Sharpe v. Westmoreland

• Decision Date: 11 April 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 5-17-0321,5-17-0321
• Citation: 2019 IL App (5th) 170321,430 Ill.Dec. 602,126 N.E.3d 690
• Parties: Matt SHARPE, Petitioner, v. Crystal WESTMORELAND, Respondent-Appellant (Gregg Sharpe, Intervenor; Kris Fulkerson, Intervenor-Appellee).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (5th) 170321

126 N.E.3d 690

430 Ill.Dec. 602

Matt SHARPE, Petitioner,

v.Crystal WESTMORELAND, Respondent-Appellant

(Gregg Sharpe, Intervenor; Kris Fulkerson, Intervenor-Appellee).

NO. 5-17-0321

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Rule 23 order filed March 29, 2019.

Motion to publish granted April 11, 2019.

Opinion Filed April 11, 2019

Barbara L. Sherer, of Sherer Law Offices, of Edwardsville, for appellant.

Robert R. Stauffer, Clifford W. Berlow, and Sarah F. Weiss, of Jenner & Block LLP, John Knight, of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., both of Chicago, and Jayni D. Lintvedt, of Courtney Clark Law, P.C., of Belleville, for intervenor-appellee.

JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This interlocutory appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of Madison County issued on April 3, 2017, granting the petition for leave to intervene filed by Kris Fulkerson (hereinafter Kris), intervenor-appellee. In granting the petition, the court determined that Kris had standing as a stepparent under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) ( 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq . (West 2016) ) to seek visitation with and to seek parental responsibilities of her deceased partner's child, A.S. Crystal Westmoreland (hereinafter Mother), respondent-appellant, the natural mother and surviving parent of the minor child, A.S., argued that Kris did not have standing because she is not a stepparent of A.S., given that she was never legally married to A.S.'s father as required by the definition of stepparent under sections 600(l ) and 602.9(a)(3) of the Marriage Act ( 750 ILCS 5/600(l ), 602.9(a)(3) (West 2016) ). On April 20, 2017, Mother filed a motion to certify questions of law for interlocutory appeal and for stay of the trial court proceedings, citing the conflict between the language of the Marriage Act and the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act (Civil Union Act) ( 750 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 2016) ) as to whether or not, by law, a person who was joined in a civil union with a child's parent can be classified as the child's stepparent under the Marriage Act. On July 18, 2017, the circuit court entered an order staying the pending proceedings and granting Mother's motion to certify questions of law for interlocutory appeal. On August 17, 2017, Mother filed with this court an application for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017), which we granted on September 27, 2017.

¶ 2 The marriage of Mother and Matt Sharpe (hereinafter Father) was dissolved in January of 2013. As part of the dissolution, Mother and Father agreed to a joint parenting agreement with respect to their child A.S., who was then seven years old. While the parties shared equal parenting time, A.S.'s legal residence was with Father. In November of 2013, Father entered into a civil union with Kris. A.S. continued to reside with Father and now Kris and her three children. Unfortunately, Father died on January 2, 2017. After Father's death, Mother began to deny Kris visitation with A.S. even though A.S. expressed a desire to live with Kris and her children. As a result, Kris filed a petition seeking visitation rights and an allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to A.S.

¶ 3 The issues before us, as certified for interlocutory appeal, are whether a partner to a civil union as defined by the Civil Union Act has standing to request visitation with and parental responsibilities of his or her deceased partner's child as a stepparent under the Marriage Act. Questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of statutes, are to be reviewed de novo . AT & T Teleholdings, Inc. v. Department of Revenue , 2012 IL App (1st) 113053, ¶ 28, 368 Ill.Dec. 110, 983 N.E.2d 523.

¶ 4 The Civil Union Act provides persons entering into civil unions with the same obligations, responsibilities, protections, and benefits afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to those persons entering into marriages. 750 ILCS 75/5 (West 2016). The Act's passage was in part a response to the need to afford protection to same sex couples prior to the legalization of same sex marriages in Illinois, and the legislative history reflects the intent that partners joined in a civil union and married spouses generally shall share the same benefits and rights in relation to their respective mates. The equation of partners' rights and obligations in relation to each other does not necessarily equate civil union partners to married spouses in relation to children, however. Cf . 750 ILCS 5/505(a) (West 2018) (child support following dissolution of marriage or, as specifically included, civil union).

¶ 5 The Marriage Act specifically addresses in part the allocation of parental responsibilities, including establishing visitation with a minor child by an individual who is a nonparent of such child. Requirements of nonparent standing to seek visitation and parental allocation of responsibilities are designed to safeguard the superior right of a natural parent to make decisions for his or her child. See In re Custody of M.C.C. , 383 Ill. App. 3d 913, 917, 323 Ill.Dec. 100, 892 N.E.2d 1092 (2008) (Illinois law clearly recognizes the superior rights of a natural parent to the care, custody, and control of his or her child). The law presumes the natural parent's right to physical custody of his or her child is superior to that of a nonparent and that it is in the best interest of the child to be raised by natural parents. In re Custody of M.C.C. , 383 Ill. App. 3d at 917, 323 Ill.Dec. 100, 892 N.E.2d 1092. This is the reason why the Marriage Act carves out specific exceptions delineating which nonparent individuals have standing to seek to establish rights to spend time or make decisions with or for a minor child not their own.

¶ 6 A stepparent under the Marriage Act is expressly defined as someone who is or was married to the parent, immediately prior to his or her death, of the child in question. 750 ILCS 5/600(l ), 602.9(a)(3). Neither of these sections mentions or includes partners to a civil union. The question therefore becomes whether stepparentage for purposes of having standing to seek visitation and an allocation of parental responsibility requires a legal marriage as opposed to a civil union partnership. Given the interest the State has in protecting the rights of the natural parent and the stringent requirements for a party to seek nonparent visitation, we conclude that the legislature intended these provisions to be narrowly defined and applied. The answer therefore is yes, stepparentage requires a legal marriage as opposed to a civil union.

¶ 7 We initially note that Kris is asking for relief under the Marriage Act, yet Kris and her former civil union partner, Father, made a conscious choice to enter into a civil union as opposed to a marriage under the Marriage Act. At all times, they had the opportunity to avail themselves of the benefits the Marriage Act affords, but Kris and Father specifically chose not to do so.

¶ 8 More importantly, the provisions of the Marriage Act at issue here were adopted in 2016, well after Illinois began recognizing civil unions in 2011. The Marriage Act, even after the most...