Shaw v. State, Dept. of Admin.
| Decision Date | 08 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | Nos. S-4933,S-5010,s. S-4933 |
| Citation | 861 P.2d 566 |
| Parties | John J. SHAW, Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, Public Defender Agency, and David C. Backstrom, Respondents. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, Public Defender Agency, and David C. Backstrom, Petitioners, v. John J. SHAW, Respondent. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Joseph L. Paskvan, Hoppner & Paskvan, Fairbanks, for petitioner-respondent John J. Shaw.
Randy M. Olsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fairbanks, Charles E. Cole, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for respondents-petitioners State of Alaska, Dept. of Admin., Public Defender Agency, and David C. Backstrom.
Before MOORE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, BURKE, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.
These petitions raise several questions arising out of a legal malpractice action brought by a criminal defendant against his attorney. First, we address at what time prejudgment interest in a legal malpractice action brought against a criminal defense attorney begins to accrue. Second, we address the question whether innocence or actual guilt of the plaintiff in the legal malpractice action is relevant. If so, we must further decide who bears the burden of proof on the issue. We address these issues in turn.
The long and complex factual and procedural background in this case is set out in Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991) (Shaw I ). We limit this opinion to summarizing the dates and events relevant to the questions raised by these petitions: (1) Shaw was convicted of two counts of burglary and two counts of larceny in 1973; (2) upon apprehension after fleeing the state, Shaw was sentenced for the 1973 convictions in 1980; (3) on August 15, 1986, Shaw's convictions were set aside as "constitutionally defective;" and (4) Shaw filed a legal malpractice claim against his attorney and the Public Defender's office on January 13, 1988. Id. at 1359-60. Finally in Shaw I we held that the statute of limitations as to legal malpractice arising out of criminal proceedings does not begin to run until after the criminal defendant obtains post-conviction relief. Id. at 1362.
Subsequently both parties moved to establish the law of the case on different issues: Shaw moved for a statement of law regarding when prejudgment interest accrues, and the State moved to establish the law of the case concerning, among other things, the elements to be proven at trial and the accompanying burdens of proof.
In response to Shaw's motion, the superior court found that the legal malpractice cause of action accrued upon Shaw's obtaining post-conviction relief. Therefore, under AS 09.30.070, prejudgment interest commences upon service of the complaint. In response to the State's motion, the superior court held that, as the State acknowledged both duty and breach of duty, Shaw's only burden at trial was to prove the proximate causal connection between his counsel's negligent defense at trial and his claimed damages. The superior court further ruled that at trial the State had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative defense that Shaw was actually guilty of the original charges.
Shaw petitioned for review of the court's ruling concerning the time at which prejudgment interest accrues and the State petitioned for review of the ruling establishing the law of the case as to the parties' respective burdens at trial. We AFFIRM.
In order to determine when prejudgment interest begins to accrue, we must determine when Shaw's cause of action arose. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 274 (Alaska 1970) (). We have consistently held in the context of civil judgments that "a cause of action accrues when all the essential elements forming the basis for the claim have occurred." Lamoreux v. Langlotz, 757 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1988) (citations omitted). Thus, the question is when did all the essential elements forming the basis of Shaw's claim accrue.
In Shaw I, we held that "obtaining post-conviction relief is an element of legal malpractice in criminal cases." 816 P.2d at 1360 n. 2. It is clear, then, that all the essential elements of Shaw's legal malpractice claim did not accrue until he obtained post-conviction relief on August 15, 1986. 2 In regard to prejudgment interest, the legislature has provided that all causes of action that accrue after June 11, 1986 are subject to AS 09.30.070. Ch. 139, § 9, SLA 1986. The statute provides, in part:
(b) Except when the court finds that the parties have agreed otherwise, prejudgment interest accrues from the day process is served on the defendant or the day the defendant received written notification that an injury has occurred and that a claim may be brought against the defendant for that injury, whichever is earlier.
AS 09.30.070(b). As no written notice was provided to the defendant, prejudgment interest began to accrue on January 15, 1988, when the complaint was served.
We have not previously addressed the relevance of a criminal defendant's innocence to that defendant's subsequent malpractice claim against his former defense attorney. A survey of case law from other states indicates that this area of criminal malpractice constitutes a small but growing percentage of legal malpractice cases. 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.1, at 284 n. 4 (3d ed. 1989). In cases that have addressed the issue of a criminal defendant's guilt, the vast majority of courts have held that innocence or the actual guilt 3 of the criminal defendant is relevant. 4 Before deciding whether to join the majority of courts on this issue, we first address the question of whether the civil arena even allows such an inquiry to be made. We think that it does. In so holding, we base our decision on the different purposes and goals of the criminal and civil justice systems.
It is indisputable that a primary goal, perhaps the paramount goal, of the criminal justice system is to protect the innocent accused against an erroneous conviction. Our society has made "a fundamental value determination ... that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1077, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also State v. Alto, 589 P.2d 402, 406 (Alaska 1979) (). This value determination is evidenced by the array of protections provided an accused by the United States Constitution and the Alaska Constitution. When the state brings its power as a prosecuting authority to bear on an individual, the Constitutions protect the accused by imposing carefully crafted limitations 5 on the state's ability to prosecute. 6
Few would dispute that reliable factfinding is also a significant goal of both the criminal and the civil systems. In both arenas, courts seek the truth concerning the events in dispute. In the criminal system however, the goal of reliable factfinding and the goal of protecting the innocent accused may conflict. 7
When these two goals conflict, it is the goal of reliable factfinding that must give way to the paramount goal of protecting the innocent accused. As Lafave and Israel noted:
Reliable factfinding, as a goal in itself, would seek to ensure equally the accuracy of both guilty verdicts and nonguilty verdicts. Protection of the innocent, however, places greater priority on the accuracy of the guilty verdict. It reflects a desire to minimize the chance of convicting an innocent person even at the price of increasing the chance that a guilty person may escape conviction.
1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 1.6(c), at 45 (1984). 8
Thus, the criminal system resolves the conflict between protecting the innocent accused and reliable factfinding by choosing to err on the side of ensuring the accuracy of guilty verdicts. In order to ensure accuracy, the criminal trial is limited by the protections the Constitutions provide to determining the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, at times the determination of the truth in a particular case is subsumed in order to fulfill the goal of protecting the innocent.
In the civil system, however, the same conflict does not arise because the goal of protecting an innocent accused is no longer paramount. The protective barriers provided an accused by our state and federal case law and Constitutions are no longer applicable, and thus we are not confined to a determination of the plaintiff's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as noted above, the determination that the civil arena allows inquiry into innocence or the actual guilt of the plaintiff does not end our inquiry. Simply because we are not prevented in the civil system from determining innocence or the actual guilt of the plaintiff does not resolve the question of whether innocence or the actual guilt of the plaintiff is relevant in a malpractice suit against his former defense attorney. We conclude that it is.
If a plaintiff in a criminal malpractice action against his former defense attorney has engaged in the criminal conduct he was accused of in the criminal trial, public policy prevents recovery on his part. We have previously held that civil recovery should not be a tool for shifting an individual's responsibility for the individual's criminal acts. This principle is applicable to the case at hand.
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