Sharbaugh v. Beaudry

• Decision Date: 14 July 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:16cv126–MCR–EMT
• Citation: 267 F.Supp.3d 1326
• Parties: Russell K. SHARBAUGH, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Ricky Dean Martin, Plaintiff, v. John C. BEAUDRY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

267 F.Supp.3d 1326

Russell K. SHARBAUGH, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Ricky Dean Martin, Plaintiff,

v.John C. BEAUDRY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:16cv126–MCR–EMT

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division.

Signed July 14, 2017

Devon M. Jacob, Jacob Litigation, Mechanicsburg, PA, for Plaintiff.

James Andrew Talbert, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., John Fares Asmar, Law Office of John F. Asmar, Michelle Lynn Hendrix, Vernis & Bowling of Northwest Florida, P.A., Elizabeth Nicole Palmer, Wade Palmer & Shoemaker P.A., Pensacola, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

M. CASEY RODGERS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this civil rights suit, Plaintiff Russell Sharbaugh ("Sharbaugh"), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ricky Dean Martin, alleges that Ricky Dean Martin was brutally beaten, raped, and murdered by his cellmate while serving a state prison sentence. Sharbaugh claims that the attack resulted from the deliberate indifference of the Defendants (prison officials and supervisors) to the known substantial risk of harm Martin faced from the cellmate, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.¹ See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sharbaugh seeks damages for Martin's emotional and physical torture, injury, and trauma; immense pain and suffering; humiliation; terror; and death ("hedonic damages").²

Pending are Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c) on the ground that in this case, noneconomic damages are not available as a matter of law on Sharbaugh's § 1983 claim because Martin died as a result of the alleged constitutional violation.³ Defendants argue that because § 1983 does not speak to damages or the survival of a cause of action after death, it is "deficient" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and therefore, pursuant to § 1988, the Court must look to state law and award damages consistent with Florida's Wrongful Death Act ("FWDA"), Fla. Stat. §§ 768.16 – 768.26, which does not permit recovery for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering.⁴ Sharbaugh opposes the motions, arguing that, because the FWDA precludes a claim for the decedent's pain and suffering, it is inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983 and should not govern the damages award in this case. After an exhaustive review of the matter, the Court concludes that the FWDA, which fills a gap in § 1983 by allowing for the survival of Martin's cause of action against Defendants but precluding a claim for decedent's pain and suffering, is not inconsistent with the policies underlying federal law. Defendants' motions will be granted.

I. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim is considered under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B) (providing that failure to state a claim can be raised by a motion under Rule 12(c) ); see also 316, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co. , 625 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1181 (N.D. Fla. 2008). Thus, the Court considers whether the plaintiff has pled a plausible claim, "accepting the facts in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Horsley v. Feldt , 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2002) ; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (stating the plausibility standard).

II. Discussion

A. Sections 1983 & 1988

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for injuries caused by official actions taken under color of state law in deprivation of a person's constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has characterized § 1983 as creating " ‘a species of tort liability’ in favor of persons who are deprived" of their rights under the Constitution. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura , 477 U.S. 299, 305–06, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (quoting Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) ). As one of the "Reconstruction civil rights statutes," § 1983 is given "a sweep as broad as [its] language." Robertson v. Wegmann , 436 U.S. 584, 590, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge , 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) ).

The exercise of jurisdiction under § 1983 and the means of enforcing its mandate are set out in § 1988, which provides:

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by [the civil rights laws] ... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with [federal laws], so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but, in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause....

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Section 1988 recognizes that in certain respects, the civil rights statutes are "unsuited or insufficient to furnish suitable remedies," 42 U.S.C. § 1988, because "federal law simply does not cover every issue that may arise in the context of a federal civil rights action." Robertson , 436 U.S. at 588, 98 S.Ct. 1955. Thus, to fully carry the civil rights statutes into effect, § 1988 requires courts to conduct a three-step inquiry to determine "the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims." Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 267, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds); see also Estate of Gilliam v. City of Prattville , 639 F.3d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 2011). First, courts look to federal law, and consider whether it is "suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect." Estate of Gilliam , 639 F.3d at 1045 (citing § 1988 ) (alteration in original). Second, if federal law is not "adapted to the object" or is "deficient" in providing suitable remedies, courts must apply common law, as modified by state law. Id. (quoting § 1988 ). Third, if state law is required to fill a gap in federal law, courts also must consider whether applying the state law would be "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States," and if so, the state law is not to be applied, because the federal interest predominates. Id. (quoting § 1988 ); see also Wilson , 471 U.S. at 267, 105 S.Ct. 1938.

To determine whether federal law is suitable to carry the civil rights statutes into effect and, if not, whether the applicable state law is inconsistent with federal law, courts must consider not only the text of the federal statute, which in this case is § 1983, but also its underlying policies and principles. See Robertson , 436 U.S. at 590, 98 S.Ct. 1991 ; see also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. , 396 U.S. 229, 240, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969). In Robertson , the Supreme Court described the congressional policies underlying § 1983 as twofold—(1) to provide compensation to the injured person and (2) to deter abuses of power by state actors. See Robertson , 436 U.S. at 590, 98 S.Ct. 1991. To fulfill these goals, compensation under § 1983 must be "tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question" and must be sufficient "to accord meaningful compensation." Carey , 435 U.S. at 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042. In turn, by awarding appropriate compensation, courts necessarily satisfy Congress's second goal of deterrence. "[T]here is no evidence that [Congress] meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages." Id. at 256, 98 S.Ct. 1042 ; see also Stachura , 477 U.S. at 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537 ("Deterrence is also an important purpose of this system, but it operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory—damages grounded in determinations of plaintiffs' actual losses.").

Clearly, § 1983 was intended to hold state actors liable when their unconstitutional actions result in death.⁵ See Brazier v. Cherry , 293 F.2d 401, 404–05 (5th Cir. 1961),⁶ cert. denied , 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 243, 7 L.Ed.2d 136 (1961). However, as discussed infra , neither the common law nor § 1983 specifies a measure of damages to apply when death results from a constitutional deprivation. See Moor v. Alameda Cty. , 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Because the issue of damages in this case is so closely linked to the survival of Martin's personal injury claim, the Court finds that a full discussion of both damages and survival is necessary, even though the parties do not dispute that § 1983 is "deficient" as to whether Martin's § 1983 claim generally survives his death.

The Supreme Court has explained that at the time § 1983 was enacted in 1871, members of Congress, many of whom were lawyers, were undoubtedly familiar with the then-existing compensation principles of general tort law and clearly understood that by holding state actors liable in a civil suit for injuries to persons, they were incorporating into the Civil Rights Act "the principle that damages are designed to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of rights."⁷ See Carey , 435 U.S. at 254–57, 98 S.Ct. 1042 ; see also Stachura , 477 U.S. at 307, 106 S.Ct. 2537 ("Congress adopted this common-law system of recovery when it established liability for ‘constitutional torts.’ "). The Supreme Court has also explained that...