Sharpley v. Wright

• Decision Date: 30 March 1903
• Docket Number: P2
• Citation: 205 Pa. 253,54 A. 896
• Parties: Sharpley v. Wright, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

54 A. 896

205 Pa. 253

Sharpley v. Wright, Appellant

No. P2

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 30, 1903

Argued January 6, 1903

Appeal, No. 92, Jan. T., 1902, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 3, Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1900, No. 547, on verdict for plaintiff in case of William Sharpley v. Thomas H Wright. Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before McMICHAEL J.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $1,750. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned was in submitting the case to the jury.

The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.

Joseph T. Bunting, for appellant. -- The defendant in this case claims that he is not responsible for the injury which resulted to the plaintiff, even if the defect in the derrick which caused the injury could have been ascertained by a previous inspection, because defendant had neither the control over the derrick which would have warranted an inspection, nor the power to make the repairs which might have been suggested by the inspection: Anderson v. Oliver, 138 Pa. 156; Johnston v. Ott, 155 Pa. 17; Elliott v. Hall, L.R. 15 Q.B. Div. 315; Heaven v. Pender, L.R. 11 Q.B. Div. 503; Mulchey v. Methodist Religious Society, 125 Mass. 487; Hayes v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 150 Mass. 457 (23 N.E. Repr. 225); Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124.

There is a long line of cases in the federal courts which hold that where a boss stevedore has contracted to unload a ship, an employee of the stevedore injured by a defective appliance furnished by the ship for the discharge of the cargo, can recover against the ship for such injuries: The Rheola, 19 Fed. Repr. 926; The Carolina, 30 Fed. Repr. 199; The Phoenix, 34 Fed. Repr. 760; Steel v. McNeil, 60 Fed. Repr. 105.

John P. Connelly, with him Flanders & Pugh, for appellee. -- It is of no consequence, nor is it an issue in this case, whether some one else (the owner of the machine, for example), was also in fault, or whether he might be held liable in another suit. It is immaterial how many others have been in fault, if defendant's act is an efficient cause of the injury: 1 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, sec. 31.

The defendant allowed his workmen to use this derrick, although he had not examined or made any inspection of it, as it was his duty to do; and it cannot be denied that the defect was one which could have been discovered by proper inspection: the ratchet was worn and the wire was rotten: Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. James, 56 Fed. Repr. 1001; Bennett v. Standard Plate Glass Co., 158 Pa. 120; Tracy v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 Fed. Repr. 103; Honinfins v. Chambersburg Engineering Co., 196 Pa. 47; Newton v. Vulcan Iron Works, 199 Pa. 646; Dyer v. Pittsburg Bridge Co., 198 Pa. 182.

Before MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MESTREZAT:

The plaintiff was injured while in the service of the defendant and this action was brought to recover damages for his injuries, which he alleges were caused by the negligence of the defendant. Thomas H. Wright, the defendant, was a stevedore, and contracted with W.S. Taylor & Company to pile lumber for them on their wharf on Delaware avenue, in the city of Philadelphia. William S. Sharpley, the plaintiff, was employed by the defendant to assist in this work. In performing the work, the defendant's employees used a derrick owned and erected by Taylor & Company on the wharf. The mast of the derrick was planted in the ground and cribbed with timber. The ratchet wheel of the derrick, used in hoisting the timber, was moved by a crank and, when supporting the timber, was held in place by a paul or dog whose grip of the wheel was made secure by a weight attached to it by means of a wire. The plaintiff, with other laborers, was engaged in piling lumber on the morning of November 29, 1899. While he was at the crank of the ratchet wheel lowering on the lumber pile a large stick of timber which had been hoisted by the derrick, the wire attaching the weight to the dog broke, releasing it from the wheel which suddenly began to revolve at a great speed and the crank of which struck the plaintiff injuring him severely. The proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was the breaking of the wire, which had been in use for a long time and was rotten and defective. The plaintiff avers in his statement that the defendant failed to exercise due care in providing him with safe and properly constructed machinery and appliances with which to do his work, and alleges that the wire holding in position the dog had become insufficient, weak, worn and rotten, and that the ratchets and dog were, and for a long time had been insufficient, worn, and imperfect. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on which judgment was entered, and the defendant has appealed.

The assignments of error raise but a single question and that is whether the defendant is responsible for the unsafe condition of the derrick. That the derrick was unsafe and that a previous inspection would have disclosed the fact are not controverted. The defendant, however, denies his liability for the injury received by the plaintiff "because he had neither the control over the derrick which would have warranted an inspection, nor the power to make the repairs which might have been suggested by the inspection."

The position of the defendant is untenable. His contract with Taylor & Company required him to pile the lumber on the wharf, and for that purpose he had to furnish the tools and appliances as well as the labor. The testimony shows that a derrick could be used advantageously in performing the work and that without such an appliance the cost of piling the lumber would have been materially increased. The size of the timber required the use of a heavy derrick in handling it. Whether the defendant used the derrick constructed by Taylor & Company on the wharf, or brought another derrick to the wharf with which to perform his work, is immaterial so far as it affects this case. The machine which injured the plaintiff was in the possession and control of the defendant while his employees used it in handling the lumber, and was unquestionably an appliance used in piling the lumber in pursuance of the contract with Taylor & Company. That the possession and control of the machine by appellant was temporary and liable to be resumed...