Shaughnessy v. United States Accardi

Citation349 U.S. 280,99 L.Ed. 1074,75 S.Ct. 746
Decision Date23 May 1955
Docket NumberNo. 616,616
PartiesEdward J. SHAUGHNESSY, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York District, Department of Justice, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. Joseph ACCARDI
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Mr. Marvin E. Frankel, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Jack Wasserman, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are called upon in this case to remove ambiguities from a previous opinion which, while clear enough to the trial court, appears to have conveyed a triplicity of meaning to the Court of Appeals. A year ago Accardi was here contestng the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he attacked the refusal of the Board of Immigration Appeals to grant his application for suspension of deportation. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 1954, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681. The sole foundation of his claim was that 'the Attorney General (is doing) precisely what the regulations forbid him to do: dictating the Board's decision.'* 347 U.S. 260, at page 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, at page 503. We remanded the petition to the trial court for a hearing on the question of 'the Board's alleged failure to exercise its own discretion, contrary to existing valid regulations.' It was alleged on information and belief that the Attorney General had prepared prior to the Board's decision 'a list of one hundred individuals whose deportation he sought * * *' as 'unsavory characters'; that Accardi's name was among the group; and that the 'list * * * was circulated by the Department of Justice among all of its employees connected with the Immigration Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals' with the result that 'since that time it has been impossible for (Accardi) to secure fair consideration of his case.' We concludd that, if Accardi could prove that the Board had not exercised its own discretion in the matter, he should receive 'a new hearing before the Board without the burden of previous proscription by the list.'

On the remand, the District Court, after a full hearing, found that the Board members 'reached their individual and collective decision on the merits, free from any dictation or suggestion * * *' and again dismissed the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting, 219 F.2d 77, 80. The opinion of the court based its conclusion on the ground that the 'Attorney General's statements (had) unconsciously influence(d) the Board members so that they felt obliged not to exercise their discretion and, without doing so, to decide against Accardi.' The chief judge concurring in the result, thought that our prior opinion merely required Accardi to prove 'that there was a list as alleged, that he was on it, and that this fact was known to the Board.' The dissenting judge, on the other hand, read our opinion as meaning 'no more * * * than that (Accardi's) allegations sufficiently charged 'dictation' by the Attorney General,' entitling Accardi to a hearing on the question of 'whether the Board's denial of discretionary relief represented its own untrammelled decision or one dictated by the Attorney General.' Page 90. He concluded that the finding of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous. We agree with the dissenting judge both as to the interpretation of our prior opinion and its application to the facts of this case.

The opinion of the court recognized that, before Accardi was entitled to another Board hearing, he had to prove that a majority of the Board not only knew of the 'list' but were affected by it. However, the opinion concluded that the Board's position that its judgment had not been affected the 'the list' was incredible. We find nothing incredible in the uncontradicted testimony produced before the trial judge through a number of witnesses including the Board members. The record shows that in fact there was no list, as such, and hence that one could not have been circulated among the members of the Board; that the fanfare of publicity complained of was in connection with the Attorney General's 'deportation program'; that this program was never publicly related to Accardi until after the Board's decision; that only one Board member knew Accardi was covered by the program, while two others and the Chairman never had such knowledge until after their decision; that the fifth member asserted that he 'may have known (of Accardi's inclusion in the program) but * * * couldn't say'; and that no person in the Department of Justice ever directly or indirectly approached any Board member as to the matter. It seems to us that the record fully supports the District Court's conclusion that the Board's decisions represented the free and undictated decision of each member. Among the eight witnesses who gave testimony concerning the matter, was the Attorney General. He testified that there was no list; that his investigation 'indicated that (Accardi) was a racketeer and that is the reason (he) moved to deport him'; that he 'never at any time discussed this matter with any member of the (Board).' In the face of such evidence, we do not believe that speculation on the effect of subconscious psychological pressures provides sufficient justification for rejecting the District Court's finding as clearly erroneous.

Accardi emphasizes the trial court's finding that the Board had notice of the program and of his inclusion therein. This 'notice,' at most, was given only to the calendar clerk of the Board so that the hearing of certain cases might be expedited. The testimony that it was not furnished to members of the Board or the Chairman is undisputed.

We believe that Accardi has had the hearing required by our previous opinion and that he has failed to prove his case.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice BLACK, with whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER joins, dissenting.

There is disagreement here as there was in the Court of Appeals as to precisely what was meant by our former opinion and holding in this case. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681. This is not surprising in view of ambiguity of language at its best. The Court gives our former opinion a different and in some respects a narrower meaning than I would. I think the Court's interpretation deprives Accardi of a right which I thought our first opinion guaranteed him as far as possible under existing law—an opportunity to have his rights determined by a tribunal which had not already made up its mind based on anonymous information. Consideration of this basic issue requires a more extensive reference to the record in this and the prior case than the Court has found it necessary to give. Accardi's rights cannot be fairly determined on broad legal generalizations or by merely interpreting our former opinion. If that opinion means no more than the Court indicates then Accardi's right to have suspension of his deportation determined without prejudgment by the Attorney General has never been passed on.

Accardi, born in Italy, came to this country in 1932, when the was 21 years old. He entered the United States from Canada, intending to remain here permanently. But he had no immigration visa. Under the law this made him a deportable alien. Proceedings to deport him were begun in 1947. He married in 1949 and has one child. His wife and child depend on him for support. Because of his original illegal entry, Accardi was ordered deported.

The basis of this controversy is not the original order of deportation but is Accardi's application for suspension of that order under § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917.1 That section provides that under certain circumstances the Attorney General 'may' suspend deportation of an alien upon proof that he has had good moral character for the preceding five years. The Act does not require the Attorney General to hold hearings, or make findings in suspension cases. But regulations properly promulgated by the Attorney General do provide for hearings, and as we held in the prior Accardi case those regulations have the effect of law. In other words, our holding was that the Attorney General can no more deny the suspension without hearings prescribed by the regulations than he could if such hearings had been prescribed by Congress itself. And as we explained in our prior opinion, the law through the regulations now provides for aliens like Accardi to obtain 'decisions at three separate administrative levels below the Attorney General—hearing officer, commissioner, and the Board of Immigration Appeals.' 347 U.S. at page 266, 74 S.Ct. at page 502. The Board is appointed by the Attorney General and can be removed by him whenever he pleases.

The habeas corpus petition considered in this case and the prior one alleged that the deportation order and the order denying favorable discretionary relief were both null and void, violated due process and should be set aside. The two chief grounds alleged were: (1) The decision to deny favorable discretionary relief to Accardi 'was pre-judged by the Attorney General on October 2, 1952,' which was six months before the Board of Immigration Appeals finally acted on Accardi's application for suspension; (2) The Attorney General had so widely publicized and circulated statements about his plan to deport Accardi that it was impossible for the Attorney General's subordinates to grant fair consideration to Accardi's application for suspension of deportation. An exhibit attached to the petition showed that the Attorney General on October 2, 1952, publicized that 'the Justice Department hopes to strip citizenship rights from 100 foreign-born racketeers and deport them' and that Accardi was one of these alleged racketeers. Other...

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