Shea v. Corbett

• Decision Date: 23 December 1921
• Citation: 97 Conn. 141,115 A. 694
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHEA v. CORBETT. SLONSKI v. SAME.

115 A. 694

97 Conn. 141

SHEA v. CORBETT.

SLONSKI v. SAME.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 23, 1921

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; John J. Walsh and John R. Booth, Judges.

Actions by George S. Shea and by Michael Slonski, each against James Corbett. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals from both judgments. No error in either case.

Robert J. Woodruff, of New Haven, for appellant.

Barnard Keating, of Bridgeport, for appellees.

GAGER J.

Shea's action was to recover for injury to his automobile due to defendant's negligence in the operation of his automobile, and Slonski's action was to recover for personal injuries due to the same acts of negligence. The facts material to the appeal are brief: Shea was a resident of Connecticut, and his automobile was lawfully registered under the laws of Connecticut; this automobile was being operated by Slonski, the plaintiff in the second case. Slonski was a resident of the state of New York, and was an operator duly licensed under the laws of New York, and had operated his car in Connecticut for a period of less than 30 days. Slonski had driven his own car duly registered in New York to Bridgeport with his family. In Bridgeport his car was found to be out of repair, and was taken to a garage. To enable Slonski to return to New York the plaintiff Shea loaned his car to Slonski, who drove it to Brooklyn, N.Y. To return this borrowed car to Shea in Bridgeport, Slonski drove Shea's car back to Bridgeport and while so driving the car on the highway in Bridgeport the collision causing the injuries to both Shea's car and Slonski's person happened. The defendant demurred to each complaint, in substance on the ground that, under the provisions of sections 21 and 44 of chapter 233 of the Acts of 1919, being the Motor Vehicle Act of 1919, in force at the time of the collision in question, neither of the plaintiffs was entitled to recover. Both demurrers were overruled, and upon the trial the same defense was raised by request to charge, not granted, and by objection to the admission of Slonski's New York license as an automobile operator, which was admitted over the objection. The single point in each case was as to the effect of the New York license to Slonski as an operator while he was driving in Connecticut.

It is necessary to have the statute before us. Section 21 of the act of 1919, relating to operation by a nonresident, omitting the part relating to public service and commercial motor vehicles, is as follows:

" Any nonresident over eighteen years of age, who has complied with the laws of the state within which he resides, relating to motor vehicles and the operation thereof, may operate such motor vehicle upon the highways of the state for a period not exceeding thirty days, not necessarily consecutive, in any year, without complying with the provisions of this act requiring the registration of motor vehicles and the licensing of operators *** provided such nonresident shall cause to be displayed on his motor vehicle, upon two plates substantially as required by section thirteen, the distinguishing number or mark required by the state within which he resides. *** Any nonresident who shall operate a motor vehicle in this state for a period of more than thirty days during any one year in violation of the provisions of this section shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars."

Section 44, barring recovery of damages in civil actions, reads as follows:

" No recovery shall be had in the courts of this state by the owner of a motor vehicle which has not been legally registered in accordance with section eight, nine, ten, eleven or twelve for injury to person or property received by reason of the operation of such motor vehicle upon any public highway, unless such motor vehicle is the property of a nonresident and is within the provisions of section twenty-one; nor shall such recovery be had if such motor vehicle be legally registered but was being operated by an unlicensed person in violation of any provision of section fourteen, fifteen or sixteen, provided nothing herein shall prevent recovery by a licensed operator or a passenger who had reason to believe that such motor vehicle was legally registered, nor by any passenger who was not aware that the operator was unlicensed or the motor vehicle not properly registered."

Let us first take Slonski's Case: He was a nonresident, living in Brooklyn, New York, and he was duly authorized as an operator under the laws of New York. He had not operated in this state more than 30 days during the current license year. Under the express terms of the statute he was released from " complying with the provisions of this act requiring the registration of motor vehicles and the licensing of operators." That is, within the time limited for nonresidents he stood in all respects as though he held a Connecticut license, and, if needed, a Connecticut car registration. If he had at the time of the accident been driving his own car, it is admitted that no question could have been raised. The defendant, however, contends that because Slonski was driving a car with a Connecticut registration, the statute denies him the protection of his New York license certificate when driving the Connecticut car; that is, that the nonresident provision must, both as to license and car registration, be coincident and corelated in their effect, and that, assuming the 30-day limitation not to have been exceeded in either case, a New York car could not have been operated by a Connecticut licensee nor a Connecticut car by a New York licensee. We think this narrow construction is not warranted by the language or the manifest purpose of the act, and that such construction materially limits the comity character of the statute. There is no connection between the license to operate and the registration of the car. Probably in a great majority of cases the operator is not the owner of the car he is operating. An operator's license is purely a personal privilege, nontransferable, and granted by the state on account of fitness. Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 27 Am.Dec. 675; Berry, Automobiles (3d Ed.) § § 100 and 260. The registration certificate is for the purpose of identification and revenue. Operator and owner, while they may, of course, be the same person, are treated in the motor vehicle laws as entirely unrelated. The license is...