Shaw v. Ruiz, A92A1871

• Decision Date: 09 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. A92A1871,A92A1871
• Citation: 428 S.E.2d 98,207 Ga.App. 299
• Parties: SHAW v. RUIZ.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 98

428 S.E.2d 98

207 Ga.App. 299

SHAW v. RUIZ.

No. A92A1871.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 9, 1993.

Davis, Gregory & Christy, Hardy Gregory, Jr., Vienna, for appellant.

McCurdy & Candler, Dana B. Miles, Donald C. Suessmith, Jr., Decatur, for appellee.

BLACKBURN, Judge.

Appellee Manuel C. Ruiz filed a suit on a promissory note and for damages against Armour Alloy, Inc. and appellant Neil Shaw. After the filing of responses and counterclaims, a pretrial order was issued setting forth a succinct outline of the facts and contentions to be tried, as follows: Ruiz and Shaw were the co-owners of Armour Alloy, Inc. Ruiz sold his stock back to the corporation so that Shaw would be the sole owner in exchange for $20,000 cash and a promissory note in the amount of $50,000. Industrial Equipment Company, another corporation owned by Shaw which was added by amendment as a party defendant, made two payments on the note but no payments were received from Shaw or Armour Alloy. The defendants were also alleged to have refused to pay Ruiz certain sales commissions and design fees owed him in the amount of $4,710. Ruiz further claimed that Shaw fraudulently transferred all of Armour Alloy's assets to Industrial Equipment Company so that Armour Alloy was unable to pay the note. He sought to recover the sum of the promissory note plus accrued interest, his commission and design fees and punitive damages as a result of Shaw's fraudulent conduct. The issues were tried before a jury which returned a verdict in favor of Ruiz, including special interrogatories finding that Armour Alloy was not insolvent when it issued the promissory note and that the corporate veil had been pierced. The jury awarded Ruiz $70,911.65 in general damages, $10,636.75 attorney fees and $12,500 punitive damages. Shaw appeals from the denial of his amended motion for new trial, enumerating 17 separate errors.

1. Shaw contends that the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate the trial on the issue of punitive damages as required by OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(2). The cause of action arose here subsequent to the effective date of the statute, and thus it should have controlled the trial procedure. However, this court has previously held that where this occurs a litigant cannot acquiesce in the form of the verdict used and then contest it on appeal. Miles Rich Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mass., 201 Ga.App. 693(1), 411 S.E.2d 901 (1991); Dunkin' Donuts v. Gebar, 202 Ga.App. 450(3), 414 S.E.2d 683 (1992). Here the trial transcript shows that there was a prolonged, detailed discussion between the parties concerning the jury interrogatories and the form of the verdict, but at no time was the bifurcation issue raised nor was any objection made either before or after the jury was instructed. Accordingly, there is no basis for complaint in this regard.

2. Likewise, no reversible error occurred because the trial court's charge to the jury applied the principles found in OCGA § 51-12-5, which have been replaced by those enunciated in OCGA § 51-12-5.1. The judge specifically inquired at the end of his jury instructions if either counsel had any objections, and both attorneys stated that they had none. Such specific acquiescence waives any objections to the charge as given. Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga.App. 760(1), 420 S.E.2d 643 (1992).

There was no error in the charge so substantial as to be harmful as a matter of law, which would require our review under the exception set forth in OCGA § 5-5-24(c). Tahamtan v. Tahamtan, 204 Ga.App. 680(6), 420 S.E.2d 363 (1992). Under the charge given, the jury was to award punitive damages only if they found fraud had been committed; OCGA § 51-12-5.1(b) also authorizes punitive damages when fraud has been shown. Contrary to Shaw's assertion, no mention was made of compensation to the plaintiff. Rather, the jury was told to award such damages to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the wrong, which is in accordance with OCGA § 51-12-5.1(c). Shaw also argues that under the bifurcation procedure in OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(2), which allows new evidence of what amount of damages is sufficient to deter, penalize or punish the defendant, the jury would have realized his weak financial condition at the time and might have awarded less or no punitive damages. This contention is at best conjectural and there is no evidence of record in regard to his financial status. "The burden is on the one who asserts error to show it affirmatively by the record, and the briefs of the parties cannot be used in lieu thereof for adding evidence to support or refute a claim. [Cit.]" Miller v. Tranakos, 198 Ga.App. 668, 671(3), 402 S.E.2d 772 (1991).

3. Shaw insists that the trial court erroneously denied his motions for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages because all legal theories pursuant to which the evidence was presented were based upon the old law in OCGA § 51-12-5, and the evidence was not adjusted to the new principles. For the reasons set forth above, there is no merit in this claim.

4. Shaw complains that the trial court erred in sustaining an objection on the ground of relevance when he asked Ruiz how he got certain work in South America after he sold his stock and left Armour Alloy. Pretermitting any issue of whether such evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes, the trial transcript shows that this question was asked and answered in subsequent cross-examination, thereby curing and rendering harmless any error in sustaining the objection complained of. Seay v. Urban Medical Hosp., 172 Ga.App. 344(2), 323 S.E.2d 190 (1984).

5. Shaw protests the trial court's overruling his objection based on lack of relevance to questions about whether he was initially unwilling to incorporate the partnership with Ruiz because of his ongoing divorce proceedings. The questions objected to alluded to a letter from Shaw's attorney to his accountant, which was admitted in evidence without objection, explaining that in early 1985 Shaw "was not willing to incorporate because of his then hotly contested divorce." Shaw testified only that he was not trying to hide anything from his wife and that he could not answer why his lawyer made the statement. "No other grounds for the objection appear in the record. Objections based on the irrelevancy of evidence are insufficient to show reversible error. [Cit.] Further, '(q)uestions of relevancy are within the domain of the trial court.' [Cit.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony, and there was no reversible error." Davis v. Knight, 195 Ga.App. 726(2), 394 S.E.2d 634 (1990).

6. Shaw contends that the trial court incorrectly ruled that two invoices from a company in Cartersville, Georgia, to an individual in Columbia, which he tendered in support of his allegations of fraud and conspiracy on the part of Ruiz, as well as the insolvency of Armour Alloy, were irrelevant because they did not show interference with contractual relations and were therefore inadmissible. The trial court pointed out to Shaw at the time of his objection that he had not pled fraud and the issue was not included in the pre-trial order. During a lengthy colloquy outside the presence of the jury, Shaw's attorney admitted the invoices did not show that any money was lost by Armour Alloy. Moreover, Shaw did not prepare or supervise preparation of the documents, and thus could not connect them to the case to prove any element of contractual interference. " 'Testimony concerning information acquired solely through books and records kept by a third person is inadmissible as hearsay.' [Cits.]" Dunwoody-Woodlands Cond. Assn. v. Hedquist, 199 Ga.App. 91, 92(2), 403 S.E.2d 893 (1991). Again, no reversible error has been shown.

7. In Enumerations 7 and 8, Shaw complains about the trial court's sustaining an objection to his asking Ruiz to look at a stock purchase agreement and testify how much cash Armour Alloy had on a certain date. The trial transcript reveals that this document had already been introduced in evidence and there had been other testimony about it. There being competent evidence concerning the stock purchase agreement, the refusal to allow Ruiz's testimony in this regard was not reversible error. Ogletree v. Brokers South, 192 Ga.App. 53(4), 383 S.E.2d 900 (1989).

8. The trial court sustained an objection on the basis that a legal conclusion was called for when Shaw was asked if he felt Ruiz had "a responsibility for that equipment in South America and a responsibility for a portion of its payment, and if so, why?" Shaw suggests that this question does not call for a legal conclusion, but for an opinion which any lay person might be likely to have concerning business investments. "[W]hether a question calls for a legal conclusion[,] or principally a fact which incidentally involves a legal word or phrase, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Cits.]" Gage v. Tiffin Motor Homes, 153 Ga.App. 704, 708(2), 266 S.E.2d 345 (1980). Shaw made no proffer of what he expected this testimony to show, nor did he rephrase the question to clarify that the "responsibility" he asked about did not refer to a contractual requirement or statutory duty to pay for the equipment, thereby calling for Shaw's conclusion as to the legal import of Ruiz's actions. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in prohibiting the witness from answering the question. Compare Dept. of Transp. v. Franco's Pizza, etc., 200 Ga.App. 723(2), 409 S.E.2d 281 (1991).

9. Enumeration 10, which asserts error in the trial court's refusal to admit a document which Shaw claimed would show Ruiz's efforts to divert business away from Armour Alloy, is without merit. This exhibit was a purchase order from one company to another, neither of which were parties to the litigation, and no witnesses representing them were called to testify as to the authenticity of the document. "Before a...