Shauf v. Rios

• Decision Date: 02 March 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV–17–713–R
• Citation: 313 F.Supp.3d 1262
• Parties: Michael SHAUF, guardian of the person and estate of Daniel Lee Boling, II, an incapacitated adult, Plaintiff, v. Hector A. RIOS, Jr., Warden, Lawton Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

313 F.Supp.3d 1262

Michael SHAUF, guardian of the person and estate of Daniel Lee Boling, II, an incapacitated adult, Plaintiff,

v.Hector A. RIOS, Jr., Warden, Lawton Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CIV–17–713–R

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Signed March 2, 2018

Kirsten L. Palfreyman, Atkinson Haskins Nellis Brittingham Gladd & Fiasco, Stanley D. Monroe, Monroe & Keele PC, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff.

Carson C. Smith, Charles A. Schreck, Robert S. Lafferrandre, Pierce Couch Hendrickson Baysinger & Green, John P. Cannon, Lexie P. Norwood, Stan J. West, Attorney General's Ofc., Timothy M. Bunson, James E. Dunn & Associates PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants.

ORDER

DAVID L. RUSSELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendants Hector Rios, Laura Pitman, Greg Williams, Richard Wilson, and Carol Barrett's Motions to Dismiss, Docs. 15–18. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint brings an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 —on behalf of Daniel Boling, a Lawton Correctional Facility ("LCF") inmate allegedly beat into a coma by his cellmate Randy Mounce—against three LCF agents and two deputy directors of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("ODOC") in their individual capacity. See Doc. 3. Plaintiff states a plausible claim for relief with respect to Greg Williams, Richard Wilson, and Carol Barrett, and the Court dismisses the complaint against Laura Pitman and Hector Rios for the following reasons.

I. Background

According to the complaint, Randy Mounce is a very violent inmate. He first entered ODOC custody in 1994, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for stabbing someone to death. See Doc. 3, at 3. Mounce committed various prison violations before arriving at LCF:

• August, 16, 1998: battery of another inmate

• October 12, 1998: battery of another person

• August 29, 2004: threatening bodily harm to another inmate

• September 18, 2009: stabbing of another inmate (Inmate "S")

• January 29, 2013: stabbing of another inmate (Inmate "N")

Id. at 4.

On December 19, 2014, ODOC transferred Mounce from a maximum-security prison to LCF, a private medium-security prison. Id. ODOC's "transfer packet" accompanying Mounce to LCF documented each of the incidents above except for the 2013 stabbing of Inmate "N." ODOC was aware of the stabbing, as Internal Affairs Investigators reported findings to ODOC supervisors. Id. LCF housed Mounce in the segregation unit for his first two weeks due to lack of bed availability. Id. at 5. On December 31, 2014, despite his violent history and his positive test for methamphetamine upon arrival, Mounce was classified as "medium security" and released to general population. Id.

Mounce's misconduct continued while at LCF:

• December, 2014: positive test for methamphetamine

• April 22, 2015: battery of another inmate

• May 27, 2015: threatening bodily harm to another inmate (his cellmate)

• June 4, 2015: possession of methamphetamine

Id. at 4–5. Then on July 3, 2015, a dispute arose between Mounce and Daniel Boling, his new cellmate after Mounce's May 27, 2015, threats to his old cellmate prompted a cell change. Id. at 5. Mounce beat Boling until Boling lapsed into a coma—he remains unconscious and will likely spend the rest of his life that way. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff filed this Section 1983 action on June 30, 2017, against Hector Rios and Carol Barrett, and he amended it on August 24 to add Richard Wilson, Laura Pitman, and Greg Williams. See Docs. 1 and 3. Defendant Rios is the Warden of LCF. He is allegedly responsible for oversight of all operations, including classification, discipline, and staff training. See Doc. 3, at 7. Defendant Barrett is an LCF case manager. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that in filling out Mounce's Custody Assessment Scale form, she "recklessly omitted several relevant facts" and classified him as "medium security." Id. Defendant Wilson is an LCF Unit Manager over Mounce and Boling's unit at the time of Mounce's alleged attack. Id. at 2. He is "responsible for oversight of the unit record keeping system to ensure that detailed information about each offender housed in [his] unit is maintained by ... staff." Id. at 8. Wilson also "directed that Boling be housed with" Mounce. Id. at 5. Defendant Pitman is Deputy Director/Administrator of Classification and Population for ODOC. Plaintiff alleges that she "knew or should have known of the long, violent history of Mounce toward other inmates," but took no action to protect Boling from this risk. Id. at 6. Lastly, Defendant Williams is ODOC's Deputy Director of Private Prison Administration. Id. at 3. He approved Mounce's transfer to LCF and signed a form that disregarded the 2013 Inmate "N" stabbing; it read, "Offender has minimum points. He has no active misconducts. Offender[']s last misconduct was on 6[ ]/30/2010." Id. at 10.

II. Discussion

A complaint may be dismissed upon a motion for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The standard "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Dismissal is proper "if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the complaint does not contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " MacArthur v. San Juan County , 497 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 676–80, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The plaintiff cannot merely give "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Such conclusory allegations are not entitled to the court's presumption for the plaintiff. Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts that at least makes the claims plausible and raise the "right of relief above the speculative level." Id. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which protects against violations of "right[s] secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States ... committed ... under color of state law." West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) ; see also Phillips v. Tiona , 508 Fed. App'x 737, 750 (10th Cir. 2013) ("We have long assumed that employees of a private prison act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suits by inmates...."). "In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who ... must provide humane conditions of confinement; [they] must ... ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ " Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 526–527, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) ). Prison officials must also "protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Id. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Cortes–Quinones v. Jimenez–Nettleship , 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988) ). "Having incarcerated ‘persons [with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,’ having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course." Id. (quoting Hudson , 468 U.S. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194 ).

To allege a plausible Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, Plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) objective harm, (2) a culpable state of mind, and (3) an "affirmative link" between a prison official's conduct and the constitutional violation. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't , 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013).

First, the constitutional deprivation must be "sufficiently serious"—Plaintiff must plead facts establishing that he was "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) ). How substantial a risk must be to survive a 12(b)(6) motion is unclear. Grimsley v. MacKay , 93 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 1996). After all, "[p]risons are necessarily dangerous places." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 858, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (Thomas, J., concurring). Officials face the "unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions." Id. at 845, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Spain v. Procunier , 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) ). Nonetheless, the Eighth Amendment does not require a direct and imminent threat to a particular inmate. Courts find substantial risk of harm "even when the potential and ultimate victims ha[ve] been wholly oblivious to the impending threat, particularly in cases of improper cell assignments." Brown v. Budz , 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005).

The second requirement is subjective and requires an official's " ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Wilson , 501 U.S. at 302–03, 111 S.Ct. 2321 ). This standard is equivalent to recklessness, or knowingly disregarding a risk. Id. at 836–37, 114 S.Ct. 1970. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Third, Plaintiff must allege an "affirmative link" between the official's conduct and the constitutional violation, embodied by "personal involvement" and "causation." Schneide...