Shaughnessy v. Director General of Railroads

• Decision Date: 25 May 1922
• Citation: Shaughnessy v. Director General of Railroads, 274 Pa. 413, 118 A. 390 (Pa. 1922)
• Docket Number: 180
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Shaughnessy, Appellant v. Director General of Railroads

Page 413

274 Pa. 413

Shaughnessy, Appellant

v. Director General of Railroads.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 19, 1922.

May 25, 1922.

Argued April 19, 1922.

Appeal, No. 180, Jan. T., 1922, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. Centre Co., Dec. T., 1919, No. 90, on verdict for defendant, in case of M. E. Shaughnessy v. Director Gen. of Railroads.

Before FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ. Reversed.

Charles B. Lenahan, with him Spangler & Walker, for appellant.—Whether the circumstances exist as will repel the legal presumption of negligence, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, from all the evidence in the case: Penna. R. R. v. Weiss, 87 Pa. 447; McCafferty v. R. R., 193 Pa. 339; Devlin v. Light Co., 192 Pa. 188; Rauch v. Smedley, 208 Pa. 175; Simons v. Ry., 254 Pa. 507; Van v. Richmond, 259 Pa. 300; Kane v. Phila., 196 Pa. 502; Doud v. Dir. Gen., 269 Pa. 182.

John Blanchard, with him James C. Furst and Edmund Blanchard, for appellee.—Binding instructions were proper: Lonzer v. R. R., 196 Pa. 610; Pottsville Lumber Co. v. Wells, 157 Pa. 5; Milton Weaving Co. v. Gas & Electric Co., 251 Pa. 79; Imp. Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442; Anspach v. Ry., 225 Pa. 528; Lapinco v. Ry., 257 Pa. 344; Schley v. R. R., 227 Pa. 494; Walters v. Bridge Co., 234 Pa. 7.

OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE SADLER, May 25, 1922:

On April 13, 1918, plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's train. He was seated in a Pullman car which was derailed while passing through Centre County, and as a result was seriously hurt. Investigation, made after the accident, disclosed a rail broken into six parts, and a spreading of the track for some distance, likely due to the shifting of the ties when the coach was overturned. Suit was brought to recover damages, and, upon the trial, evidence was offered to show the relation of claimant to the company at the time his injury was received, and the amount of loss sustained. With these facts proven, a presumption of responsibility arose, the passenger having suffered harm by reason of a defect in the railroad appliances: Meier v. P. R. R. Co., 64 Pa. 225; McCafferty v. P. R. R. Co., 193 Pa. 339; Spear v. P., W. & B. R. R. Co., 119 Pa. 61. It then became the duty of defendant to establish, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the accident occurred notwithstanding its exercise of the highest degree of practicable care and diligence: Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182.

To meet this burden, and relieve itself of presumptive responsibility, witnesses were called to show the making of proper inspection to discover defects. It appeared that the supervisor of the division went over the track at least once a month, and a track-walker passed the locus in quo, daily on foot, observing the rails for possible breaks. The section covered by him each day to and fro was nearly five miles in length, and his investigations were limited to such matters as were openly visible. It was proven, further, that the rail which gave way had been purchased from a reputable manufacturer about one year previously, after tests had been made to determine its soundness. Experts examined the broken pieces after the derailment, and testified the steel was of good quality, the fracture having resulted from "internal transverse fissures," which were latent defects, not discoverable by the use of any reasonable mechanical methods. No evidence in contradiction was offered by plaintiff, resting as he did on the presumption of lack of proper care arising from the happening of the accident. Upon motion, the court gave binding instructions for defendant, and subsequently entered judgment on the verdict rendered. As a result, this appeal was taken.

A narrow question is involved. In view of the legal presumption arising in favor of plaintiff, could the court say as a matter of law, that the uncontradicted testimony of witnesses for the defendant, showing inspection of the track, and the defect found in the broken rail, taken in connection with the expert opinion that this could not have been discovered by any known tests, made necessary a verdict for the defendant?

As early as Sullivan v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 234, it was expressly declared that it is for the jury to say whether the circumstances disclosed repelled the legal presumption of negligence arising where the passenger is injured by an overturned car. This rule has been consistently followed in many decisions since (P. R. R. Co. v. Weiss, 87 Pa. 447; Van v. Richmond, 259 Pa. 300; Kane v. Phila., 196 Pa. 502), and it is applied where a prima facie case is made out, notwithstanding the great preponderance of the testimony is with the defendant Simons v. P. & R. Ry. Co., 254 Pa. 507; Rauch v. Smedley, 208 Pa. 175.

The rebuttable presumption of liability has the...