Shea v. Kevic Corp.
| Decision Date | 24 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 40563.,40563. |
| Parties | Irina N. SHEA, Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross Respondent, v. KEVIC CORPORATION, d/b/a Lett's Downtown Carwash, Defendant–Respondent–Cross Appellant, and Does I through X, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Irina N. SHEA, Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross Respondent,
v.
KEVIC CORPORATION, d/b/a Lett's Downtown Carwash, Defendant–Respondent–Cross Appellant,
and
Does I through X, inclusive, Defendants.
No. 40563.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Coeur d'Alene, April 2014 Term.
June 24, 2014.
[328 P.3d 523]
The district court's rulings on respondent's Motions to Strike Affidavits are affirmed. Judgment of dismissal is vacated and case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant.
Madsen Law Offices, P.C., Coeur d'Alene, attorneys for appellant. Henry D. Madsen argued.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, L.L.P., Boise, attorneys for respondent. Chris H. Hansen argued.
W. JONES, Justice.
Appellant Irina N. Shea brought a negligence suit against Respondent Kevic Corporation (Kevic), d/b/a Lett's Downtown Car Wash, located in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. Shea claimed that she was injured when she slipped and fell on ice near the exit of the car wash due to Kevic's negligence in allowing ice to build up near the car wash exit or in failing to warn of the danger of ice buildup. The district court granted Kevic's motion to strike portions of the affidavit of Shea's attorney Henry Madsen and also granted Kevic's motion for summary judgment. Shea appeals these rulings. In addition, Shea appeals the district court's denial of her two motions for reconsideration. Kevic cross-appeals the district court's order denying its motion to strike portions of Shea's affidavit, which Shea had filed in support of her first motion for reconsideration.
On November 14, 2011, Shea filed a complaint and demand for a jury trial against Kevic. Shea alleged that on January 22, 2011, she “sustained certain injuries as a result of a fall on the ice at the premises of” Lett's Downtown Car Wash, “when she exited her vehicle to adjust her mirrors which had been moved during the car wash.” Shea asserted that Kevic was negligent in allowing ice to build up at Lett's Downtown Car Wash premises and in failing to warn or protect patrons from the ice. Shea sought over $30,000 in damages.
Kevic moved for summary judgment. Shea responded in opposition to Kevic's motion and submitted an affidavit of her attorney Madsen in support of her opposition. Kevic moved to strike portions of the affidavit and two of its accompanying exhibits.
[328 P.3d 524]
The district court granted Kevic's motion to strike and motion for summary judgment.
Shea moved for reconsideration. In support of her motion, Shea submitted her own affidavit. Kevic moved to strike Shea's affidavit, but the district court denied Kevic's motion. The district court also denied Shea's motion for reconsideration. The district court entered judgment in favor of Kevic.
Shea filed a second motion for reconsideration and Madsen submitted another affidavit in support of the motion. Kevic again moved to strike portions of the affidavit and its accompanying exhibits. The district court granted Kevic's motion. The district court also denied Shea's second motion for reconsideration and granted Kevic's motion for Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 11 sanctions.
Shea appeals to this Court, asserting that the district court erred in (1) granting Kevic's motion for summary judgment; (2) granting Kevic's motions to strike; (3) denying Shea's first motion for reconsideration; and (4) denying Shea's second motion for reconsideration. Kevic cross-appeals, raising the issue of whether the district court erred in denying Kevic's motion to strike Shea's affidavit.
2. Whether the district court erred in granting Kevic's motion for summary judgment.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Kevic's motion to strike Shea's affidavit.
4. Whether the district court erred in denying Shea's two motions for reconsideration.
A. Motions to Strike
“Summary judgment proceedings are decided on the basis of admissible evidence.” Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692, 696, 316 P.3d 104, 108 (2013). Hence, “[t]he admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012). “This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when determining whether testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible.” Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason.” Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271, 281 P.3d at 108 (quoting O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)).
B. Summary Judgment“In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion.” Summers v. Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004). Under I.R.C.P. 56, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The party initially bringing the motion has the burden to prove that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. This Court will construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. However, the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but
[328 P.3d 525]
must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 114–15, 306 P.3d 197, 199–200 (2013) (quoting Boise Mode, LLC, v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 103–04, 294 P.3d 1111, 1115–16 (2013)). “Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact.... However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence.” ParkWest Homes, LLC, v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 682, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) (internal citation omitted).
C. Motions to Reconsider
As for motions to reconsider, we recently clarified that the standard of review was “the same standard of review used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration.” Thus, when the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for reconsideration, “this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.” This means the Court reviews the district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo.
Bremer, LLC, v. E. Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 Idaho 736, 744, 316 P.3d 652, 660 (2013) (quoting Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113).
Kevic moved to strike two separate affidavits submitted by Madsen. The first affidavit was submitted with Shea's opposition to Kevic's motion for summary judgment (Madsen's first affidavit) and the second with Shea's second motion for reconsideration (Madsen's second affidavit). The district court granted both of Kevic's motions to strike portions of these affidavits.
1. The district court properly granted Kevic's motion to strike select portions of Madsen's first affidavit.Kevic moved to strike two items in Madsen's first affidavit. The first item was part of the deposition testimony of Kevin Lett, the owner of Lett's Downtown Car Wash, regarding a photograph of the car wash exit that Lett was shown during the deposition. Lett testified to the following regarding the photograph, referred to as Plaintiff's Exhibit 8:
Q. (By Mr. Madsen) And with regards [sic] to Plaintiff's—can I have you take a look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 8? Do you recognize that?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that the exit from the car wash, also?
A. Yes.
Q. And what does Plaintiff's Exhibit—you don't know when that was taken, do you?
A. I do not.
Q. What does Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 depict?
A. A wet exit area.
Q. Does it also depict ice?
MR. HANSEN: Object to the form. Lack of foundation.
THE DEPONENT: I can't—I couldn't tell if it was ice or water.
Q. (By Mr. Madsen) Does it—in your opinion looking at the picture, it's not smooth, is it? This surface isn't smooth with regard to the picture, is it?
MR. HANSEN: Object to the form. Lack of foundation. Go ahead.
THE DEPONENT: I can't tell one way or the other.
Q. (By Mr. Madsen) Does the picture have somewhat of an icy look?
MR. HANSEN: Object to the form. Lack of foundation. Calls for speculation. Go ahead.
THE DEPONENT: Uh, yes.
Kevic did not move to strike any other portion of Lett's deposition testimony provided in Exhibit A of Madsen's first affidavit.
[328 P.3d 526]
The district court properly exercised its discretion in striking Lett's deposition testimony of the car wash photograph. “Authentication or identification of documentary evidence is a condition precedent to its admissibility.” Harris, Inc., v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 P.3d 400, 409 (2011)...
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