Shapour v. California

• Decision Date: 05 August 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:13-CV-01682
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: YOUSSEF SHAPOUR, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Defendants.

YOUSSEF SHAPOUR, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-01682

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 5, 2014

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED; FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; AND TO STRIKE

I. Introduction

On October 18, 2013, pro se Plaintiff Youssef Shapour ("Plaintiff"), filed an action against Defendant California Department of Transportation ("Defendant") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Plaintiff alleges two causes of action: one for retaliation for engaging in a protected activity and one for disparate treatment. Doc. No. 1 ("Compl."). On January 21, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the retaliation cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and to dismiss the disparate treatment cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. No. 15 ("Motion"). In the alternate, Defendant filed a motion for a more definite statement and to strike. Doc. No. 15, Motion. On February 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. Doc. No 18. On March 10, 2014, Defendant filed areply brief in support of the motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 26 ("Reply"). Each motion will be address infra.

II. Background¹

Plaintiff began employment at Caltrans at the California Department of Transportation ("DOT") in 1989. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff was employed as a Material Engineer in the Fresno Materials Laboratory from January 1999 to March 2009. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff is of Middle Eastern origin and is Muslim. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 3.

Beginning in the summer of 2007, the Fresno Materials Laboratory became polarized between Christian-Caucasian employees and Asian, Indian, and Middle Eastern employees. Doc. No. 1, Complaint at ¶¶ 5-9. Two Caucasian employees played loud Christian music on a daily basis, "made an issue" about the safety of a microwave and a refrigerator, and complained about "foreign-born employee[']s" apparel and work habits. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 8, 9. In March 2008, Plaintiff approached his supervisor for help dealing with the hostile work environment but was told that an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint had already been filed against the Caucasian employees. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 11. In March and April of 2008, Caucasian employees filed internal EEO complaints against Plaintiff and his supervisor, also a foreign-born employee. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 12.

In April 2008, a managerial inquiry was conducted to improve the Fresno Materials Laboratory work environment. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 13. On May 5, 2008, a managerial inquiry consultant interviewed Plaintiff as part of the managerial inquiry. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶¶ 14-18. In late-May 2008, Plaintiff's supervisor was relocated. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff's former supervisor was "eventually separated from state service altogether." Doc. No. 26, Reply at 2. On October 30, 2008, Plaintiff sent an email to numerous managers and supervisors "seekinghelp," alerting them to "EEO violations by ... two Caucasian employees," and "construction management's cover up." Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 21.

On November 25, 2008, Plaintiff was issued a warning letter "based on internal EEO findings." Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 24. In "[l]ate November, early December," the acting supervisor conducted a performance appraisal of Plaintiff and indicated that improvement was needed regarding Plaintiff's "Relation with People." Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 25. On January 12, 2009, Plaintiff's position as Material Engineer was transferred to San Luis Obispo. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 25.

Plaintiff submitted an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") complaint form on January 14, 2009 and an EEO complaint on January 16, 2009. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶¶ 30-31. On February 13, 2009, Plaintiff's "temporary supervisor" spoke with him in an "intimidating manner" regarding the "EEO issues." Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 33. On July 22, 2013, the EEOC investigation concluded that it was unable to establish that the DOT violated Title VII and issued Plaintiff a right to sue. Doc. No. 1, Compl. Exhibit 1.

Subsequent to filing this suit, Plaintiff has been transferred to another location. Doc. No. 15, Motion at 12.

III. Retaliation

Defendant's initial motion to dismiss is replete with accusations that Plaintiff's complaint is unclear and unintelligible. After multiple passes of Defendant's briefs, this Court parsed together Defendant's initial motion to dismiss and reply brief in support thereof to determine Defendant filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for a retaliation claim and failure to state a prima facie retaliation claim.

a. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

This Court interprets Defendant's motion to dismiss and reply brief in support thereof in conjunction to ascertain Defendant's theory. That apparently being that because Plaintiff fails toshow injury in fact, Plaintiff lacks standing. Defendant contends that due to Plaintiff's primary reliance on inferential connections to establish causation and a lack of redressability for requesting relief, inter alia, of a reinvestigation of three individuals not party to this suit, Plaintiff's complaint warrants dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. No. 15, Motion at 11-12, Doc. No. 26, Reply at 3. Defendant's argument is not persuasive.

i. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Complaints are subject to a motion to dismiss where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff carries the burden of proof of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996). To satisfy subject matter jurisdiction pleading standards, the Ninth Circuit succinctly explains:

"To invoke a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff needs to provide only 'a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). The plaintiff must allege facts, not mere legal conclusions, in compliance with the pleading standards established by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)."

Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

A defendant may challenge subject matter jurisdiction in one of two ways: through a "facial attack" or a "factual attack." Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegation to invoke federal jurisdiction whereas a factual attack challenges the truth of the allegations. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014); Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, Defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleading since, in the complaint, the "only...adverse action taken following the inquiry...was against the supervisor, not Plaintiff." Doc. No. 26, Reply at 3. More precisely, "Plaintiff lacks standing to sue for retaliation." Doc. No. 26, Reply at 4.

The district court resolves a facial challenge as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismissand is limited to considering the allegations in the complaint. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). Pro se plaintiffs' complaints are construed liberally and all reasonable inferences are drawn in their favor. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).

ii. Authority

District courts have original subject matter jurisdiction in civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action under Title VII - one for disparate treatment and one for retaliation. Title 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) authorizes District Courts' jurisdiction for enforcing Title VII.

iii. Standing

A plaintiff establishes standing by demonstrating a "concrete and particularized" injury, "fairly traceable" to the discriminatory policy, that is "likely" to be "redressed by a favorable decision" of this court. Breiner v. Nevada Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); see also San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). As discussed supra Plaintiff has made a facial challenge to the sufficiency of Defendant's complaint to prove standing. Again, the district court resolves a facial challenge as it would a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and is limited to considering the allegations in the complaint. All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the Plaintiff.

A concrete and particularized injury is established by showing an invasion of a legally protected interest. Bras v. California Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1995). As discussed, Plaintiff alleges exposure to a concrete injury by suffering adverse employment actions. Plaintiff's complaint alleges specific instances of harm, namely that he received a poor performance evaluation, his position at DOT was transferred to San Luis Obispo, and he wassubject to actions "design[ed] to deter other minority employees from engaging in federally protected activities." Doc. No. 1, Compl. at ¶¶ 25, 28, 41.

Injury is fairly traceable when there is a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged action and the injury is not the result of third party intervention. Bras v. California Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1995). The adverse employment actions that Plaintiff challenges...