Sharp v. Com.

• Decision Date: 09 October 1972
• Parties: Dennis Joe SHARP v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 217

192 S.E.2d 217

213 Va. 269

Dennis Joe SHARP v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Oct. 9, 1972.

Robert T. Hall, Fairfax (Hall & Jackson, Fairfax on brief), for plaintiff in error.

Gilbert W. Haith, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Andrew P. Miller, Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendant in error.

Before SNEAD, C.J., and I'ANSON, CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, and HARMAN, JJ.

SNEAD, Chief Justice.

Armed with a search warrant, police officers entered premises occupied by Dennis Joe Sharp, defendant, in Fairfax County, and found under his bed two and one-half bricks of marijuana weighing a total of 1,447 grams, seventeen 'baggies' of marijuana weighing a total of 257.4 grams, a phial of marijuana and a pipe with charred marijuana in the bowl.

On November 16, 1970 Sharp was indicted for possession of marijuana, a controlled drug, with intent to distribute it, in violation of § 54--524.101(a), Code of 1950, as amended. A jury trial resulted in a verdict of guilty and defendant's punishment was fixed at three years confinement in the State Penitentiary and the payment of a fine of $3,000. On April 2, 1971 judgment was entered on the verdict, and we granted defendant a writ of error limited to the assignment of error alleging that the court erred in giving Instruction No. 5, which follows:

'The Court instructs the jury that a conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute may be based Solely upon evidence as to the quantity of such marijuana unlawfully possessed.' (Emphasis added.)

The instruction was based upon § 54--524.101(a), ¹ which provided:

'Except as authorized by this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally:

'(1) To distribute, or to possess with intent to distribute, a controlled drug;

'(2) To manufacture a controlled drug.

'A conviction for a violation of this § 54--524.101(a) may be based solely upon evidence as to the quantity of any controlled drug or drugs unlawfully possessed.'

The defendant contends here, as he did in the court below, that the subsidiary statutory provision which authorized a conviction based solely on evidence as to quantity was void because it was unconstitutionally vague, uncertain and ambiguous, providing no standards for determining guilt, and it created an arbitrary presumption having no rational connection with the facts and circumstances.

On the other hand, the Commonwealth maintains that the statutory provision was a constitutionally valid rule of evidence, that it created a rational rebuttable presumption, and that it was clear and unambiguous.

We are of opinion that the defendant's contentions are well-founded. We have often said that a penal statute must be definite and certain to be valid, and it denies due process of law if it is vague or ambiguous. Hancock v. Brown, Director, 212 Va. 215, 218, 183 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1971). In Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 458, 94 S.E.2d 537, 540 (1956) we said:

'It is elementary that an act creating a statutory offense, to be valid, must specify with reasonable certainty and definiteness the conduct which is commanded or prohibited, that is, what must be done or avoided, so that a person of ordinary intelligence may know what is thereby required of him . . .. The enactment should define the acts to be done or not to be done which constitute such offense with such certainty that a person may determine whether or not he has violated the law at the time he does or fails to do the act, which is charged to be a violation thereof . . .. Unless an act creating a statutory offense satisfies this requirement of certainty and definiteness it violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Virginia Constitution.'

Under the subsidiary provision of the statute, a person of ordinary intelligence in possession of a quantity of marijuana could not with reasonable certainty know whether he was guilty of the misdemeanor of mere possession or the felony of possession with intent to distribute.

We are further of opinion that the statutory inference or presumption of possession with intent to distribute did not have sufficient rational connection with the fact of possession of a quantity of a controlled...