Sharp v. Best Buy Co.
Decision Date | 10 April 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13CV-00166-GNS-HBB |
Parties | ROBERT A. SHARP, JR. PLAINTIFF v. BEST BUY CO., INC. DEFENDANT |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Best Buy Co., Inc. ("Best Buy") (DN 17). Because the time to file a response has passed, this matter is ripe for a decision. For the reasons outlined below, the motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Robert A. Sharp, Jr. ("Sharp") was employed by Defendant Best Buy Co., Inc. ("Best Buy") in its Bowling Green, Kentucky, store as an auto technician in the vehicle install bay. (Sharp Dep. 41:18-20, Sept. 23, 2014, DN 17-2). While the position was initially part-time, Sharp eventually went to full-time status and was later promoted to the position of lead auto technician, which he held until the time of his termination. (Sharp Dep. 41:23-42:3, 42:16-18, 44:8-12). As an employee of Best Buy, Sharp was familiar with Best Buy's zero-tolerance sexual harassment policy and knew that engaging in sexual harassment was grounds for termination. (Sharp Dep. 169:11-22).
The record reflects that Sharp had been diagnosed as having narcolepsy and cataplexy. (Sharp Dep. 67:7-17). During his employment, Sharp presented a note dated June 14, 2012, from his treating physician requesting that Best Buy accommodate Sharp's disability by avoidingshift work. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C, DN 17-4; Sharp Dep. 73:17-74:10). With the exception of one scheduling mistake, the uncontroverted record reflects that Best Buy provided the requested accommodation. (Sharp Dep. 73:8-16).
On June 13, 2013, Best Buy first became aware of alleged sexual harassment by Sharp when fellow employee Chloe Cesler ("Cesler") made a verbal complaint to a person named Monique1 on the Human Resources Hotline. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J, Ex. G at 2, DN 17-8; Sharp Dep. 154:12-155:1; Crossland Decl. ¶ 5, DN 17-3). To follow up her verbal report, Cesler e-mailed Monique with additional details regarding incidents of sexual harassment perpetrated by Sharp, which included:
In her e-mail message, Cesler noted that many of those events had been observed by co-workers and that she was aware that other female employees had been subject to sexual harassment by Sharp. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. G at 2, DN 17-8).
Monique investigated Cesler's complaint over a period of several weeks. (Crossland Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, DN 17-3). During the investigation, Monique spoke with other Best Buy employees or obtained written statements from them regarding Sharp's workplace misconduct. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. H at 2-26, DN 17-9). Besides confirming Cesler's complaint, the co-workers conveyed information about other incidents of sexual harassment, which included:
As a result of its investigation, Best Buy determined that Sharp's conduct violated its sexual harassment policy. (Crossland Decl. ¶ 9). On July 26, 2013, Thomas Crossland, the store's General Manager, terminated Sharp's employment. (Crossland Decl. ¶ 9; Sharp Dep. 44:13-14).
Sharp filed this lawsuit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12117; and KRS 207.150 and KRS 207.170, which are provisions of Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act ("KEOA"). (Compl. ¶¶ 17-22, DN 1). The deadline for discovery has passed, and Best Buy has moved for summary judgment. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., DN 17). Sharp did not respond to the motion.2
This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of Sharp's ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's pendent state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether there is any genuine issue of any material fact that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden stating the basis for the motion and identifying evidence in the record that demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving party must the produce specific evidence proving the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more than merely show the existence of some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must present specific facts proving that a genuine factual issue exists by "citing to particular parts of the materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
In its motion, Best Buy argues that summary judgment is warranted on all of Plaintiff's claims. Each claim is separately addressed below.
In the Complaint, Sharp asserts that Best Buy terminated him because of his disability in violation of the federal and state law.3 (Co...
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