Shaw v. City of Charleston
Decision Date | 24 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 3522.,3522. |
Citation | 351 S.C. 32,567 S.E.2d 530 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Darlene SHAW, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF CHARLESTON, Appellant, and Marianna Hanckel f/k/a Marianna D. Glass, Respondent. |
Henry D. McMaster and Bryan P. Stirling, both of Tompkins and McMaster, of Columbia, for appellant.
James D. Myrick and Jonathan D. Crumly, both of Charleston, for respondent.
Darlene Shaw was injured when she tripped on the sidewalk in front of Marianna Hanckel's house on Tradd Street in Charleston. Shaw sued Hanckel and the City of Charleston alleging they were both negligent and jointly and severally liable for her injuries. The trial court granted Hanckel's motion for summary judgment over City's objection. We reverse and remand.
Shaw alleges she tripped and injured herself when she accidentally inserted her foot into a hole where the sidewalk abuts an old coal grate appurtenant to Hanckel's house. The grate is a textured piece of sheet metal covering an opening in the sidewalk which historically was a chute for coal to be delivered into the basement of the house. The opening is reinforced with brick, and the sidewalk is concrete.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Hanckel argued the evidence showed only that the sidewalk, not the coal grate, caused Shaw's fall. She noted as a matter of law that City is responsible for maintaining the public sidewalk, and in fact, "[t]he City of Charleston has admitted this responsibility.. . . ." In opposition, City asserted it does not own the steel grate or the brick shaft and is not the responsible party. City summarizes its position:
Hanckel has moved for summary judgment on the ground that "it is the duty of the City of Charleston, not hers, to maintain city sidewalks . . . (quoting from page one of the text of Hanckel's motion)." There is no dispute regarding this assertion. However, Hanckel's reliance on this assertion as the basis for her motion for summary judgment is wholly misplaced. The issue here is not whether each defendant has a duty to maintain its own property. Rather, the central issue regarding Hanckel's motion is a question of location. Specifically: was the defect involved in the plaintiff's fall located on property owned and maintained by Hanckel or, rather, by the City? We submit that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether the defect is located on Hanckel's property or on the City's.
The trial court granted Hanckel summary judgment and clearly found that the hole in which Shaw tripped was part of the sidewalk. It found: In its conclusions of law, the trial court continued:
There is no evidence in the record which would create a material question of fact that Hanckel owed a duty to inspect and maintain public sidewalks outside her house. The evidence in the record, taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, establishes that even if Hanckel had some ownership rights in the air shaft cover and its surrounding stone, such structures were squarely upon the public sidewalk and subject to the City of Charleston's control. (Emphasis added.)
Originally, the City's argument was limited to whether the trial judge erred in her finding that "the defect that caused this accident was a part of the sidewalk and not a part of the shaft owned by . . . Hanckel" where an issue of material fact exists regarding whether the defect was located on Hanckel's property or the sidewalk maintained by the City. Thereafter, this court directed the parties to brief "the issue of whether a co-defendant in an action based on negligence is an `aggrieved party' within the contemplation of Rule 201(b), SCACR, thereby vesting it with the right to appeal a grant of summary judgment to its co-defendant when the plaintiff in the action, against whom the summary judgment is awarded, does not file an appeal." Understandably, City argues it is an aggrieved party and Hanckel argues it is not. Therefore, the two issues before us are:
City argues it is an "aggrieved party" within the contemplation of the rule, and may therefore appeal the grant of summary judgment to its co-defendant. We agree.
Rule 201(b), SCACR, provides that "[o]nly a party aggrieved by an order, judgment, or sentence may appeal." We recently reiterated that "[a] party is aggrieved by a judgment or decree when it operates on his or her rights of property or bears directly on his or her interest." Beaufort Realty Co. v. Beaufort County, 346 S.C. 298, 301, 551 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ct.App.2001). "The word `aggrieved' refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right, or the imposition on a party of a burden or obligation." Id.; see Parker v. Brown, 195 S.C. 35, 44-45, 10 S.E.2d 625, 629 (1940) (). "A party cannot appeal from a decision which does not affect his or her interest, however erroneous and prejudicial it may be to some other person's rights and interests." Beaufort Realty, 346 S.C. at 301,551 S.E.2d at 589-590; First Union Nat'l Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 565, 511 S.E.2d 372, 378 (Ct.App.1998).
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-100(c) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added).
Hanckel argues City can never be an aggrieved party under the present facts because the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) states it "shall not apply to governmental entities." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-38-65 (Supp.2001). She argues this section essentially places City in the position of a joint tortfeasor under the common law. The intention behind UCATA is to provide some relief to "a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-38-20(B) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). Because the Tort Claims Act applies and clearly provides that liability among or between tortfeasors shall be apportioned by the jury, this argument lacks merit.
Clearly the inclusion or exclusion of Hanckel, who may be deemed partially liable to Shaw, drastically affects City's potential exposure in this tort action. If Hanckel remains a party, the verdict may apportion the damages between Hanckel and City. Without Hanckel, however, City could only be apportioned 100% of any potential liability. Such a result under the Tort Claims Act clearly bears directly on its pecuniary interests.
Our sister state, Georgia, has drawn a similar distinction regarding appealability and standing turning on whether the co-defendant's rights are affected. In the case of Hussey, Gay & Bell v. Ga. Ports Auth., the Georgia Court of Appeals held:
(A) co-defendant does not have any standing to appeal an order granting summary judgment in favor of another defendant when (his) right has not been adversely affected thereby. Only if the co-defendants are sued as joint tortfeasors does the grant of summary judgment as to one potentially affect the other's right of contribution. Therefore, it is only in this situation that the co-defendant is deemed a losing party and therefore has standing to appeal the grant of summary judgment to another co-defendant.
Hussey, 204 Ga.App. 504, 420 S.E.2d 50, 53 (1992) (quotations and citations omitted). See generally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 275 (1995 & Supp.2002). In the seminal case, Georgia held a co-defendant had standing to appeal the grant of summary judgment to another co-defendant against whom a contribution claim was asserted. R.E. Thomas Erectors, Inc. v. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 171 Ga.App. 903, 321 S.E.2d 412 (1984). Later, the court clarified that relaxation of standing requirements for co-defendants was limited to those sued as joint tortfeasors. C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Studard, 201 Ga.App. 741, 412 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1991); see also Johnson & Harber Constr. Co., 220 Ga.App. 179, 469 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1996); Shackelford v. Green, 180 Ga.App. 617, 349 S.E.2d 781 (1986). Under similar circumstances, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that a co-defendant had standing to appeal the grant of summary judgment to another who would otherwise share liability where their interests were adverse because dismissal was premised on determination of contractual assumption of co-defendant's...
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