Shawnee Trail Conservancy et al v. U.S. Dept. Agriculture

• Citation: 222 F.3d 383
• Decision Date: 25 July 2000
• Docket Number: R-IX,No. 99-3364,99-3364
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2000) Shawnee Trail Conservancy, Illinois Trail Riders, Horsemen's Council of Illinois, Southern Illinois Campground and Ranch Owners Association, and Illinois Federation of Outdoor Resources, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. United States Department of Agriculture, United States Forest Service, Daniel Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture, Michael P. Dombeck, Chief, United States Forest Service, Robert T. Jacobs, Regional Forester, Eastern Region (), United States Forest Service, and Louise Odegaard, Supervisor, Shawnee National Forest, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 383

222 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000)

Shawnee Trail Conservancy, Illinois Trail Riders, Horsemen's Council of Illinois, Southern Illinois Campground and Ranch Owners Association, and Illinois Federation of Outdoor Resources, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. United States Department of Agriculture, United States Forest Service, Daniel Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture, Michael P. Dombeck, Chief, United States Forest Service, Robert T. Jacobs, Regional Forester, Eastern Region (R-IX), United States Forest Service, and Louise Odegaard, Supervisor, Shawnee National Forest, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-3364

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued March 29, 2000

Decided July 25, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Benton Division. No. 98-CV-4248-JPG--J. Phil Gilbert, Chief Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Flaum, Ripple, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.

Flaum, Circuit Judge.

The Shawnee Trail Conservancy, the Illinois Trail Riders, the Horsemen's Council of Illinois, the Southern Illinois Campground and Ranch Owners Association, and the Illinois Federation of Outdoor Resources brought suit in federal district court under both the United States Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. sec. 701 et seq., alleging that the defendants lacked the constitutional and statutory authority to designate certain areas of the Shawnee National Forest (the "Shawnee") as Research Natural Areas ("RNAs"). The district court dismissed both of the plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs' constitutional claim was an adverse claim of title against the United States and therefore had to be brought pursuant to the Quiet Title Act of 1972 ("QTA" or the "Act"), 28 U.S.C. sec. 2409a et seq., and that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies for purposes of their APA claim. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. Facts

The dispute in this case centers on the use of the Shawnee National Forest, an area that consists of approximately 265,135 acres in southern Illinois. The Shawnee is managed by the United States Forest Service according to a land use and management plan required by statute. According to the applicable regulations, the goal of the land use and management plan is to "maximize[ ] long term net public benefits in an environmentally sound manner."

In November 1986, the Forest Service issued its 1986 Land and Resource Management Plan. Among other things, the Plan proposed that twelve areas in the Shawnee, including the Atwood Ridge area and the Burke Branch area, be designated RNAs. RNAs are areas of land within a National Forest on which the Forest Service allows natural conditions to prevail in order to promote biological diversity, research and monitoring, and education. The Chief of the Forest Service followed the recommendations of the 1986 Plan and established the Atwood Ridge RNA in September 1990 and the Burke Branch RNA in March 1991.

The Forest Service has designated a total of eighty-one areas in the Shawnee as RNAs. In order to protect these areas, mountain bikes, all- terrain vehicles, and off-road motorcycles are prohibited. In addition, equestrian use is limited to designated trails. On January 31, 1997, the Forest Service took the additional step of closing forty of the Shawnee's RNAs, including the Atwood Ridge RNA and the Burke Branch RNA, to all equestrian use.

In July 1998, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court challenging the Forest Service's decision to restrict access to the Atwood Ridge and Burke Branch areas and its decision to designate those areas as RNAs. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claim on the ground that it challenged the United States' title to land and consequently had to be brought under the QTA. The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' APA claim, holding that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

We review de novo the district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1999). In considering the defendants' motion to dismiss, we "must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[s]." Capital Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993).

A. The Quiet Title Act

The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the Forest Service lacks the authority to restrict the use of certain roads in the Atwood Ridge RNA and the Burke Branch RNA. According to the plaintiffs, these roads are subject to both public and private easements and rights-of-way that pre-date the creation of the Shawnee. The plaintiffs contend that because these easements and rights-of-way have been continually used and have not been vacated or abandoned, the right to control the use of the roads in the Atwood Ridge RNA and the Burke Branch RNA are not held by the Forest Service. In other words, the plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service cannot restrict the use of the roads in the Atwood Ridge and Burke Branch areas because they do not own the property rights necessary to make decisions concerning their incidents of use.

The district court did not reach the plaintiffs' constitutional claim on the merits, but rather concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim because the plaintiffs' argument represented a clear challenge to the United States' ownership of the land in question. According to the district court, all such challenges must be brought pursuant to the QTA. Because the plaintiffs did not bring their claim under the QTA, but rather under the Constitution, the district court held that it could not consider the issue of title to the land. The district court further found unpersuasive the plaintiffs' attempt to structure their claim as a constitutional challenge to the federal government's regulatory authority, and not to its title. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that this decision was erroneous and that the district court properly had subject matter jurisdiction over their constitutional challenge to the restrictions imposed by the Forest Service.

The QTA operates as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in cases where a party seeks to adjudicate a title dispute to real property in which the United States claims an interest. Specifically, the Act provides that "The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights." 28 U.S.C. sec. 2409a(a). In its decisions interpreting the QTA, the Supreme Court has made clear that, through its adoption of the Act, "Congress intended . . . to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States' title to real property." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983) (emphasis added). While the plaintiffs concede that the QTA is the exclusive vehicle for suits challenging the United States' title to real property in certain contexts, they contend that this exclusivity principle does not apply when the party bringing the suit is not an adverse claimant.

The plaintiffs contend that the "adverse claimants" language in the Supreme Court's Block opinion is an important limitation on the exclusivity of the QTA. The plaintiffs admit that the Act is the exclusive means by which a party claiming a property interest in land in which the United States also maintains an interest may challenge the United States' assertion of title. However, the plaintiffs argue that the QTA does not limit their ability to challenge the United States' regulatory authority by bringing suit pursuant to other statutes or the Constitution as long as they do not seek to quiet title in themselves. Under this theory, because the plaintiffs do not claim that they own the easements or rights-of-way over the roads in the Atwood Ridge RNA and the Burke Branch RNA, the plaintiffs' suit need not be brought pursuant to the QTA.

In support of this argument, the plaintiffs do not cite any case law specifically limiting the exclusivity of the QTA to suits in which the plaintiffs seek to quiet title in themselves. Instead, they rely on cases that have entertained challenges to the regulatory authority of the United States without addressing the QTA. See, e.g., Wilkensen v. Department of the Int., 634 F.Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F.Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997). Although we recognize that these cases resolved title disputes similar to the one around which this case centers without reference to the QTA, it is significant that those cases give no indication that the QTA was ever raised as an issue. In circumstances where a court assumes jurisdiction without addressing a jurisdictional issue, that assumption of jurisdiction is of limited precedential value. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) ("[T]his Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silento.").

Because we find the precedent cited by the plaintiffs to be of little value, the merits of their argument turn on the persuasiveness of their definition of "adverse claimants." According to the plaintiffs, the plain meaning of "adverse claimants" does not include parties who, although challenging the federal government's right to regulate land, do not attempt to quiet title in themselves. Although we agree that the interpretation offered by the plaintiffs is a plausible one, we do not believe that the language of the Supreme Court's opinion in Block is as clear as the plaintiffs contend. It is true that the...