Shaw v. Econ. Opportunity Planning Ass'n of Greater Toledo, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11 CV 564 |
| Parties | JAMIE M. SHAW, et al., Plaintiff, v. ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF GREATER TOLEDO, INC., et al. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jamie M. Shaw was employed by Defendant Economic Opportunity Planning Association of Greater Toledo, Inc. (EOPA) as a disabilities assistant beginning January 5, 2009. Among state tort law claims, Plaintiff alleges Defendant EOPA discriminated against her based on pregnancy and gender. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE) breached its duty to fairly represent her and EOPA breached its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between OAPSE and EOPA. Additionally, Plaintiff's husband asserts a claim for damages due to loss of consortium. (Doc. 15, at 11).
The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1367. The parties have consented to the undersigned's exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Civil Rule 73. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff alleges nine causes of action:
(Doc. 15).
Defendant EOPA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 23), and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 25). For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On January 5, 2009, Plaintiff began working for EOPA as a disabilities assistant, teaching children with learning disabilities and assisting teachers in a classroom setting. (Doc. 15, at 3; Doc. 20, at 3; Doc. 19-1, at 9). Plaintiff's employment contract was pursuant to a CBA between EOPA and its employee union OAPSE. (Doc. 15, at 3).
Plaintiff's employment with EOPA, while brief, was turbulent. The event giving rise to the instant action was her termination January 29, 2010. Prior to that, however, Plaintiff was terminated May 16, 2009, though subsequently reinstated. The facts relating to the May 16, 2009 termination are not dispostive here, but provide necessary background and context.
On or about May 4, 2009, Plaintiff alleges her direct supervisor Linda Anderson reprimanded her for suggesting a job opening be posted through OAPSE, ostensibly to protect herself from beingreplaced by an applicant with more seniority. (Doc. 15, at 3). Shortly after, Plaintiff was called into Ms. Anderson's office for a "counseling session" based on her probationary status as a new employee and was terminated. (Doc. 15, at 3). Ms. Anderson testified Plaintiff was terminated for being disrespectful to other employees. (Doc. 19-1, at 24-18). However, Plaintiff believed she was terminated for engaging in protected union activity. (Doc. 15, at 3). Plaintiff sought the assistance of OAPSE to challenge her termination. (Doc. 15, at 4). In turn, OAPSE filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) challenging Plaintiff's termination. (Doc. 15, at 4). On September 15, 2009, Plaintiff was reinstated to her position as a disabilities assistant pursuant to a settlement agreement between EOPA and OAPSE. (Doc. 15, at 4).
Plaintiff returned to work at EOPA on September 21, 2009, met with human resources to complete paperwork, then went to her first assignment of the day. (Doc. 15, at 4; Doc. 19-3, at 52). After lunch, Plaintiff met with Ms. Anderson and informed her she was pregnant. (Doc. 19-3, at 53). Plaintiff claims Ms. Anderson "reprimanded" her for being pregnant - specifically, that Ms. Anderson indicated another employee was also pregnant and was concerned it would be unfair for other staff members to have to cover for two maternity leaves. (Doc. 19-3, at 53). Ms. Anderson denies making this statement. (Doc. 19-1, at 35). After the meeting, Plaintiff went to her next assignment. (Doc. 19-3, at 53). Later that afternoon, Plaintiff began having contractions and called Ms. Anderson to inform her she needed to leave to see her doctor. (Doc. 19-3, at 54). Plaintiff's physician placed her on bed rest and told her she could not return to work until after the baby was born. (Doc. 19-3, at 54). Plaintiff's estimated return to work date at that time was February 4, 2010. (Doc. 15, at 4; Doc. 19-3, at 57).
Plaintiff immediately contacted EOPA human resources technician Rolanda Key to informher about her condition and request the necessary paperwork for medical leave. (Doc. 19-3, at 55-56). Ms. Key testified that she told Plaintiff she did not qualify for extended leave under the FMLA during this conversation - something Plaintiff was aware of. Rather, Ms. Key informed Plaintiff she qualified for serious medical illness leave, which allowed her " two [30] day leaves" pursuant to EOPA's serious medical leave policy. (Doc. 19-3, at 60; Doc. 19-2, at 13). Plaintiff refers to this policy as "leave without pay". (Doc. 19-3, at 63). Ms. Key testified she informed Plaintiff if she needed more than 60 days, Plaintiff would have to speak with the human resources director for approval. (Doc. 19-2, at 13). Ms. Key testified she mailed Plaintiff a letter confirming her 60 day serious medical leave, indicating it would expire on November 21, 2009. (Doc. 19-2, at 22). Plaintiff denies Ms. Key told her she was only entitled to 60 days of leave and denies receiving a letter; rather, Plaintiff assumed she was covered by the "leave without pay" policy until her return date of February 4, 2010. (Doc. 19-2, at 68-70).
Although Plaintiff's due date was in January 2010, she delivered several weeks early, on December 10, 2009. (Doc. 19-3, at 68). Even so, she still anticipated her return to work date was February 4, 2010. (Doc. 19-3, at 69). After her son was born, Plaintiff tried to contact EOPA human resources to confirm her back to work date and could not reach anyone, but testified she left a phone message indicating she would be back February 4, 2010. (Doc. 19-3, at 69).
Plaintiff claims she first learned of the 60 day serious medical illness leave policy in a letter she received January 13, 2010. (Doc. 19-2, at 70). After receiving the letter, she called EOPA human resources to discuss the policy and was informed a pre-disciplinary hearing was scheduled regarding her exhausted leave January 25, 2010. (Doc. 19-2, at 68-70). At the pre-disciplinary hearing, EOPA human resources personnel notified Plaintiff she was subject to termination for exhausting her leavepast the 60 days. (Doc. 19-3, at 75-77). Ms. Anderson was not a part of the meeting. (Doc. 19-3, at 75). On January 29, 2010, Plaintiff was asked to attend an additional meeting with human resources director Jack Hackett to answer follow-up questions. (Doc. 19-3, at 77). Again, Ms. Anderson was not present. (Doc. 19-3, at 76). At the end of this meeting, Mr. Hackett told Plaintiff he would contact her once a decision was made regarding her termination. (Doc. 19-3, at 77).
Since Plaintiff had not heard anything, she returned to work February 4, 2010. (Doc. 19-3, at 78). Upon arrival, Mr. Hackett informed Plaintiff she had been terminated as of January 29, 2010 for failing to return to work after exhausting medical leave. (Doc. 19-3, at 78). The following day, Plaintiff received a letter from EOPA indicating she had been terminated. (Doc. 19-3, at 78).
Subsequently, Plaintiff contacted OAPSE and filed a grievance regarding her termination. (Doc. 19-3, at 79). A grievance hearing was held and attended by EOPA's executive director Dr. Scott, EOPA human resources personnel, Plaintiff, and an OAPSE representative. (Doc. 19-3, at 81). Shortly after the hearing, Dr. Scott sent a letter to Plaintiff concurring with the decision to terminate her employment. (Doc. 19-3, at 81-83). Plaintiff sought further recourse, requesting arbitration through the OAPSE appeal process. (Doc. 19-3, at 86). Ultimately, OAPSE chose not to pursue Plaintiff's claim through arbitration. (Doc. 19-3, at 93). Thus, Plaintiff initiated the instant action against EOPA and OAPSE.
Pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute; rather, the Court determines only whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). This burden "may be discharged by 'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
§ 301 Hybrid Claim
A hybrid § 301/fair representation claim arises when a plaintiff alleges her employer breached its obligations under a CBA in violation of § 301 of the LMRA, and the plaintiff's labor union violated its duty of fair representation. See Delcostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 185. These two claims are "inextricably interdependent", and require courts to analyze them as one hybrid § 301 claim. Delcostello, 462...
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