allowed to return to their own homes.
Plaintiffs assert that the roadblocks were enforced in an arbitrary fashion. By way of example, Plaintiffs allege that during the brief stops at the roadblocks, residents and visitors were not systematically required to provide their drivers licenses or insurance papers. Instead, officers conducting the roadblocks randomly asked for Plaintiffs' drivers licenses. According to Plaintiffs, the residents of South Acres were often denied access to their own homes, even after proving they were residents of South Acres with their drivers licenses and insurance papers. Other Plaintiffs argue that officers simply turned Plaintiffs away without ever giving them an opportunity to show their drivers licenses in order to prove that they were, in fact, residents of South Acres. Plaintiffs also assert that they were never informed as to the duration of the roadblocks or of alternative routes for entering the subdivision.
The purported purpose for the erection of these roadblocks was laudably to combat increased crime resulting from gang activity in the area. Plaintiffs assert that some officers enforcing the roadblocks informed them of the reason for the roadblocks, while other officers summarily denied residents access to their homes. Plaintiffs argue that although the manifest objective of the roadblocks was to reduce criminal activity in the South Acres subdivision, the officers repeatedly stopped and denied access to residents and visitors who were clearly older than the "rowdy youth" originally targeted by the roadblocks.
Plaintiffs assert that the roadblocks reflected a deliberate Texas City policy which was expressly endorsed by the Mayor and the Chief of Police, acting under color of law. Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants had the option of posting police officers to deter or arrest wrongdoers, yet the Defendants chose to employ allegedly unconstitutionally intrusive roadblocks. Moreover, according to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants have promised to continue to operate these allegedly random and arbitrary roadblocks in the future.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief on the issue of the constitutionality of Defendants' erection and enforcement of its roadblocks in the South Acres subdivision. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin the Defendants from erecting or enforcing its roadblocks, at least in the manner alleged here, in the South Acres subdivision in the future. Finally, Plaintiffs bring this action for damages they allegedly sustained as a consequence of Defendants' erection and enforcement of roadblocks in the South Acres Subdivision.
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some "balancing test" than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where the "reasonable" requirements of the probable-cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials — perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens — may be tempted to conduct searches to sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance between the individual and society depends on the recognition of "the right to be let alone" — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
The issue before the Court is whether the random erection and enforcement of roadblocks by Defendants at the entrances to a predominantly African-American subdivision violated the Constitutional rights of Plaintiffs who either resided, visited, or conducted business within the subdivision. Defendants created the roadblocks for the ostensible purpose of reducing gang-related criminal activity in the area. While this is certainly a commendable aspiration, Plaintiffs argue that these particular roadblocks constitute seizures and that the seizure of presumably innocent citizens is an affront to a series of rights that an individual possesses by virtue of being a citizen of the State of Texas and the United States. These rights are the right to be let alone, the right of privacy, and the right to travel. Plaintiffs further assert that these roadblocks impinged upon their freedom to assemble.
Defendants argue that the roadblocks in question are analogous to the Border Patrol's stopping of a vehicle at a checkpoint for brief questioning regarding authority to enter the United States. The United States Supreme Court held that in these cases the Constitutional rights of privacy and personal security were not violated. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).
Defendants further argue that there is no support for Plaintiffs' contention of a Constitutional violation because the Plaintiffs did not allege to have been searched or detained for any extended period of time, nor did Plaintiffs claim to have been subjected to detention at all, given that Plaintiffs might have elected to by-pass the checkpoints in question.
However, this Court finds the roadblocks at issue are inherently different from the Border Patrol checkpoints considered in Martinez-Fuerte. The types of roadblocks utilized by the Border Patrol in Martinez-Fuerte were routine, fixed, and permanent. The Supreme court in Martinez-Fuerte observed:
Routine fixed/permanent checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly to roving patrol stops on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, 566-567, 96 S.Ct. at 3083, 3086-3087.
The roadblocks imposed in the South Acres subdivision were not fixed or permanent and therefore constituted an undeniable intrusion upon the motoring public. Here, the roadblocks seriously interfered with the legitimate traffic entering the subdivision.1 The Court does not challenge the legitimacy of the...
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...when it was set up near the entrance of a subdivision in order to reduce gang-related criminal activity. Shankle v. Texas City, 885 F.Supp. 996 (S.D.Tex.1995) (holding that an "area warrant" was necessary prior to erecting roadblocks at key points of entry into the subdivision). Similarly, ......
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