Sharon v. Hill

• Decision Date: 16 October 1884
• Citation: 22 F. 28
• Court: United States Circuit Court, District of California
• Parties: SHARON v. HILL.

22 F. 28

SHARON v. HILL.

United States Circuit Court, D. California.

October 16, 1884

W. H L. Barnes, for complainant.

Tyler &amp Tyler, for defendant.

SAWYER J., (orally.)

There is but one thing to do in this case, and that is to overrule the plea. There are, in fact, two pleas: one is that another suit is pending in a state court for the same cause of suit the other is that the complainant, Sharon, is a citizen of the state of California, of which state the defendant is also a citizen, and therefore that this court has no jurisdiction in the case. If the complainant had objected to the plea on account of duplicity and multifariousness, and set it down for argument instead of replying, the court would have been obliged to overrule it on that ground. But one plea can be set up in equity without express leave of the court. Story Eq. Pl. Secs. 653, 654; 2 Daniell, Ch.Pr. 681, 682, (Perkins' Ed.) The plea is bad on that ground. The plaintiff's counsel did not see fit to set it down for argument on that ground, and the objection is perhaps waived.

Admitting the facts as alleged in the plea, of another suit pending, to be true, the plea must be held bad because the two causes of suit are not identical. The suit in the state court is for a divorce and a division of the community property. The suit in this court is for a decree declaring the written instrument set out and claimed to be a contract of marriage, made in pursuance of section 75 of the Civil Code of California, to be fraudulent and void; for canceling it on that ground; and for a perpetual injunction restraining defendant from claiming any rights under it. It is true, the same principal issue will arise in both cases, but the bills of complaint in the respective suits call and pray for entirely different and inconsistent relief. They are, therefore, not the same cause of suit; nor is the relief sought in the two suits by the same party. The first plea is bad, in substance, on that ground. 2 Daniell, Ch.Pr. 720, 721. The whole effect sought in the second suit could not be had in the first, nor by the same party. A cross-bill, at least, would be necessary, which would, in effect, be another suit. The suit in the state court for divorce and a division of the community property rests, for cause of suit, upon an alleged valid and subsisting contract. It can be maintained on no other theory. The complainant seeks to enforce the contract up to the present moment, by claiming a decree for her half of the common property under it; and then to have the contract dissolved, as to the future, upon matters arising subsequently to the making of the contract; while the cause of suit in this court is a forgery in making, and fraud in setting up, a contract alleged to have never been entered into. It is sought to have the pretended contract decreed to be void ab initio, as a forgery and a fraud. An alleged valid and subsisting contract is, therefore, the basis and cause of one suit; and forgery and fraud, the basis and cause upon which the other rests. These, certainly, do not constitute the same causes of suit. The causes of suit are clearly not identical. It is also bad on another ground: that the suit set up is not pending in a court of the same jurisdiction. Id. It is well settled by the supreme court of the...