Sharkey Issaquena Cmty. Hosp. v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 17 December 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 2014-IA-00465-SCT,2014-IA-00465-SCT
• Citation: Sharkey Issaquena Cmty. Hosp. v. Anderson, NO. 2014-IA-00465-SCT (Miss. Dec 17, 2015)
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SHARKEY ISSAQUENA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL v. ALAN ANDERSON AND LINDA ANDERSON

SHARKEY ISSAQUENA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL v. ALAN ANDERSON AND LINDA ANDERSON

NO. 2014-IA-00465-SCT

SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

December 17, 2015

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/19/2014

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. M. JAMES CHANEY, JR.

TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: CLIFFORD C. WHITNEY, III R. E. PARKER, JR. JOEL S. GATLIN, III

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SHARKEY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CLIFFORD C. WHITNEY, III R. E. PARKER, JR.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: WILLIAM W. FULGHAM OMAR LAMONT NELSON

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 12/17/2015

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR AND KITCHENS, JJ.

KITCHENS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Alan and Linda Anderson filed a medical malpractice action against Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital but failed to designate an expert timely in accordance with the scheduling order imposed by the Circuit Court of Sharkey County. Out of time, the Andersons filed their expert designation, along with a motion for continuance. The hospital moved to strike the expert designation and moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted a continuance to the Andersons and denied both the hospital's motion to strike and its motion for summary judgment. Aggrieved, the hospital filed the instant interlocutory appeal. Finding no error in the decision of the Circuit Court of Sharkey County, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Alan and Linda Anderson (the Andersons) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Sharkey County, Mississippi, on April 19, 2013, alleging that Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital (SICH) had failed to diagnose Alan Anderson's stroke timely when he presented to the hospital's emergency room on September 23, 2011. The Andersons alleged that the hospital breached the applicable standard of care by discharging Alan Anderson, despite his having presented to the hospital with symptoms indicating stroke, and instructing him to consult his primary care physician within three or four days, which resulted in a stroke and "greatly increased deficits in his function, loss of enjoyment of life, medical costs, pain, suffering and other damages . . . ." SICH filed its answer and affirmative defenses on July 25, 2013. The parties agreed to, and the trial court entered, a scheduling order, which set the following deadlines:

1. That counsel shall complete all discovery no later than February 3, 2014.

2. That counsel shall serve all motions to join additional parties no later than September 28, 2013.

3. That all the Plaintiff experts shall be designated on or before November 30, 2013.

4. That all the Defense experts shall be designated on or before December 31, 2013.

5. That all motions, with the exception of the in limine motions shall be served on or before February 3, 2014.

6. The parties shall file a joint pretrial order on February 17, 2014. Plaintiff will submit his section of the Pretrial Order no later than February 7, 2014 and Defendants will submit their portion of the Pretrial Order no later than February 12, 2014.

(Emphases in original.) The trial court set the trial for March 3, 2014.

¶3. Despite the Andersons' failure to file a designation of experts, SICH filed its own expert designation, along with the credentials of its proposed experts, on January 2, 2014. On February 5, 2014, the Andersons filed a motion for continuance and for relief from the scheduling order, stating that "[i]n the prior six months, significant discovery has occurred including the deposition of the Plaintiff and responses to written discovery" and that "Plaintiff has in good faith engaged in significant discovery in the past six months, but that more discovery needs to be done in order to prepare the case for trial." With their motion for continuance, the Andersons filed their expert designation. That same day, SICH filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Andersons' failure to designate an expert witness on or before the appointed date in the scheduling order entitled it to summary judgment because, in the absence of an expert witness, the Andersons "cannot prove their claims as a matter of law."

¶4. Two days later, on February 7, 2014, SICH filed an opposition to the motion for continuance and a motion to strike the Andersons' expert designation. SICH claimed that the Andersons had been dilatory in pursuing discovery and that SICH was "prejudiced by the three months late" expert disclosure. According to SICH, "Defendant's experts did not have the designation . . . available to them in preparing their opinions in this case . . . ." SICH claimed that the late disclosure made it impossible for it to prepare for the trial date set in thescheduling order. The trial court heard SICH's motion for summary judgment, its motion to strike expert designation, and the Andersons' motion for continuance on February 14, 2014.

¶5. The trial court granted the Andersons' motion for continuance and denied both SICH's motion to strike expert designation and its motion for summary judgment, holding that the denial of summary judgment was "without prejudice to its being renewed at a later date." The trial court, in granting the motion for continuance, continued the trial "to a date to be determined" and gave the plaintiffs "until and including March 14, 2014,¹ in which to fully respond to all discovery submitted by the Defendant, and to supplement or designate experts." The trial court ruled that the Andersons "shall not take any further discovery in this case." Further, the trial court gave SICH "until April 18, 2014 to take additional discovery and to supplement its expert designations. The court then ordered the parties to confer and to "obtain a new trial date from the Court Administrator."

¶6. SICH timely filed a petition for interlocutory appeal on April 14, 2014, which this Court granted on May 22, 2014. It raised the following issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Andersons' motion for continuance.

II. Whether the trial court erred by denying SICH's motion to strike.

III. Whether the Andersons' failure to file an expert affidavit in accordance with the original scheduling order resulted in an entitlement of SICH to summary judgment.

Each issue is addressed in turn.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. We review the trial court's grant of the Andersons' motion for continuance for abuse of discretion: "'[t]he granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse.'" Peden v. City of Gautier, 870 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Miss. 2001)). Further, "[a] trial court has an inherent right to control its docket and is afforded 'reasonable latitude' regarding the setting and continuance of cases." Watts v. Pennington, 598 So. 2d 1308, 1312 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Liberty Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Mitchell, 398 So. 2d 208, 210 (Miss. 1981)). With regard to the trial court's ruling on SICH's motion to strike, "the trial court has 'considerable discretion' in ruling on discovery matters, and . . . this Court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion." Douglas v. Burley, 134 So. 3d 692, 697 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Venton v. Beckham, 845 So. 2d 676, 684 (Miss. 2003)).

¶8. "When reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment, this Court applies a de novo standard of review." Anderson v. Alps Auto., Inc., 51 So. 3d 929, 931 (Miss. 2010) (citing Crawford Logging, Inc. v. Estate of Irving, 41 So. 3d 687, 689 (Miss. 2010)). Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, showthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Andersons' motion for continuance.

¶9. SICH argues that the trial court committed reversible error by granting the Andersons' motion for continuance because that court failed to recognize that the motion was a responsive filing under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) to SICH's Rule 56(c) summary judgment motion.

¶10. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(f). But nothing in the record indicates that the Andersons' motion for continuance was filed pursuant to Rule 56(f), or that it was filed in response to SICH's motion for summary judgment. In fact, the motion for continuance attested that "[p]laintiff has in good faith engaged in significant discovery in the past six months, but that more discovery needs to be done in order to prepare the case for trial." (Emphasis added.)

¶11. This Court has held that "[a] trial court has the authority and indeed a duty to maintain control of the docket and ensure efficient disposal of court business." Venton v. Beckham, 845 So. 2d 676, 684 (Miss. 2003) (citing Harris v. Fort Worth Steel & Mach. Co., 440 So. 2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1983)). That said, the trial court is "afforded 'reasonable latitude'regarding the setting and continuance of cases." Watts, 598 So. 2d at 1312 (quoting Mitchell, 398 So. 2d at 210). In the context of a motion for continuance, this Court is to reverse only if "manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial . . . ." Peden, 870 So. 2d at 1188 (quoting Morgan, 786 So. 2d at 1045) (emphasis added).

¶12. Despite the fact that "[t]he granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the...