Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Melendez

• Decision Date: 03 September 2021
• Docket Number: SJC-13054
• Citation: 173 N.E.3d 356,488 Mass. 338
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS, INC. v. Margarita MELENDEZ.

488 Mass. 338

173 N.E.3d 356

SHAW'S SUPERMARKETS, INC.

v.Margarita MELENDEZ.

SJC-13054

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 5, 2021.

Decided September 3, 2021.

Kristyn Dery Kaupas, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Michael V. Caplette, Southbridge, for the defendant.

Brendan G. Carney, Thomas R. Murphy, Salem, Kevin J. Powers, & J. Michael Conley, Braintree, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

GAZIANO, J.

Margarita Melendez, the plaintiff in the underlying District Court case, commenced legal action against the defendant, a grocery store chain, after being injured inside one of its stores in a collision with a grocery cart, allegedly as a result of the negligence of one of the defendant's employees. The complaint was filed after the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, based on the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2A, but in light of this court's order that "[a]ll civil statutes of limitations were tolled ... from March 17, 2020, though June 30, 2020," due to the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Supreme Judicial Court, Third Updated Order Regarding Court Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic, No. OE-144 (June 24, 2020). The defendant moved to dismiss, on the ground that the tolling order applied only to those civil statutes of limitations that expired between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020, and, thus, that the plaintiff's cause of action, which it argued accrued on September 3, 2017, was time barred at the time she filed her complaint on September 24, 2020. A District Court judge denied the defendant's motion based on the plain language of the order, which tolled all civil statutes of limitations regardless of their expiration.¹

1. Background. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Rafferty v. Merck & Co., 479 Mass. 141, 147, 92 N.E.3d 1205 (2018) ; Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676, 940 N.E.2d 413 (2011).

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was injured on September 3, 2017, while shopping at a grocery store operated by the defendant Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. (Shaw's), in Sturbridge. A Shaw's employee pushed a cart out from a back room into the consumer area of the store, colliding with the plaintiff and knocking her to the floor. She suffered multiple injuries as a result of the fall, including a concussion and injuries to her neck, back, left wrist, and right knee. The plaintiff filed a complaint for negligence in the District Court on September 24, 2020.

Shaw's subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff failed to file the complaint within the three-year period prescribed by the statute of limitations, G. L. c. 260, § 2A ("actions of tort ... shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues." Relying upon our multiple orders concerning the exigent circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, a District Court judge denied the motion to dismiss.

2. Orders concerning court operations during COVID-19 pandemic. "The power, authority, and jurisdiction of this court ... rest on at least the following grounds, among others: (a) the inherent common law and constitutional powers of this court, as the highest constitutional court of the Commonwealth, to protect and preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to supervise the administration of justice; (b) the supervisory powers confirmed to this court by G. L. c. 211, § 3, as amended; (c) the power of this court to maintain and impose discipline with respect to the conduct of all members of the bar, either as lawyers engaged in practice or as judicial officers; and (d) the power of this court to establish and enforce rules of court for the orderly conduct (1) of officers and judges of the courts and (2) of judicial business and administration. We need not now decide what other common law, equity, or inherent judicial powers and jurisdiction may exist." (Footnote omitted.) Matter of DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 757, 758–759, 274 N.E.2d 454 (1971). See Opinions of the Justices, 372 Mass. 883, 889, 363 N.E.2d 652 (1977) ; Keenan, petitioner, 310 Mass. 166, 181-182, 37 N.E.2d 516 (1941) ; Russell v. Howe, 12 Gray 147, 152-153, 78 Mass. 147 (1858) ; art. 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

The court's superintendence powers over all of the courts in the Commonwealth include the authority to issue "such writs, summonses and other processes and such orders, directions and rules as may be necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the laws, the improvement of the administration of such courts, and the securing of their proper and efficient administration." G. L. c. 211, § 3.²

Pursuant to our superintendence and rulemaking authority, this court has issued a variety of orders since March 2020 regarding court operations in the Commonwealth during the COVID-19 pandemic. These orders have sought to safeguard the health and safety of the public, as well as court personnel, while recognizing the importance to all litigants and, indeed, to all residents of the Commonwealth of an efficient and functioning judiciary during this unprecedented period.

Among other measures, our third updated order, referencing our second updated order, stated:

"All civil statutes of limitations were tolled ... from March 17, 2020, through June 30, 2020, and will not be tolled any further unless there is a new surge in COVID-19 cases in the Commonwealth and the [Supreme Judicial Court] determines that a new or extended period of tolling is needed.... The new date for the expiration of a statute of limitation is calculated as follows: determine how many days remained as of March 17, 2020, until the statute of limitation would have expired, and that same number of days will remain as of July 1, 2020 in civil cases .... For example, if fourteen (14) days remained as of March 17 before the statute of limitation would have expired in a civil case, then fourteen (14) days will continue to remain as of July 1, before the statute of limitation expires (i.e., July 15)."

Our more recent fourth, fifth, and sixth updated orders did not concern tolling periods for civil actions.

After the District Court judge denied its motion to dismiss, Shaw's filed an emergency petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. Shaw's argued that our orders tolled only those civil statutes of limitations that had been set to expire between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020, and thus were inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim, for which, under G. L. c. 260, § 2A, the statute of limitations would have expired on September 3, 2020. The single justice reserved and reported the emergency petition to the full court.

3. Discussion. In interpreting rules and orders adopted by this court, we rely upon basic principles of statutory construction. Thus, we begin with the plain language of the order. See, e.g., Bar Counsel v. Farber, 464 Mass. 784, 791, 985 N.E.2d 1155 (2013) (interpreting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 9, as appearing in 425 Mass. 1312 [1997], regarding bar discipline based on "plain language" of rule). See also Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. 345, 357, 851 N.E.2d 404 (2006). If the language is clear and unambiguous, we "must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and ... need not look beyond the words." Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 487, 491, 159 N.E.3d 653 (2020), quoting Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 756, 752 N.E.2d 732 (2001). While language is ambiguous when it "reasonably can be construed in multiple ways," Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 797, 89 N.E.3d 1184 (2018), citing Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 818, 857 N.E.2d 1052 (2006), "ambiguity is not created simply because a controversy exists between parties, each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other," Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 466, 645 N.E.2d 1165 (1995).

Here, we conclude that the phrase "all civil statutes of limitations" is clear and unambiguous. As indicated by the use of the word "all," the plain meaning of these words encompasses each and every civil statute of limitations, not just those where the statutory period of limitation expired between March 17, 2020, and June 30, 2020. Where a word is not defined in a statute, we give the word its usual and accepted meaning, so long as those meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose. Seideman v. Newton, 452 Mass. 472, 477-478, 895 N.E.2d 439 (2008), and cases cited. In common usage, "all" means "the whole of"; "the greatest possible"; "every"; and "any." Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 54 (2003). We adopted this broad tolling order cognizant of the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic has engendered not only for the judiciary and court staff, but also for attorneys and litigants considering the initiation of legal action. In light of ongoing State and local restrictions imposed to combat the spread of COVID-19, and the effect of such restrictions on the ability of attorneys and litigants to prepare civil claims, we decline Shaw's request that we narrow our order.³ "All" means all.

We note that, elsewhere in our COVID-19 orders, where this court sought exclusively to extend legal terms or deadlines that expired within a specific period, we did so explicitly. For example, in contrast to the provision tolling civil statutes of limitations, our third updated order specified that "all deadlines set forth in statutes or court rules, standing orders, tracking orders, or guidelines that...