Sharp v. State, 27154.

• Citation: 215 Ind. 505,19 N.E.2d 942
• Decision Date: 29 March 1939
• Docket Number: No. 27154.,27154.
• Parties: SHARP v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

215 Ind. 505
19 N.E.2d 942

SHARP
v.
STATE.

No. 27154.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 29, 1939.

Joseph E. Sharp was convicted of abortion, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

[19 N.E.2d 942]

Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; Frank P. Baker, judge.
Todd & McCarmack, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

O. S. Jackson, Atty. Gen., and james K. Northam and Hubert E. Dirks, Deputy Attys. Gen., for the State.

[19 N.E.2d 943]

FANSLER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction of the crime of abortion.

Error is assigned upon the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial.

It is contended that the court erred in permitting a medical witness, who had testified as an expert, to be cross-examined upon the question of whether or not septicemia might be produced by a certain type of injury when there was no evidence that the victim had such an injury. There is no merit in the contention. It was proper for the court to allow a reasonable latitude in the examination for the purpose of testing the knowledge of the witness if for no other purpose.

Complaint is made of several hypothetical questions upon the ground that the questions assumed facts that were not proved and did not contain facts which were undisputed in the evidence. No good purpose will be served by setting out these lengthy questions and all of the evidence. It is sufficient to say that the questions conformed to the State's theory, which it contended was supported by the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, and therefore there was no error in permitting the questions.

It is contended that the evidence is insufficient for the reason that the corpus delicti was not proved. This is upon the theory that there is no evidence that the result was effected by the acts of the defendant. There is no direct evidence upon this point. The appellant contends that the establishment of the fact must depend upon an inference based upon an inference, and that such a procedure is not permitted. See Orey v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 1939, Ind.Sup., 19 N.E.2d 547.

There was evidence that the subject was cleaning house and seemed in good health on the day she called at the defendant's office; that she went down town on a street car; that she told the defendant she was pregnant, and had four children living and one dead; and that she did not want another child; that he asked her about her heart and the length of pregnancy, and that she replied that her heart was all right; that she had been pregnant five or six...