Shaw v. G. B. Beaumont Co.
| Decision Date | 11 October 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 33.,33. |
| Citation | 102 A. 151,88 N.J.Eq. 333 |
| Parties | SHAW. v. G. B. BEAUMONT CO. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllalus by the Court.)
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
Bill by Eleanor P. Shaw against the G. B. Beaumont Company. From a decree of the Chancery Court for complainant, defendant appeals. Decree affirmed.
William A. Lewis, Gilbert Collins, and Edward A. Markley, all of Jersey City, for appellant.
Hartshorne, Insley & Leake, of Jersey City, and William E. Decker, of Atlantic City, for appellee.
BLACK, J. The fundamental question in this case is one of equitable jurisdiction. The litigation grows out of an agreement made between the parties to this suit, on the 26th day of February, 1913. The complainant, being seised of lands at the corner of Highland avenue and the boulevard in Jersey City, N. J., entered into an agreement on the above date with the defendant to erect an apartment house on a part thereof. Under the terms of the agreement the complainant conveyed the lands to the defendant, and also gave the defendant certain moneys, the lands to be reconveyed to her on completion of the building and payment thereof, the cost to be ascertained by an accounting to be made by the defendant. The defendant having erected and completed the apartment house on part of the land, sold and mortgaged other parts, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, retained title to the remainder, and collected rents from apartments when rented. The defendant having failed to render a just and true account, the complainant exhibited her bill of complaint in the court below, and prayed: (a) For an accounting; (b) a reconveyance of the lands held by the defendant; (c) a receiver to collect the rents pending the litigation. The case was brought to trial, before Advisory Master Charles J. Roe, resulting in a decree for the complainant and the sum of $5,540.35, to be paid by the defendant to the complainant; hence the defendant brings this appeal, alleging seven specifications as grounds of appeal.
The first and only one that requires any extended discussion relates to the ruling of the advisory master which limited the scope of the accounting to the agreement of February 26, 1913. The appellant urges that the master should have included the transactions between the complainant and the defendant, under two prior written agreements, viz. August 27, and November 22, 1912. They referred speaking generally, to the same subject, viz. that of building. They were both abandoned, no work being done under them, except the preparing of plans for a building, under the agreement of August 27, 1912, and the payment of $540 to the appellant. The accounting was a long and laborious one, involving something over $100,000. The record is also voluminous. The clause in the agreement of February 26, 1913, providing for the conveyance of the property and the holding of it by the defendant, until it should be paid, is the distinguishing feature between that agreement and the two preceding agreements referred to above. That clause is the sole ground or the special equity, which gives the Court of Chancery jurisdiction over this cause. The question then is, Did the master err in limiting the scope of the accounting as above indicated? One other fact is urged, as having some significance, which may be mentioned; that is, the parties stipulated before the master, authorizing him to consider all the matters in dispute and adjudicate thereon (and waiving a jury trial on any such matters in the brief), but it may be said, in passing, that such a stipulation imposes no obligation on the Court of Chancery to decide those issues.
It may be conceded that a Court of Chancery, having once acquired jurisdiction of a cause, will do all in its power to settle all the rights of all the parties, in the matter of any controversy, but this is not an inflexible rule which the Court of Chancery is bound to follow in every case that comes before it.
The rule to be applied was succinctly stated by Vice Chancellor Reed, in the case of Stout v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of London, 65 N. J. Eq. 573, 56 Atl. 694, in these words:
Chief Justice Beasley, speaking for this court said:
"It is not true, by any means, that when a court of conscience has acquired cognizance for one purpose, it thereby acquires cognizance over the entire controversy for all purposes." Lodor v. McGovern, 48 N. J. Eq. 279, 22 Atl. 200, 27 Am. St. Rep. 446.
The principle is further illustrated in our courts, in the cases of Little v. Cooper, 10 N. J. Eq. 273; Red Jacket Tribe v. Hoff, 33 N. J. Eq. 441. The subject is discussed, the principle illustrated and applied in many cases and by text-writers, such as 1 Story's Eq. Jur. par. 72; Pomeroy on Equity, par. 181; 10 R. C. L. p. 374, par. 123.
The extending of the jurisdiction of chancery so as to include all the points in controversy rests somewhat in the discretion of the chancellor, especially so where the rights involved grow out of other contracts. In this case the defendant has an adequate and complete remedy at law, for all the items involved under the two former contracts, including damages for their alleged breach. The Court of Chancery cannot retain jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a purely legal remedy or to try a claim for unliquidated damages. Trotter v. Heckscher, 40 N. J. Eq. 657, 4 Atl. 83; Phillips v. Pullen, 45 N. J. Eq. 157,16 Atl. 915.
The bill of complaint in this suit was filed April 22, 1915. The present Chancery Act (P. L. 1915, p. 184, par. 8), by which a jury trial shall be deemed to be waived, unless demanded in the pleadings, does not apply to this case. Id. par. 12. We...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brennan v. Orban
...of parental rights). But the Family Part judges are the successors of those "courts of conscience," Shaw v. G.B. Beaumont Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 333, 336, 102 A. 151 (E. & A. 1917), that have always administered justice to the citizens of New Jersey. We are confident that they can successfully ba......
-
Kosman v. Thompson
...v. First National Bank (D. C.) 252 F. 613;India Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. (C. C.) 117 F. 354;Shaw v. Beaumont Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 333, 102 A. 151, 2 A. L. R. 122. [14] VI. After the action to collect said assessment has been separated into single suits and each such several c......
-
United States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co.
... ... relation of the parties is not that of principal and agent ... An examination of the several cases mentioned in the note to ... Shaw v. Beaumont Co., 2 A.L.R. 122 (88 N.J.Eq. 333, ... 102 A. 151), and of U.S. v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 ... U.S. 323, 43 Sup.Ct. 128, 67 L.Ed ... ...
-
Capraro v. Propati
...subserve the ends of justice. Luckenbach Terminals, Inc. v. North Bergen Township, 127 N.J.Eq. 93, 11 A.2d 46; Shaw v. B. Beaumont Co., 88 N.J.Eq. 333, 102 A. 151, 2 A.L.R. 122; Loder v. McGovern, supra; Little v. Cooper, supra; Brown v. Edsall, Neither the hazards of a jury trial, due to "......