Sharon v. Terry

• Decision Date: 03 September 1888
• Citation: 36 F. 337
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: SHARON v. TERRY et al. NEWLANDS et al. v. SAME.

36 F. 337

SHARON v. TERRY et al.

NEWLANDS et al. v. SAME.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. California.

September 3, 1888

Syllabus by the Court

Upon proceedings to revive a suit in equity, abated by the death of the complainant, for the purpose of executing a final decree which has been rendered in such suit, no objections can be taken which could have been urged when the original bill was pending, except want of jurisdiction, apparent upon the record. An attack upon a judgment or decree in a proceeding to revive it is a collateral attack, and can only avail when there is a want of jurisdiction, either of the parties or of the subject-matter.

The circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction to cancel a written contract of marriage on the ground of its forgery. Such contract, if genuine, and followed by the requisite consummation, imposes upon the husband from its date the obligation to support the wife, and confers upon the wife certain rights in his property, and such obligation and rights measure the sum or value of the matter in dispute in a suit to cancel such written contract, within the meaning of the acts of congress requiring a certain value to such matter in order to give the circuit courts of the United States jurisdiction. Where the controversy is not respecting the amount or value in dispute, such amount or value, when necessary to the jurisdiction, may be shown by the evidence produced in the case, or by affidavits filed when the question of jurisdiction is raised.

The right of action to cancel a marriage contract, which, if genuine, and followed by the requisite consummation as mentioned above, would create rights in the property of the alleged husband, survives to his executor or administrator.

The transfer of the property of the plaintiff in a suit to cancel a forged marriage contract while such suit is pending does not abate it, if the plaintiff retain a right during his life to claim the rents and profits thereof, and the purchasers or beneficiaries under such transfer are entitled to the benefit of the decree rendered in such suit canceling the contract to protect the property from claims made under or by virtue of it.

Where the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States has attached in a suit brought by a citizen of a state other than that in which the court is held, the right of the plaintiff to prosecute his suit in such court to a final determination there cannot be arrested, defeated, or impaired by any subsequent action or proceeding of the defendant respecting the same subject-matter in a state court.

Where different courts may entertain jurisdiction of the same subject, the court which first obtains jurisdiction will with some well-recognized exceptions retain it to the end of the controversy either to the entire exclusion of the other or to the exclusion so far as to render the latter's decision subordinate to that of the court first obtaining jurisdiction, and it is immaterial which court renders the first judgment or decree.

The exceptions to the rule that priority of jurisdiction controls priority of decision are-- First, where the same plaintiff has asked, in different suits, a determination of the same matter; and, second, where the cases are upon contracts or obligations, which from their nature are merged in the judgment rendered, the subject upon which the first suit is founded having thus ceased to exist.

The decree of a circuit court of the United States, canceling a forged marriage contract, may be used to stay the enforcement of judgments for property rights recovered upon such contract in a subsequent suit in a state court.

Section 720, Rev. St., prohibiting injunctions by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in a state court, does not apply where the federal court has first obtained jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the proceedings and of the parties in the state court. This section must be construed in connection with section 716, Rev. St., which provides that the federal courts shall have power to issue all writs which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

Before FIELD, Circuit Justice, SAWYER, Circuit Judge, and SABIN District Judge.

In Equity. On demurrer.

Bill of revivor by Frederick W. Sharon, executor, against David S Terry and Sarah Althea Terry, his wife, and bill in the nature of revivor and supplement, and to carry decree into execution, by Francis G. Newlands, trustee, against the same. These cases are brought to revive and carry into execution a final decree of this court in the suit of William Sharon v. Sarah Althea Hill, entered as of the 29th day of September, 1885. On the 3d day of October, 1883, William Sharon, a citizen of the state of Nevada, since deceased, instituted, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of California, a suit in equity against Sarah Althea Hill, now Sarah Althea Terry, to obtain its decree adjudging a certain paper in her possession, purporting to be a declaration of marriage between them, to be a forgery, and enjoining its use, and directing its cancellation. In his complaint, after stating his citizenship in Nevada, and the citizenship of the defendant in California, he sets forth, in substance, this: That he was, and had been for some years, an unmarried man; that formerly he was the husband of Maria Ann Sharon, who died in May, 1875, and that he had never been the husband of any other person; that there were two children living, the issue of that marriage, and also grandchildren, the children of a deceased daughter of the marriage; that he was possessed of a large fortune in real and personal property, was extensively engaged in business enterprises and ventures, and had a wide business and social connection; that, as he was informed, the defendant was an unmarried woman, of about 30 years of age, for some time a resident of San Francisco; that within two months then past she had repeatedly and publicly claimed and represented, and then declared and represented, that she was his lawful wife; that she falsely and fraudulently pretended that she was duly married to him on the 25th day of August, 1880, at the city and county of San Francisco; that on that day they had jointly made a declaration of marriage, showing the names, ages, and residences of the parties, jointly doing the acts required by section 75 of the Civil Code of California to constitute a marriage between them; and that thereby they became and were husband and wife according to the law of that state.

The complainant further alleged that these several claims, representations, and pretensions were wholly and maliciously false, and were made by her for the purpose of injuring him in his property, business, and social relations; for the purpose of obtaining credit by the use of his name with merchants and others, and thereby compelling him to maintain her; and for the purpose of harassing him, and, in case of his death, his heirs and next of kin and legatees, into payment of large sums of money to quiet her false and fraudulent claims and pretensions. He also set forth what he was informed was a copy of the declaration of marriage, and alleged that if she had any such instrument it was 'false, forged, and counterfeited;' that he never, on the day of its date or at any other time, made or executed such document or declaration, and never knew or heard of the same until within a month previous to that time, and that the same was null and void as against him, and ought in equity and good conscience to be so declared, and ordered to be delivered up, to be annulled and canceled.

The complaint concluded with a prayer that it be adjudged and decreed that the said Sarah Althea Hill was not, and never had been, the wife of the complainant; that he did not make the said joint declaration of marriage, or any marriage between them, and that she be perpetually enjoined and restrained from making said allegations, representations, and pretensions of marriage with him; that said contract or joint declaration of marriage be decreed and adjudged to be 'false, fraudulent, forged, and counterfeited,' and ordered to be delivered up, to be canceled and annulled, according to the practice of courts of equity in like cases; and that he might have such other and further relief as the nature and justice of the case might require. The complaint was verified in the usual form by his oath. It was filed, as stated above, October 3, 1883, and on the same day a subpoena was issued thereon, which was personally served by the marshal on the defendant, at San Francisco, two days afterwards,-- October 5th. On the 3d of December following the defendant appeared in the suit by solicitors, giving her name as Sarah Althea Sharon, and demurred to the complaint on the alleged ground that it did not contain any matter of equity whereon the court could make any decree or give the complainant any relief against her. The demurrer was argued at the ensuing February term in 1884, and overruled, with leave to the defendant to answer by the next rule-day on the usual terms. ^[1] The case, as presented, was held to be a proper one for equitable relief. 'This supposed contract,' said the court, 'is alleged to be a forgery, and to be fraudulent. It purports to be in writing, and to be signed by the parties; and the defendant claims by virtue of it to be the wife of complainant, and to have an interest in his property, which is alleged to be of the value of several millions of dollars. There is no adequate remedy at law for complainant against the claim set up under the alleged contract, and no means at law to annul it at the suit of complainant. The defendant can...