SHC v. Lu
| Decision Date | 16 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 49309-4-I.,49309-4-I. |
| Citation | 54 P.3d 174,113 Wash.App. 511 |
| Parties | S.H.C. and F.M., Appellants, v. Sheng-Yen LU, an individual; and Ling Shen Ching Tze Temple, Inc., a corporation, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Rebecca Jane Roe, Kathryn Goater, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
M. Colleen Barrett, Gregory Worden, Barrett & Worden, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Respondent.
The First Amendment does not provide religious organizations with absolute immunity from liability for tortious conduct.1 If such liability is predicated on secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of church doctrine or religious beliefs, there is no violation of the Constitution.2 Here, S.H.C. claims that the Ling Shen Ching Tze Temple, Inc., (Temple) is vicariously liable under various theories for alleged sexual acts committed by Grandmaster Sheng-Yen Lu (Grandmaster Lu). He is the spiritual leader and founder of the True Buddha religion practiced by followers worshiping at the Temple. Because the Temple did not owe S.H.C. a duty under the facts of this case, there was no breach of fiduciary duty for which the Temple is liable. Moreover, the negligent supervision/retention claim and the business invitee claim are barred by the First Amendment. Finally, this record does not support any claim under the alternative theories of alter ego, ostensible agency, or negligent pastoral counseling. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting summary judgment of dismissal to the Temple.
Grandmaster Lu founded the True Buddha School, a denomination of Buddhism. The Temple is a Buddhist Temple and associated monastic community of the True Buddha School. The practice of the True Buddha School is a combination of Taoism, sectarian Buddhism, and Tantric Buddhism. Grandmaster Lu is recognized by followers of the True Buddha School as a living Buddha.
S.H.C. became a follower of Grandmaster Lu in 1992. Sometime in 1996 she began to go to the Temple to receive blessings because she was not feeling well. During her stays there, she had headaches. According to S.H.C., Grandmaster Lu told her that he could cure the headaches. She also claims that he told her that she would die. According to her, Grandmaster Lu told her that he could save her life and cure her illness by the "Twin Body Blessing." The "blessing" was, in fact, sexual intercourse, which S.H.C. engaged in with Grandmaster Lu multiple times from 1996 to 1999. She maintains that he assured her that this "blessing" would save her life. Only when she did not die, and after she saw him approach other women in similar ways, did she realize that he had tricked her.
S.H.C. sued Grandmaster Lu for negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrage, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent pastoral counseling. Her suit against the Temple included claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent pastoral counseling, and negligent retention and supervision of Grandmaster Lu.
The Temple moved for summary judgment on all claims against it, and the trial court granted this motion. Thereafter, S.H.C. and the Temple moved for entry of a final judgment as to the claims against the Temple only, which the trial court granted.
S.H.C. appeals.
We first establish certain parameters of our decision. Although the Temple concedes that factual questions preclude dismissal of Grandmaster Lu, the claims of S.H.C. against him are not presently before us.3 For purposes of the summary judgment motion of the Temple that is before us, we assume, without deciding, that Grandmaster Lu is liable for one or more of the claims that S.H.C. asserts against him. Our focus here is on the claims against the Temple that the trial court dismissed.
As to those claims, we first consider whether each is potentially valid. For those claims that are potentially valid, we only then reach the First Amendment questions.4
S.H.C. argues that the court erred in dismissing her claim for negligent supervision. Specifically, S.H.C. argues that the First Amendment does not bar review of the claim. We disagree.
We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 Summary judgment is proper when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion regarding the material facts.6 A material fact is one on which the outcome of litigation depends.7 All facts and reasonable inferences must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.8 We review questions of law de novo.9
"Negligent supervision creates a limited duty to control an employee for the protection of a third person, even when the employee is acting outside the scope of employment."10 Employer liability for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision arises from this duty. "If an employee conducts negligent acts outside the scope of employment, the employer may be liable for negligent supervision."11 An employer is not liable for negligent supervision of an employee unless the employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the employee presented a risk of danger to others.12
The parties dispute whether Grandmaster Lu is an employee of the Temple. They also dispute whether the Temple had knowledge of Grandmaster Lu's alleged acts. We address the second point, and need not address the first. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to S.H.C., the nonmoving party, there are genuine issues of fact as to the Temple's notice of improper activities.
S.H.C. testified that Temple officials were aware that her interactions with Grandmaster Lu were "out of the ordinary or unacceptable for interactions by followers." She states that one of the Temple's nuns saw her leave a closed door consultation room after she was alone with Grandmaster Lu. She further states that one of the Temple's monks scolded her for approaching Grandmaster Lu because followers were not supposed to approach and speak with him. She also states that on another occasion several nuns saw Grandmaster Lu approach her in the Temple, take her into an office, and close the door. She states that Temple personnel summoned her to Grandmaster Lu's presence and that masters, monks, and nuns saw her leave Grandmaster Lu's bedroom. Finally, she states that one of the Temple's nuns warned her that they were keeping track of how much time she spent with Grandmaster Lu, that she should stop having consultations with him, and that she should not have consultations with the door locked. This evidence is sufficient to create a factual issue that the Temple was on notice of Grandmaster Lu's activities, subject only to the question of whether the factual issue is material for summary judgment purposes.
The Temple also argues that S.H.C. has failed to show that the Temple had the authority to control Grandmaster Lu. Again, this presents a genuine factual issue. Even if the Temple has no authority to supervise or terminate Grandmaster Lu "in his capacity as Spiritual Leader of the True Buddha religion," as Temple President Master Teck Hui Teng testified, S.H.C. did introduce evidence that the Temple officials had the authority to exclude Grandmaster Lu from the Temple grounds. Thus, on the question of control, there are also genuine issues of fact.
Because there were genuine issues of fact regarding notice and control, we must now turn to the question of whether those factual issues are material. Because the First Amendment bars consideration of this claim, we hold they are not.
Clergy sexual misconduct and the consequences that flow from such misconduct continue to be the subjects of much litigation.13 A principle question for religious institutions associated with clergy accused of sexual misconduct is whether the First Amendment bars vicarious liability for such institutions.14 Resolution of this question has, by no means, been uniform either among or within jurisdictions that have considered the issue.15
In Washington, C.J.C. v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop of Yakima presented this question. The state supreme court rejected the argument by a church that the First Amendment barred the court from imposing a duty on the church to take reasonable measures to prevent harm intentionally inflicted on children by a church worker. In that case, the court considered three consolidated cases regarding negligence claims brought against church entities and individual church officials. The defendants included officials who did not themselves directly perpetrate intentional acts of childhood sexual abuse, but who allegedly failed to protect the child victims or otherwise prevent the abuse.
The court considered the question of First Amendment protections in its discussion of one of the three consolidated cases, Funkhouser v. Wilson.16 In that case, three daughters of a former pastor of the Calvary Baptist Church of Twisp (Church) sued the Church and Orin Wilson, a prominent member and onetime deacon of the Church. They claimed Wilson molested them when they were children. Although a Church elder had been warned that Wilson had had inappropriate sexual contact with a child, Wilson was "made a deacon and was entrusted with various leadership positions within the Church that allegedly provided extensive contact with and authority over children."17 The Church elder who was warned failed to alert the plaintiffs or their father of the accusations against Wilson. The state supreme court held that the Church owed a duty of reasonable care to affirmatively act to prevent the harm the children suffered, in view of its special protective relationship to them, its relationship to Wilson, and the knowledge the Church allegedly possessed.18
The supreme court then considered whether the claims against the Church were barred by the First Amendment. The court stated that ...
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