Sharpe v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 13-319 C,13-319 C
• Parties: IAN OWEN SHARPE et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

IAN OWEN SHARPE et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 13-319 C

United States Court of Federal Claims

Filed: September 4, 2013

Motion for Reconsideration; Pro Se Plaintiffs; Frivolous Claims; Sanctions Warranted

Ian Owen Sharpe, Gregory R. Young and Michael Troy Olson, Marianna, FL, pro se.

Veronica N. Onyema, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION

HEWITT, Chief Judge

I. Background

Plaintiffs are inmates at the Federal Correctional Institution in Marianna, Florida. See generally Allegation of Fed. Constitutional Question Jurisdiction (Compl.) (Complaint or Compl.), Docket Number (Dkt. No.) 1 (listing "[Federal Correctional Institution] Marianna" as plaintiffs' address). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this court "challeng[ing] the Constitutional Enactment validity" of federal bill H.R. 3190 (the bill), which was passed in 1948 as Pub. L. No. 80-772 and codified as amended in title 18 of the United States Code, governing crimes and criminal procedure. See id. at 1-2. Specifically, plaintiffs' Complaint claimed that the bill "was never passed Constitutionally by the House of Representatives," was never "certified as 'truly enrolled' by" officials eligible to sign the bill into law, was "never voted upon by . . . Congress," and was, therefore, "mistakenly signed by" President Harry Truman. Id. at 1 (emphasis and some capitalization omitted). Plaintiffs alleged that the "impermissible application of [this] unconstitutional statute . . . continues [to] depriv[e] the Plaintiffs ofdue process, life, liberty, and property interests and defrauds the [United States Department of the] Treasury." Id. (emphasis omitted).

"[B]ecause the Complaint [did] not address any matter within the jurisdiction of the court," the court dismissed the Complaint sua sponte. Order of May 21, 2013, Dkt. No. 8, at 1. This case was closed on May 22, 2013. See generally J., Dkt. No. 9 (entering judgment for defendant and dismissing the Complaint). Since then, plaintiffs have submitted a number of documents to the court, most of which have been returned unfiled. See, e.g., Order of May 30, 2013, Dkt. No. 10, at 1; Order of June 5, 2013, Dkt. No. 11, at 1; Order of June 27, 2013, Dkt. No. 14, at 2-4; Order of July 31, 2013, Dkt. No. 17, at 2 (returning documents unfiled).

Now before the court are plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Transfer to Cure Want of Jurisdiction (plaintiffs' Motion or Pls.' Mot.), Dkt. No. 15, filed June 27, 2013, and Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Transfer to Cure Want of Jurisdiction (defendant's Response or Def.'s Resp.), Dkt. No. 16, filed July 15, 2013.¹

Plaintiffs also submitted a reply brief with respect to their Motion, which the court returned unfiled because "there was no provision for [its] filing" and because plaintiffs failed to include an original and two copies, as required by Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). Order of July 31, 2013, at 1-2; cf. RCFC 5.5(d)(2) (requiring "an original and 2 copies of any filing" made after the complaint). On August 12, 2013 the court received a resubmission of plaintiffs' reply brief, along with another document titled Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Nunc Pro Tunc Reply Brief to Defendants' [sic] Ordered Response (collectively, plaintiffs' reply submission). Plaintiffs' reply submission was not filed on receipt by the office of the Clerk of Court because, although this time plaintiffs included an original and two copies of their reply brief pursuant to the court's rules, cf. RCFC 5.5(d)(2), there remains no provision for the filing of such a submission,² see RCFC 59 (providing for the filing of a response to amotion for reconsideration or a motion to alter or amend a judgment "at the court's request" but containing no provision for the filing of a reply to such a motion). Accordingly, the office of the Clerk of Court SHALL RETURN, UNFILED, plaintiffs' reply submission.

Plaintiffs' Motion argues that this court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction, see Pls.' Mot. 1-6, and, in the alternative, that transfer is warranted to cure any lack of jurisdiction, id. at 7-8. Defendant responds that plaintiffs have "fail[ed] to demonstrate that they meet the standard for reconsideration" and that "transferring the case . . . would not be in the interest of justice." Def.'s Resp. 1. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.

II. Legal Standards

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to RCFC 59, the court may grant a motion for reconsideration "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court" or "for any reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court." RCFC 59(a)(1)(A)-(B). The court may also grant a motion for reconsideration "upon the showing of satisfactory evidence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been done to the United States." RCFC 59(a)(1)(C). In addition, the court may open a judgment, "take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment" on a motion under RCFC 59. RCFC 59(a)(2).

The moving party must support its motion for reconsideration by a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying relief, based on "a manifest error of law or mistake of fact." Henderson Cnty. Drainage Dist. No. 3 v. United States (Henderson), 55 Fed. Cl. 334, 337 (2003) (citing Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 315, 316 (1999), aff'd, 240 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 129 (2002)); Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 157, 164 (1993) (same) (citing Weaver-Bailey Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 158, 158 (1990)), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). "Specifically, the moving party must show: (1) the occurrence of an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of previously unavailable evidence; or (3) the necessity of allowing the motion to prevent manifest injustice." Matthews v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 524, 526 (2006) (citing Griswold v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 458, 460-61 (2004)).

Where a party seeks reconsideration on the ground of manifest injustice, it cannot prevail unless it demonstrates that any injustice is "apparent to the point of being almostindisputable." Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 779, 785 (2006), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 536 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In other words, "manifest" is understood as "clearly apparent or obvious." Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 555, 557 (2002), aff'd, 384 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

"A motion for reconsideration is not intended . . . to give an 'unhappy litigant an additional chance to sway' the court." Matthews, 73 Fed. Cl. at 525 (quoting Froudi v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 290, 300 (1991)). A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to make new arguments that could have been made earlier; "an argument made for the first time in a motion for reconsideration comes too late, and is ordinarily deemed waived." Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States (Bluebonnet), 466 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Gen. Electric Co. v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 116, 118, 416 F.2d 1320, 1322 (1969) (per curiam) (stating that, in general, "requests for post-decision relief will be rejected if the [movant] has, without sufficient excuse, failed to make his point prior to the decision").

B. Transfer

When the court dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction, it has an obligation to determine whether transfer to another federal court that may have jurisdiction over the claims is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006) (stating that "the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer [a case over which it lacks jurisdiction] to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed"); Tex. Peanut Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (recognizing "the statutory requirement that transfer be considered to cure jurisdictional defects"); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 610 (defining "courts" to which transfer is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1631).

C. Authority to Order Sanctions

The court has "inherent powers enabling it to manage its cases and courtroom effectively and to ensure obedience to its orders." Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. United States (PG&E), 82 Fed. Cl. 474, 480 (2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see In re Bailey, 182 F.3d 860, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have repeatedly recognized that regulation of attorney behavior is an inherent power of any court of law and falls within the discretion of such court."). "These powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Id. at 44-45 (internal citation omitted).

The court also has authority to sanction based on Rule 11 of the RCFC.³ Rule 11 requires an attorney or unrepresented party to make certain certifications about any documents presented to the court, based on "an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances." RCFC 11(b). Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when an attorney or unrepresented party fails to act with "candor and truthfulness" in making such certifications. See PG&E, 82 Fed. Cl. at 478 n.2; cf. RCFC 11(b)-(c) (describing...