Shannon v. SASSEVILLE

Decision Date12 February 2010
Docket NumberCivil No. 08-343-P-H.
Citation684 F. Supp.2d 169
PartiesMichael SHANNON, Plaintiff v. Sarto Anthony SASSEVILLE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

Theodore H. Irwin, Irwin, Tardy and Morris, P.A., Portland, ME, Joshua A. Tardy, Irwin Tardy Morris, Newport, ME, for Plaintiff.

David J. Van Dyke, Hornblower, Lynch, Rabasco & Van Dyke, Lewiston, ME, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND REMITTITUR OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD

D. BROCK HORNBY, District Judge.

The issues here are, first, whether the evidence at trial supported a jury verdict of punitive damages against a man found liable for molesting his seven-year-old nephew1 and, second, whether a punitive damage award of $1.1 million on top of a compensatory award of $150,000 is excessive as a matter of state law or federal constitutional law. I conclude that the evidence fully supports a punitive damage verdict under the standards of both Rule 50 (motion for judgment as a matter of law) and Rule 59 (motion for new trial). The defendant's Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial on punitive damages are therefore DENIED.2 I also DENY the Motion for Remittitur of the award. While the punitive damage award here is large compared to the compensatory award, I conclude that it is not contrary to Maine common law or federal constitutional law given the reprehensibility of the defendant's act coupled with Maine's legitimate interest in punishing and deterring child molestation.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After becoming an adult, the plaintiff Michael Shannon sued his uncle, the defendant Sarto Sasseville, for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under Maine law. The case went to trial on December 15, 2009. At trial, the jury heard Shannon testify that when he was six or seven, he and his family visited Sasseville's home for a family gathering. Shannon testified that Sasseville (his uncle and godfather) took him into a bathroom on that occasion and fondled his genitals. Three of Sasseville's daughters testified that he had also molested them on multiple occasions when they were children.3 In deposition testimony presented as part of the plaintiff's direct case, Sasseville strenuously denied Shannon's allegations and the allegations of his two daughters, but agreed that he had molested a third daughter on one occasion by touching her breasts. (The third daughter had already testified that it was on more than one occasion and that Sasseville had touched her genitals as well as her breasts.) On cross-examination, Sasseville's lawyer questioned the credibility of all three Sasseville daughters. Sasseville's niece and his sister testified that one of the daughters had made inconsistent statements about abuse. Sasseville also took the stand and reiterated his denials. In rebuttal, Shannon called one of Sasseville's former therapists who testified that Sasseville had previously acknowledged molesting one daughter not once (as he had testified) but three times.

The jury returned a verdict finding that Sasseville had molested Shannon and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages. Sasseville moved for judgment as a matter of law, and I denied the motion from the bench. The jury next heard testimony from Sasseville regarding his financial condition, arguments from counsel, and new jury instructions regarding the imposition of punitive damages. After deliberating a few hours, the jury then awarded Shannon $1,100,000 in punitive damages. Sasseville moved for judgment as a matter of law on that damage award, and I denied the motion from the bench.

Sasseville now renews his motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the punitive damage award, moves for a new trial on punitive damages, and, alternatively, moves to reduce the punitive damage award (remittitur) on the basis that it is excessive as a matter of law.

ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction here is based upon diversity of citizenship, and the parties agree that Maine law applies.

(1) The Standards

The standard for granting a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law is that, considering all the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could have reached the same result. See Monteagudo v. Asociacion de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado, 554 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir.2009). As a judge, I do not weigh the evidence or determine credibility on such a motion, and I draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, disregarding "all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citation omitted).

By contrast, on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, I independently weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses to determine if the jury's verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence and therefore represents a miscarriage of justice. Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430, 436 (1st Cir.2009). But I am not a "thirteenth juror ," free to overturn a verdict because I might have reached a different result had I been the finder of fact in the first instance. Id. (citing Coffran v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc., 683 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.1982)). A new trial is warranted only if a verdict goes "against the demonstrable weight of the credible evidence or results in a blatant miscarriage of justice." Marcoux v. Shell Oil Prods. Co. LLC, 524 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2005)).

Under Maine law, punitive damages may be imposed if a tortfeasor acts deliberately with "express" or "actual" malice, or so outrageously that malice can be implied. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me.1985). The standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Id.

Even if the imposition of punitive damages is proper under state law, it still must be measured against federal constitutional standards. But the award will be upheld "unless it clearly appears that the amount of the award exceeds the outer boundary of the universe of sums reasonably necessary to punish and deter the defendant's conduct." Cabral v. United States DOJ, 587 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir.2001)). If a punitive damage award violates "elementary notions of fairness that ... dictate that a person receive fair notice ... of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose," BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), then the judge may ascertain the appropriate amount of an award and enter judgment in that reduced amount, see Mendez-Matos v. Mun. of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 52 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Bisbal-Ramos v. City of Mayaguez, 467 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir.2006)).

(2) Evidentiary Basis for Punitive Damages

Based on all the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could find that Sasseville deliberately molested his seven-year-old nephew/godson and that Sasseville's act was part of a pattern of using his familial position of authority and trust to abuse children in his family. The jury reasonably could find by clear and convincing evidence that Sasseville's actions were so outrageous as to imply the malice required for the imposition of punitive damages under Maine law. See Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Me.1990) (noting that punitive damages are "entirely proper in a case of ... child abuse"). The cumulative and credible testimony of Shannon, of Sasseville's daughters, and of his former psychologist severely undercut the credibility of Sasseville's denials. It is simply not possible to find that the evidence does not support the jury's award of punitive damages or that the punitive damage award was against the clear weight of the evidence.

The defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and his Motion for a New Trial regarding the imposition of punitive damages are therefore DENIED.

(3) The Amount of Punitive Damages

Sasseville argues that the punitive damage award is excessive in light of the factors that the jury had to consider under Maine law and under federal due process limitations on the size of punitive damage awards.

Under Maine law, a fact finder "must weigh `all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors'" presented by the parties, including the "egregiousness of the defendant's conduct,"4 when determining the appropriate amount of an award. Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1359 (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Me.1983)). "Aggravating factors may include whether the defendant's conduct was `intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent.'" Hanover Ins. Co., 464 A.2d at 158 (quoting Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594, 595 (Me.1983)).5

Under federal constitutional law, the judge must evaluate whether a punitive damage award is excessive by considering: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Mendez-Matos, 557 F.3d at 52 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589).6 To measure the degree of reprehensibility—and thus the need for punishment and deterrence—I consider whether "the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." Cabral, 587 F.3d at 26 (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513).

Thus, the factors...

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