Shea v. Maricopa Cnty.

• Court: Arizona Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court
• Citation: Shea v. Maricopa Cnty., 255 Ariz. 116, 528 P.3d 471 (Ariz. 2023)
• Docket Number: CV-22-0187-PR
• Decision Date: 03 May 2023
• Parties: Bart M. SHEA, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

255 Ariz. 116

528 P.3d 471

Bart M. SHEA, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-22-0187-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed May 3, 2023

Christopher H. Bayley, Andrew M. Jacobs (argued), Emily Gildar Yaron, James G. Florentine, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, Attorneys for Bart and Cheryl Shea

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Joseph J. Branco (argued), Wayne J. Peck, Deputy County Attorneys, Phoenix, Attorneys for Maricopa County, Maricopa County Board of Adjustments, and Maricopa County Planning and Development Department

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER and JUSTICES BEENE and KING joined. JUSTICE BOLICK dissented.^*

JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider the statutory jurisdictional requirements for judicial review of an administrative decision. We hold that A.R.S. § 12-904(A) does not preclude jurisdiction where a timely filing's substance (1) provides notice of the appeal; (2) identifies the decision being appealed; and (3) states the issues presented on appeal. Although the statute's requirements turn on substance, not form, to facilitate efficient handling of appeals and to provide notice to interested parties, we urge parties appealing administrative decisions to avoid potential jurisdictional pitfalls by following this Court's clear instructions in the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions ("JRAD") Rule 4(c) and JRAD Form 1.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2017, Maricopa County's Planning and Development Department (the "Department") initiated proceedings against homeowners Bart and Cheryl Shea, alleging violations of several sections of the Maricopa County Zoning Ordinance for building certain structures on their property without proper permits. On December 12, 2017, the Department's hearing officer fined the Sheas, who timely appealed to the Department's Board of Adjustment (the "Board"). In February 2018, the Board affirmed the fine.

¶3 On March 14, 2018, the Sheas filed a "Verified Complaint for Special Action" (the "complaint") in superior court, naming Maricopa County, the Board, and the Department (collectively, the "County") as defendants. In its factual and procedural background, the complaint alleged that "[o]n or about January 10, 2018, [the Sheas] appealed the hearing officer's decision to the [Board]" who "denied [their] appeal. Having been aggrieved by a decision made by the Board, [the Sheas] file this appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-816(D)." Also, the complaint's background referenced "Departmental Report DR# V201601264," which is a code the Department used to label, identify, and locate all its documents arising from the Sheas’ case, including emails, notices, hearing officer decisions, and Board meeting notes.

¶4 Count I of the complaint requested declaratory relief that "the Department's finding and ruling was not supported by fact or law," that "they owe no fines or penalties as set forth in the Department's December 12, 2017 [judgment]," and that "the Department's and County Attorney's actions were the result of improper retaliation." Counts II and III alleged procedural and substantive due process violations, respectively, and the complaint's prayer for relief also requested the court to grant declaratory relief and dismiss the citation or, alternatively, grant another hearing.

¶5 The complaint made several notable omissions. First, it did not state the date of the Board's decision affirming the hearing officer's judgment. Second, although a copy of the hearing officer's decision was attached to the complaint, a copy of the Board's decision was not. Third, the complaint was not titled as a "notice of appeal" and failed to cite A.R.S. § 11-816(B)(3), which permits judicial review of Board decisions according to Arizona's Administrative Review Act (the "Act").

¶6 Emphasizing these omissions and the complaint's excessive length, the County moved to dismiss the Sheas’ complaint, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction under two sections of the Act. See § 12-904(A) (requiring the filing of a "notice of appeal" that "identif[ies] the final administrative decision sought to be reviewed and include[s] a statement of the issues presented for review"); A.R.S. § 12-902(B) (barring judicial review of agency decisions "[u]nless review is sought ... within the time and in the manner provided in [the Act]"). However, on August 2, 2018, the trial court denied the County's motion and granted leave for the Sheas to file an amended complaint, reasoning that erroneous citations and mistitling alone are not of jurisdictional consequence.

¶7 On August 22, 2018, the Sheas filed their "First Amended Verified Complaint for Appeal of Administrative Action." On September 14, 2018, the County filed an answer, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Sheas’ complaint "violate[d] the requirements of ... § 12-904, mandating dismissal pursuant to ... § 12-902." The County also asserted a counterclaim, seeking to enforce the fine imposed at the initial hearing.

¶8 On August 27, 2019, after a judicial reassignment, the trial court sua sponte ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the Sheas’ complaint failed to comply with § 12-904(A) ; thus, the Sheas failed to file a timely "notice of appeal." Ultimately, on March 31, 2021, the court entered final judgment on the County's counterclaim.

¶9 In a split opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal and counterclaim judgment. Shea v. Maricopa Cnty. , 253 Ariz. 286, 287 ¶ 1, 289–90 ¶ 14, 512 P.3d 1034, 1035, 1037-38 (App. 2022). The majority reasoned that because the Sheas’ complaint erroneously cited § 11-816(D) for jurisdiction, only vaguely referenced the Board decision, and did not clearly identify the issues, the Sheas’ complaint failed § 12-904(A) ’s requirements, invoking § 12-902(B) ’s jurisdictional bar. Id.

¶10 We accepted review to settle a recurring issue of statewide importance: whether § 12-904(A) precludes jurisdiction for judicial review of a final administrative decision if a timely filing substantively, but not formally, (1) provides notice of the appeal; (2) identifies the decision being appealed; and (3) states the issues argued on appeal. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶11 "Determining the procedure for review of administrative decisions involves the interpretation of rules and statutes, which [this Court] review[s] de novo." Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n , 212 Ariz. 407, 412 ¶ 18, 132 P.3d 1187, 1192 (2006) ; see Bolser Enters., Inc. v. Ariz. Registrar of Contractors , 213 Ariz. 110, 112 ¶ 12, 139 P.3d 1286, 1288 (App. 2006) (applying de novo review in deciding whether the superior court properly dismissed a complaint for judicial review based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

I.

¶12 Section 11-816(B)(3) authorizes Board review of decisions made by hearing officers and directs that "[j]udicial review of the final decision by the [Board] shall be pursuant to [the Act]." Under the Act, because the statute is the sole source of jurisdiction, compliance with its strictures is mandatory. Ariz. Comm'n of Agric. & Horticulture v. Jones , 91 Ariz. 183, 187, 370 P.2d 665 (1962) ("We said of [the Act] that the right of appeal ‘exists only by force of statute, and this right is limited by the terms of the statute.’ " (quoting Knape v. Brown , 86 Ariz. 158, 159, 342 P.2d 195 (1959) )). Compliance with court rules, however, including JRAD, is not determinative of jurisdiction. See id.

¶13 Section 12-902(B), which falls under the Act, limits judicial review of administrative decisions as follows:

Unless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner provided in this article , the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of the decision .

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, according to the statute's terms, both the Act's "time" and "manner" requirements have jurisdictional import. Id.

¶14 Section 12-904(A) of the Act imposes the following "manner" requirements:

An action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by filing a notice of appeal within thirty-five days from the date when a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed is served upon the party affected .... The notice of appeal shall identify the final administrative decision sought to be reviewed and include a statement of the issues presented for review.

Id. (emphasis added). In other words, § 12-904(A) sets forth three jurisdictional requirements for judicial review of an administrative decision: (1) the notice of appeal must be timely filed; (2) the notice of appeal must "identify the final administrative decision sought to be reviewed"; and (3) the notice of appeal must "include a statement of the issues presented for review."

II.

¶15 Having established § 12-904(A) ’s three jurisdictional requirements, we now consider whether the Sheas’ complaint complied with the Act. We need not consider the Sheas’ amended complaint, which was untimely as beyond the thirty-five-day deadline, because we conclude that the complaint satisfies § 12-904(A) requirements.

A.

¶16 Our jurisprudence interpreting procedural rules, although not dispositive, informs our analysis. We have long held that, where no party is misled or prejudiced, non-statutory defects in a timely notice of appeal do not preclude jurisdiction. Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co. , 193 Ariz. 47, 50 ¶ 11, 969 P.2d 653, 656 (1998) ("[E]ven if defective, a notice of appeal is sufficient if it is neither misleading nor prejudicial."); Hanen v. Willis , 102 Ariz. 6, 9, 423 P.2d 95, 98 (1967) ("[W]hen adequate notice to appeal has been given to the other party, no mere technical error should prevent the appellate court from reaching the merits of the appeal.");...