Shay v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-04064-RGK-SK |
| Citation | 538 F.Supp.3d 983 |
| Parties | Francis SHAY et al. v. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES LTD. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Debi F. Chalik, Pro Hac Vice, Chalik and Chalik PA, Plantation, FL, Michael A. Simmrin, Simmrin Law Group, Burbank, CA, for Bruce Grant, Michelle Grant.
Edgar R. Nield, Nield Law Group APC, Jeffrey B. Maltzman, Gabrielle DeSantis Nield, Rafaela Patricia Castells, Maltzman and Partners PA, Encinitas, CA, Jonathan W. Hughes, Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, San Francisco, CA, Katie J. L. Scott, Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Michael A. Sokolson, Pro Hac Vice, Maltzman and Partners PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd.
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [DE 20]
This case arises out of the COVID-19 outbreak on the Grand Princess —a cruise ship operated by Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. ("Princess Cruises" or "Defendant"). The Grand Princess departed out of San Francisco for Hawaii on February 21, 2020, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in America. The ship had 3,533 people on board: 2,422 passengers and 1,111 crew. As of March 6, 46 people on the ship had been tested, and 21 tested positive—numbers which would rise precipitously in the coming weeks.
On May 4, 2020, Plaintiffs Francis Shay, Sandra Shay, Bruce Grant, and Michelle Grant (collectively, "Plaintiffs")—passengers aboard the Grand Princess —filed this lawsuit against Princess Cruises, alleging negligence and gross negligence. The Grants allege that they contracted COVID-19 at an unspecified point, while the Shays do not allege that they contracted the disease.
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. For the following reasons the Court GRANTS in part Defendant's Motion.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges the following:
Plaintiffs were passengers aboard the Grand Princess. Defendant, as the operator of the Grand Princess , owed a duty to Plaintiffs to ensure that they would not be exposed to unreasonable risk of harm. Defendant breached this duty by failing to take necessary precautions to keep its passengers, crew, and the public safe. For example, when the Grand Princess embarked for Hawaii on February 21, there were 62 passengers on board who had also been on the ship's prior voyage to Mexico. Defendant knew that at least two of the passengers on the Mexico voyage disembarked on February 21 with symptoms of COVID-19. Indeed, on February 25, Defendant sent emails to passengers who were on the Mexico voyage notifying them of their potential exposure to COVID-19. Nevertheless, Defendant proceeded with the Hawaii voyage, despite the risk of further infection on the ship. Defendant also failed to warn Plaintiffs about their potential exposure to the virus.
Defendant also failed to employ proper screening protocols for COVID-19 before boarding on the Hawaii voyage. Before boarding on February 21, passengers were simply asked to fill out a form confirming they were not sick. Passengers were not questioned or examined, even though another one of Defendant's ships, the Diamond Princess , suffered a severe outbreak of COVID-19 three weeks prior.
As a result of Defendant's negligence, the Grants contracted COVID-19 and all Plaintiffs suffered emotional distress and were traumatized by their fear of contracting COVID-19 as they remained quarantined on the Grand Princess. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages for Defendant's gross negligence.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 8(a), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). If a complaint fails to adequately state a claim for relief, the defendant may move to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff alleges enough facts to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Id. A plaintiff need not provide detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than mere legal conclusions. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Dismissal is "appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
The parties appear to agree that "[t]he sufficiency of the [C]omplaint is governed by the general maritime law of the United States." Stacy v. Rederiet Otto Danielsen, A.S. , 609 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc. , 39 F.3d 1398, 1409 (9th Cir. 1994) ).
Under federal maritime law, a plaintiff seeking to recover for NIED must satisfy the zone of danger test set forth in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall , 512 U.S. 532, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). Stacy , 609 F.3d at 1035. In Gottshall , a plaintiff alleged that he witnessed the death of a co-worker while on the job, and that this experience caused him severe emotional distress. Id. at 536-37, 114 S.Ct. 2396. He sought to recover damages from his employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act ("FELA") for "mental or emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) ... not directly brought about by a physical injury." Id. at 544, 114 S.Ct. 2396. The Supreme Court recognized "that uncabined recognition of claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress would hold out the very real possibility of nearly infinite and unpredictable liability for defendants." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers , 538 U.S. 135, 146, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261 (2003) (quoting Gottshall , 512 U.S. at 546, 114 S.Ct. 2396 ) (cleaned up). Thus, after considering various limiting tests developed at common law, the Court selected the zone of danger test "to delineate the proper scope of an employer's duty under the FELA to avoid subjecting its employees to negligently inflicted emotional injury." Id. (). Gottshall ’s zone of danger test limits recovery for stand-alone emotional distress claims to two categories of plaintiffs: (1) "plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct"; and (2) plaintiffs "who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct." Gottshall , 512 U.S. at 547-48, 114 S.Ct. 2396 (emphasis added).
In Metro-North , the Supreme Court applied the zone of danger test to another plaintiff's claim for damages under FELA. Metro-North Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley , 521 U.S. 424, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997). In that case, Buckley, a railroad worker who was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos, brought a claim under FELA for NIED based on his fear of developing cancer
and asbestosis in the future. The "critical question" before the Court was whether Buckley's physical contact with the insulation dust amounted to a "physical impact" under the first prong of Gottshall
’ s zone of danger test. Id. at 429, 117 S.Ct. 2113. The Court held that it was not. The Court held that the words "physical impact" as used in Gottshall do not encompass mere "exposure ... to a substance that poses some future risk of disease and which causes only emotional distress[.]" Id. at 432, 117 S.Ct. 2113. Instead, to recover, a plaintiff must manifest some symptom of the feared disease. Id. at 427, 117 S.Ct. 2113. The Court explained that restricting recovery in this way was appropriate for several reasons, including (1) the special difficulty for judges and juries in separating valid, important claims from those that are invalid or trivial; (2) the threat of unlimited and unpredictable liability; and (3) the potential for a flood of comparatively unimportant, or trivial claims. Id. at 433, 117 S.Ct. 2113.
The Supreme Court again considered the zone of danger test in Ayers . 538 U.S. at 141, 123 S.Ct. 1210. Like Buckley, the plaintiffs in Ayers were exposed to asbestos while on the job. Id. at 141–42, 123 S.Ct. 1210. However, whereas Buckley did not contract asbestosis
, the plaintiffs in Ayers did. Id. The Supreme Court observed that " Gottshall and Metro-North describe two categories [of claims]: Stand-alone emotional distress claims not provoked by any physical injury, for which recovery is sharply circumscribed by the zone-of-danger test; and emotional distress claims brought on by a physical injury, for which pain and suffering recovery is permitted." Id. at 147, 123 S.Ct. 1210. The Court went on to contrast the plaintiffs’ claims with those asserted in Gottshall and Metro-North , stating: ...
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