Sheaffer v. County of Chatham, No. 1:03 CV 0057.

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Middle District of North Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Osteen
• Citation: 337 F.Supp.2d 709
• Parties: Karen SHEAFFER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CHATHAM, Linda Clarke, Personally and in Her Official capacity as Chatham County Library Services Director, Defendants.
• Decision Date: 17 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1:03 CV 0057.

337 F.Supp.2d 709 Karen SHEAFFER, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF CHATHAM, Linda Clarke, Personally and in Her Official capacity as Chatham County Library Services Director, Defendants. No. 1:03 CV 0057. United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina. September 17, 2004.

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Jeffrey L. Starkweather, Pittsboro, NC, for plaintiff.

Donna R. Rascoe, Ann Smith Estridge, Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog Raleigh, NC, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Karen Sheaffer brought this action against the County of Chatham, North Carolina, and its Library Services Director,

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Linda Clarke, asserting various claims related to her termination as librarian for the Goldston branch of the Chatham County Library. In particular, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., the North Carolina Persons With Disabilities Protection Act, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 168A-1 et seq., the North Carolina Constitution, as well as state common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. This matter is now before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1994).

Plaintiff began working for Defendant Chatham County ("the County") in its Goldston Public Library in January 1987 and by that spring had become the Goldston branch's manager. Upon her hiring as manager, Plaintiff was elected as a board member of the Goldston Friends of the Library (the "Friends"), a private, non-profit corporation whose purposes included raising funds for the library, providing volunteers, and advocating for the interests of the library.

In December 2000, Defendant Linda Clarke was hired as Library Services Director. In January 2001, Plaintiff met with Clarke and Assistant County Manager Paul Spruill for Plaintiff's annual performance review. Plaintiff received evaluations of "Above Standard" in all categories as well as overall. Shortly after this meeting, according to Plaintiff, Clarke's attitude toward Plaintiff began to deteriorate. This change began when Plaintiff suggested that the branch librarians at the County's two other libraries assume children's programming duties with Plaintiff's guidance. Plaintiff indicated that her increasing demands as Goldston branch manager prohibited her from continuing to conduct children's programming throughout the county. In response to this proposal, Clarke suggested eliminating the part-time employee position at the Goldston Library and having that person take over all children's programming duties. Plaintiff responded that the loss of her part-time employee would lead to reduced hours of operation at the Goldston branch.

In June 2001, Plaintiff met with Clarke and regional library director Margaret Blanchard. During a discussion of the Goldston branch's hours, Blanchard expressed anger about a similar dispute that had occurred in 1996. Also during the meeting, Plaintiff proposed reinstituting a popular "reading dollar" program for children that rewarded children with "reading dollars" they could redeem for prizes at the library. The program had ended in 1997. According to Plaintiff, Blanchard was "visibly angry" at Plaintiff for raising these concerns. (Am.Compl.¶ 25.) After this meeting, Clarke began what Plaintiff calls a "relentless campaign of harassment, intimidation, and retaliation" for the exercise of her free speech rights. (Id. ¶ 26.)

On June 21, 2001, Clarke imposed a "Performance Plan" on Plaintiff though no complaints about Plaintiff's job performance had been brought to Plaintiff's attention. Among other things, the plan required Plaintiff to communicate with all staff members, including Clarke, "in a manner that is constructive and positive." (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff's discussions with

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Clarke were not to "involve comparisons with the other libraries unless so deemed appropriate by [Clarke]." (Id.) Plaintiff was also instructed to "attend meetings of the Goldston Friends of the Library along with [Clarke]." (Id.) Pursuant to the County's personnel ordinance, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Clarke for the imposition of this plan. Plaintiff's grievance was denied and although Plaintiff did not believe her concerns had been adequately addressed, she was unable to appeal the decision under the personnel ordinance.

On August 27, 2001, Clarke gave Plaintiff a written warning for violating the plan by attending a Friends meeting on August 21, 2001. Apparently Clarke read the requirement that Plaintiff "attend meetings of the Goldston Friends of the Library along with [Clarke]" to mean that Plaintiff could not attend Friends meetings without Clarke. With Clarke's permission, Plaintiff prepared a statement to submit to the Friends board indicating that she was not to attend Friends meetings without Clarke. Friends President Vance Dunn learned of the rule imposed by Clarke and scheduled a discussion of it at the September Friends meeting. Clarke was present at that meeting but according to Plaintiff refused to provide an explanation for the treatment of Plaintiff.

The day after the September Friends meeting, Clarke gave Plaintiff a second written warning, this time for conspiring with at least one Friends member to have the rule discussed at the Friends meeting rather than through internal processes. The warning specifically instructed Plaintiff that the appropriate remedy for her concerns was to file a grievance, although Plaintiff believed that county policy prohibited her from filing a grievance to challenge a written warning. Plaintiff's attorney filed a grievance directly with County Manager Charlie Horne, who declined to intervene.

During the same period, Plaintiff alleges that Clarke increasingly harassed her regarding her sick leave requests and medical needs, including regularly leaving harassing and threatening messages for Plaintiff while she was out on sick leave. On October 18, 2001, Plaintiff's attorney wrote to County Human Resources Manager Carolyn Chandre and requested four to six weeks of medical leave under the FMLA and ADA due to Plaintiff's anxiety and depression. Plaintiff alleges that even while she was out on leave, Clarke continued her pattern of harassment.

Also on October 18, Clarke issued a third written warning to Plaintiff for her alleged failure to carry out assigned tasks while on sick leave. On November 1, Clarke notified Plaintiff that a disciplinary conference had been scheduled for November 20 to discuss Plaintiff's alleged performance deficiencies. County Manager Horne held the conference in Plaintiff's absence despite Plaintiff's requests to delay the meeting until her health improved. Horne recommended that Plaintiff be terminated effective December 5, 2001.

Under the County's personnel policy, Plaintiff had a right to appeal the decision to the Personnel Advisory Committee, which had the effect of staying her termination. Plaintiff's appeal hearing was scheduled for January 31, 2002, and was later rescheduled to February 12, 2002. Plaintiff requested to be allowed the assistance of counsel or another support person at the hearing due to her health problems, but that request was denied. Plaintiff read a statement at the meeting but left shortly thereafter. Plaintiff was unable to present witnesses or cross-examine the County's witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the committee recommended upholding Plaintiff's termination. On February

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18, 2002, Plaintiff received a letter from Horne formally terminating her.

Plaintiff filed this case in state court. Defendants removed the action to this court, and, subsequently, Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) test the legal sufficiency of pleadings, but do not seek to resolve disputes surrounding the facts, the merits of claims, or the applicability of any defenses. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992). A court should dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "only in very limited circumstances." Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir.1989). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must evaluate the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir.1994). Dismissal should not be granted "unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would support its claim and would entitle it to relief." Mylan Labs. Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993). Nevertheless, although "plaintiff is not charged with pleading facts sufficient to prove her case, as an evidentiary matter, in her complaint, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that support a claim for relief." Bass v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 301, 157 L.Ed.2d 253 (2003); see also Cockerham ex rel. Cockerham v. Stokes County Bd. of Educ., 302 F.Supp.2d 490, 496 (M.D.N.C.2004).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff has asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Specifically,...