Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, No. 374

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation349 U.S. 48,75 S.Ct. 591,99 L.Ed. 868
Decision Date25 April 1955
Docket NumberNo. 374
PartiesEdward J. SHAUGHNESSY, as District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the District of New York, Petitioner, v. Mampriel Sequeira PEDREIRO

349 U.S. 48
75 S.Ct. 591
99 L.Ed. 868
Edward J. SHAUGHNESSY, as District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the District of New York, Petitioner,

v.

Mampriel Sequeira PEDREIRO.

No. 374.
Argued March 31, 1955.
Decided April 25, 1955.

Mr. Oscar H. Davis, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Aaron L. Danzig, New York City, for respondent.

Page 49

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

After administrative hearings, the respondent Pedreiro, an alien, was ordered deported under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.1 He petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York to review the deportation order, declare it void and insue a temporary injunction restraining its execution pending final district court action. In part he contended that there was no legal evidence to support the order and that in violation of due process he had been compelled to incriminate himself in the hearings. Relief was sought only against the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the District of New York. The District Court dismissed the petitioner on the ground that either the Attorney General or the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization was an indispensable party and should have been joined. This holding made it unnecessary for the District Court to pass on another ground urged for dismissal, that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 precluded judicial review of deportation orders by any method except habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting both contentions of the Government. 2 Cir., 213 F.2d 768. In doing so it followed the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which had held that deportation orders entered under the 1952 Immigration Act can be judicially reviewed in actions for declaratory relief under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.2 Rubinstein v. Brownell, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 206 F.2d 449, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 346 U.S. 929, 74 S.Ct. 319, 97 L.Ed. 421. But the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that habeas corpus is the only way such deportation orders can be attacked. Batista v.

Page 50

Nicolls, 1 Cir., 213 F.2d 20. Because of this conflict among the circuits and the contention that allowing judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus conflicts with Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972, we granted certiorari, 348 U.S. 882, 75 S.Ct. 124.

The Heikkila case, unlike this one, dealt with a deportation order under the Immigration Act of 1917. That Act provided that deportation orders of the Attorney General should be 'final'3 and had long been interpreted as precluding any type of judicial review except by habeas corpus. Heikkila contended that this narrow right of review of deportation orders under the 1917 Act had been broadened by § 10 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes review of agency action by any appropriate method 'except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review * * *.' Because this Court had construed the word 'final' in the 1917 Act as precluding any review except by habeas corpus, it held that the Administrative Procedure Act gave no additional remedy since § 10 excepted statutes that precluded judicial review. The Court carefully pointed out, however, that it did not consider whether the same result should be reached under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act 'which took effect after Heikkila's complaint was filed.'4 Consequently Heikkila does not control this case and we must consider the effect of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act on the right to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that 'Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.' And § 12

Page 51

of the Act provides that 'No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.' In the subsequent 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act there is no language which 'expressly' supersedes or modifies the expanded right of review granted by § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. But the 1952 Immigration Act does provide, as did the 1917 Act, that deportation orders of the Attorney General shall be 'final.' The Government contends that we should read this as expressing a congressional purpose to give the word 'final' in the 1952 Act precisely the same meaning Heikkila gave 'final' in the 1917 Act and thereby continue to deprive deportees of all right of judicial review except by habeas corpus. We cannot accept this contention.

Such a restrictive construction of the finality provision of the present Immigration Act would run counter to § 10 and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Their purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes like the 1952 Immigration Act. And as the Court said in the Heikkila case, the Procedure Act is to be given a 'hospitable' interpretation. In that case the Court also referred to ambiguity in the provision making deportation orders of the Attorney General 'final.' It is more in harmony with the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act to construe the ambiguous word 'final' in the 1952 Immigration Act as referring to finality in administrative procedure rather than as cutting off the right of judicial review in whole or in part. And it would certainly not be in keeping with either of these Acts to require a person ordered deported to go to jail in order to obtain review by a court.

The legislative history of both the Administrative...

To continue reading

Request your trial
259 practice notes
  • Bowen v. Massachusetts Massachusetts v. Bowen, Nos. 87-712
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1988
    ...purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes. . . ." Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 594, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955). The Secretary argues that § 704 should be construed to bar review of the agency action in the Dis......
  • Strang v. Marsh, Civ. A. No. 83-0409 P.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • February 21, 1985
    ...Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 593, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955)); see also Falzarano v. U.S., 607 F.2d 506, 512 (1st Cir.1979), I believe this characterization is consiste......
  • El Rio Santa Cruz Neigh. v. U.S. Dept. of Health, No. 04-5089.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • February 8, 2005
    ...to judicial review." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962)). In Abbott Laboratories, the C......
  • Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, Civ. No. 68-403-R.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • August 2, 1968
    ...that the Administrative Procedure Act's `generous review provisions' must be given a `hospitable' interpretation. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 594, 99 L.Ed. 868; see United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 433-435, 69 S.Ct. 1410, 1414-1415, 93 L......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
258 cases
  • Bowen v. Massachusetts Massachusetts v. Bowen, Nos. 87-712
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1988
    ...purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes. . . ." Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 594, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955). The Secretary argues that § 704 should be construed to bar review of the agency action in the Dis......
  • Strang v. Marsh, Civ. A. No. 83-0409 P.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • February 21, 1985
    ...Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 593, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955)); see also Falzarano v. U.S., 607 F.2d 506, 512 (1st Cir.1979), I believe this characterization is consiste......
  • El Rio Santa Cruz Neigh. v. U.S. Dept. of Health, No. 04-5089.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • February 8, 2005
    ...to judicial review." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380, 82 S.Ct. 787, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962)). In Abbott Laboratories, the C......
  • Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, Civ. No. 68-403-R.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • August 2, 1968
    ...that the Administrative Procedure Act's `generous review provisions' must be given a `hospitable' interpretation. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 591, 594, 99 L.Ed. 868; see United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 433-435, 69 S.Ct. 1410, 1414-1415, 93 L......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • NONCITIZENS' ACCESS TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: THE NARROWING OF s. 1252(b) (9) POST-JENNINGS.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 169 Nbr. 3, February 2021
    • February 1, 2021
    ...sections of 5 U.S.C). (37) Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163; see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955) (holding that "there is a right to judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas corpus," and that the remedy sought in t......
  • Disparate Limbo: How Administrative Law Erased Antidiscrimination.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 2, November 2021
    • November 1, 2021
    ...plaintiffs' APA lawsuit despite a potential [section] 704 hurdle). (236.) Id. at 901. (237.) Id. at 904 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (238.) Women's Equity, 906 F.2d at 744, 749 n.9, 750 (quoting Council of & for the Blind of Del. Cnty. Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2......
  • The Warren Court - After Three Terms
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 9-4, December 1956
    • December 1, 1956
    ...(1955). 30 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955), and Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540 (1955). 31 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. cardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955); and Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). 32 349 U.S. 331 (1955).......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT