Shaw v. Camp

• Decision Date: 30 March 1896
• Citation: 160 Ill. 425,43 N.E. 608
• Parties: SHAW et al. v. CAMP.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

160 Ill. 425

43 N.E. 608

SHAW et al.

v.CAMP.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 30, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, Third district.

Claim by E. Hanson Camp against the estate of Edward Swaney, deceased, on a promissory note. From a judgment of the appellate court affirming a judgment in favor of claimant, Catherine Shaw and others appeal. Affirmed.

S. R. Reed, I. A. Buckingham, and Lodge & Hicks, for appellants.

N. H. Camp, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Appellee filed a claim in the county court of Piatt county against the estate of Edward Swaney, deceased, and the claim was rejected. In the circuit court, on appeal, there was a trial by a jury, and a verdict for the claimant for $852.50, upon which judgment was entered. The judgment was affirmed by the appellate court, and a certificate of importance granted, under which the case is brought to this court. On the trial the claimant offered in evidence the instrument upon which his claim was founded, together with proof of the signature of the deceased. The instrument was as follows: ‘$750.00. Bement, Ill., Dec. 27, 1890. After my death date I promise to pay E. Hanson Camp, or order, the sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars, without interest, at _____ per cent. per annum from date. Value received.’ Following the above there was a power of attorney in the usual form to confess judgment, and the signature of Edward Swaney. To the introduction of this instrument objection was made and overruled, and it is insisted that the ruling was wrong, for the reason that the instrument was not a promissory note. It is conceded that a promissory note may be made payalbe on the death of a certain person, or at a fixed time thereafter, or on demand after such death. But it is claimed that this instrument was not payable at a time fixed, and that the words, ‘after my death date,’ should be construed to mean some uncertain time after that event. We do not regard the instrument as subject to the objection made. It did not become due until the death of the maker, which was an event certain to occur; but by its terms it became due at onoe after the occurrence of that event. There is nothing in the language to indicate that the money was to be paid at some uncertain time after the maker's death. The objection was properly overruled.

It is next urged that there was no evidence to prove a delivery. It was proved that the maker of the note handed it to William M. Camp with directions to deliver it to the payee, who was then somewhere in the Northwest, traveling for a coal company. William M. Camp was a banker, and a brother of the payee, and had in his possession other papers of the payee for safekeeping during his absence. These papers were kept in a private envelope of the payee, in a safety box in the bank. William M. Camp had the key to the safety box, and the note remained there, with the other papers of the claimant, until his return after the death of the maker. The note was delivered without condition, and after it was placed in the envelope it was held by William M. Camp as the agent of the claimant. Such a delivery, by which the maker lost all control of the note, and William M. Camp held...