Shea v. Gabriel
Decision Date | 04 August 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 75-1096,75-1096 |
Citation | 520 F.2d 879 |
Parties | Thomas SHEA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James GABRIEL, United States Attorney, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Charlotte Anne Perretta, Boston, Mass., with whom Kevin M. Keating, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
Anne T. Wallace, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom James N. Gabriel, U. S. Atty., Jeremiah O'Sullivan, Sp. Atty., and Shirley Baccus-Lobel, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on brief, for defendants-appellees.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
On December 14, 1974, federal agents served three search warrants on appellant Shea, authorizing them to search his person, automobile, and residence for various items commonly associated with gambling. The agents seized a number of things under this authority, including approximately $4,368 arranged in bundles of various denominations. 1 On February 12, 1975, Shea filed a complaint invoking the jurisdiction of the court under its inherent power to discipline its officers and to order suppression and return of illegally seized property, see Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 353-55, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931), and under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 Among other relief Shea sought to examine the affidavit upon which the warrants were based and to have the court, "after trial, enter a formal order suppressing and/or returning" to him the items seized. At the hearing on this complaint the government made the following representations to the court. 3
After an in camera examination of the affidavit submitted for the search warrants, the court declined to order its disclosure:
The court also refused to order suppression or return of the property, on the ground that the "prejudice to plaintiff by delayed return to him of the property is outweighed by the legitimate and appropriate governmental interest (in) using the property as evidence before the grand jury." 4 This appeal followed.
We first consider our jurisdiction. In DiBella v. United States,369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962), the Court held that denial of a pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence was not a final decision and therefore was not immediately appealable. That holding governs here. Both appellants in DiBella were indicted before the district court's denial of the pre-indictment motion, but we decline to attach significance to that distinction. Appellate consideration of suppression motions in the circumstances here potentially involves similar undue interference with the criminal justice system and is still piecemeal. Since appellant cannot prevent the grand jury from using the seized items and their fruits to question him, even if the seizure was illegal, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), that issue does not require recognizing appealability. To our knowledge Shea is not under arrest, has not been indicted, and has not had forfeiture proceedings started against his seized property. 5 In fact, it may be that Shea will not be indicted at all. In these circumstances we do not see any interest that would be served by finding denial of the suppression order appealable. On the other hand, if Shea is indicted and convicted, there will be an adequate chance for appellate review after the district court imposes sentence. Therefore, insofar as the appeal is from the denial of the suppression aspect of the motion, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Accord, Coury v. United States, 426 F.2d 1354, 1355 (6th Cir. 1970); Hill v. United States, 346 F.2d 175 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 956, 86 S.Ct. 433, 15 L.Ed.2d 361 (1965); see United States v. Smith, 463 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Rom, 459 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1972).
Whether the denial is appealable insofar as the motion seeks return of appellant's property is a more difficult question. Again, we begin with DiBella, where the Court stated: "Only if the motion is solely for return of property and is in no way tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant can the proceedings be regarded as independent." 369 U.S. at 131-132, 82 S.Ct. at 660. This passage produces two questions: What does "solely" mean in this context? When is a criminal prosecution in esse?
It appears logical that a motion is not "solely for return of property" when it also seeks suppression of the property as evidence. A number of courts have so held. United States v. Woodson, 490 F.2d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1973); Dudley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th Cir. 1970); Meister v. United States, 397 F.2d 268, 269 (3d Cir. 1968); Smith v. United States, 377 F.2d 739, 742 (3d Cir. 1967); Parrish v. United States, 376 F.2d 601, 603-04 (4th Cir. 1967) (Boreman, J., concurring). But other courts have read this language so as to make appealable that part of the order denying return of property. United States v. Williams, 459 F.2d 909, 910-11 (6th Cir. 1972); Coury v. United States, supra at 1355; Gottone v. United States, 345 F.2d 165 (10th Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 901, 86 S.Ct. 234, 15 L.Ed.2d 155 (1965). In United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971), the Court indicated why denial of a motion for return is immediately appealable: "Denial of review in such circumstances would mean that the Government might indefinitely retain the property without any opportunity for the movant to assert on appeal his right to possession." Thus if we found no appellate jurisdiction Shea could apparently remedy this by bringing a separate motion for return. But to insist on this procedure appears to exalt form over substance. 6
Conflicting viewpoints also characterize the issue of when a criminal prosecution is in esse 7 within the meaning of DiBella. Compare Smith v. United States, supra, 377 F.2d at 742 ( ), with Gottone v. United States, supra ( ). Perhaps a presentation to the grand jury as contemplated here is sufficient to render the motion for return one "tied to a criminal prosecution in esse " against Shea, but the Court appears to view the determinative criminal proceedings as beginning later. See DiBella, supra, 369 U.S. at 131, 82 S.Ct. 654. 8 A sensible demarcation might be when the criminal process shifts from the investigatory phase to the accusatory.
It is not necessary for us to resolve these questions here. Even if we assume, without deciding, that we have jurisdiction, we would afford appellant no relief, for the equities are not in his favor. See Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382, 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866, 73 S.Ct. 108, 97 L.Ed. 672 (195...
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