Shanley v. Shanley
| Decision Date | 02 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 112413,112413 |
| Citation | 27 Conn.Supp. 417,241 A.2d 543 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Marion E. SHANLEY v. Edward M. SHANLEY et al. |
Edward T. Falsey, Jr., and John C. Flanagan, New Haven, for plaintiff.
Tyler, Cooper, Grant, Bowerman & Keefe, New Haven, for defendants.
Succinctly stated, the motion of the plaintiff for a summary judgment as to liability is predicated upon the following facts established by police and motor vehicle reports and the affidavit of the plaintiff: The plaintiff, on December 24, 1965, at about 1:45 a.m., was a passenger in a vehicle being operated by the defendant driver, Edward M. Shanley, on Whitney Avenue in the town of Hamden when the vehicle went out of control, swerved to the right off the highway, mounted the curb and struck a pole. No reason was advanced by the driver in explanation of the erratic course the vehicle took, but he informed the plaintiff that he had fallen asleep. The affidavit of the defendant driver, far from controverting these allegations, tends to support them, the affiant asserting that he has no recollection of traveling a distance of two long blocks prior to the accident and that he assumed he had fallen asleep, he informed the plaintiff.
While the rule of law relative to the 'sleeping motorist' has been subjected to criticism, a majority of the jurisdictions agree that in automobile accident litigation if, 'without any premonitory signs of drowsiness, you were suddenly deprived of consciousness by the sandman or Morpheus, you were not at fault and were not an actor' and thus legally incapable of incurring liability. Kaufman & Kantrowitz, 'The Case of the Sleeping Motorist,' 25 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 362. '(B) ecause negligence presupposes a voluntary act, the actor (the sleeping motorist) cannot be negligent for what he does or fails to do while he is unconscious.' 2 Harper & James, Torts § 16.7, p. 921. There must be an appreciation by the alleged tort-feasor of the fact that he is sleepy. See Kakluskas v. Somers Motor Lines, Inc., 134 Conn. 35, 39, 54 A.2d 592. To put it differently, the defendant driver must be shown to be a 'responsible agent' in directing the course of the car, that he was negligent in exercising control, and that this negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. Badela v. Karpowich, 152 Conn. 360, 363, 206 A.2d 838.
It is elementary that if it appears that upon full inquiry a defense would not be found to exist, a summary judgment is warranted. Practice Book § 303; Rathkopf v. Pearson, 148 Conn. 260, 264, 170 A.2d 135. This principle of law, however, presupposes a clear-cut demonstration by the plaintiff of the existence of facts sufficient to support a recognizable cause of action. If a party does not furnish, via affidavit and other available documentary proof (Practice Book § 299), facts sufficient to support a judgment, it is not incumbent upon an adverse party, in accordance with § 299 of the Practice Book, to file an opposing affidavit disputing the data offered by the plaintiff. The legally invulnerable are not required to refute under the rule providing that the 'adverse party * * * may file opposing affidavits (italics supplied).' Practice Book § 299.
The data and affidavit proffered by the plaintiff encompass no proof to support a conclusion that the defendant Shanley as a reasonably prudent man had a warning or an appreciation of impending sleep. The most that one concludes is that the defendant went into a state of unconsciousness and his car went out of control, off the street, and struck a pole. A plaintiff cannot merely prove that a collision occurred and then call upon the defendant operator to come forward with evidence that the collision was not a proximate consequence of negligence on his part. Badela v. Karpowich, supra, 152 Conn. 362, 206 A.2d 838. Summary judgments are allowed when any party 'is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear where the truth is, that no genuine issue remains for trial.' Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas...
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Siruta v. Siruta
...negligence is a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the court. For example, she cites Shanley v. Shanley, 27 Conn.Supp. 417, 241 A.2d 543 (Conn.Super.1968), for the proposition that falling asleep behind the wheel is not necessarily negligent. But the court in Shanley d......
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Snoots v. Demorest
...operating the involved automobile.' Snoots relies on a recent decision of the Superior Court of Connecticut in Shanley v. Shanley, 27 Conn.Sup. 417, 241 A.2d 543 (1968) denying a plaintiff passenger's motion for summary judgment in view of the fact that the defendant driver's affidavit tend......
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Johnson v. McAdoo, s. 82
...in other jurisdictions, the majority view being that falling asleep is not, per se, negligence. See, e.g., Shanley v. Shanley, 27 Conn.Sup. 417, 241 A.2d 543 (Supr.1968). A minority view would hold a driver who falls asleep at the wheel negligent as a matter of law. See generally, Annot., 2......