Sheahan v. State, Docket No. 31723 (Idaho App. 3/6/2008)
| Decision Date | 06 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 31723 |
| Parties | THOMAS SHEAHAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO, Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Shoshone County. Hon. Fred M. Gibler, District Judge.
Order summarily dismissing application for post-conviction relief, affirmed.
Thomas Sheahan, Boise, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph R. Blount, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Thomas Sheahan appeals from the summary dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Sheahan was convicted on two counts of vehicular manslaughter, Idaho Code § 18-4006(3). The judgment of conviction was affirmed by this Court, State v. Sheahan, 126 Idaho 111, 878 P.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1994), and Sheahan subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief. Sheahan's conviction arose from a one-vehicle crash in the early morning hours of August 20, 1992. A Shoshone County emergency medical technician (EMT) was at the scene of a prior accident when he encountered Sheahan, his brother Billy, and friends Perry Padley and Keith Olson. Sheahan was aggressive and uncooperative with the EMT, and sped away down the Coeur d'Alene River Road with his three passengers. An officer had been dispatched from Wallace to the first accident and was driving up the River Road when the four left the first scene, headed toward the officer. The EMT identified Sheahan as the driver, with his brother in the front passenger seat, and the other two passengers in the back seat.
Only four minutes later, Deputy Sheriff Mitch Alexander encountered Sheahan's car, which had been nearly ripped in two after crashing into a lane barrier. Alexander testified that when he stopped at the scene, he observed Sheahan in the driver's seat of the car and Sheahan's brother in the front passenger seat; both were unconscious. Olson had been partly ejected from the car and was dead. Padley had been completely ejected from the car and was found in the middle of the road. He, too, was dead.
Sheahan, 126 Idaho at 112, 878 P.2d at 811. Both Sheahan and his brother were subsequently tested for alcohol. Laboratory tests revealed a blood alcohol concentration in Sheahan's body of.16 percent, while his brother's results showed .14 percent. The presence of marijuana was also detected. Sheahan testified that he was not the driver of the car, but rather he was in the back seat directly behind the driver, and he was ejected from the car during the accident. Nevertheless, the jury found him guilty of both counts of vehicular manslaughter. Sheahan was sentenced to two consecutive terms of ten years determinate, the maximum penalty for both counts.
Sheahan's initial application for post-conviction relief raised three claims, and was filed in July, 1995. The district court appointed the public defender to represent Sheahan, however, upon Sheahan's motion, the public defender was disqualified. Sheahan was appointed conflict-free counsel who represented him until October 1998, when counsel was granted leave to withdraw. A third attorney was appointed to represent Sheahan. Third counsel was granted leave to withdraw in November 1999. The district court denied Sheahan's two subsequent motions for replacement counsel. A notice of intent to dismiss Sheahan's application was issued by the district court in May 2004, and Sheahan responded by filing an amended application for post-conviction relief, which the court accepted. After receiving the state's answer, the district court again issued a notice of intent to dismiss. Sheahan filed a response. Ultimately, the district court dismissed Sheahan's application in November 2004, without an evidentiary hearing. Sheahan appealed and moved the district court for appointment of appellate counsel. The motion for appellate counsel was denied.
In addition to the dismissal of his post-conviction claims, Sheahan challenges the district court's denials for appointment of counsel and the length of time that was allowed to pass prior to a decision being rendered on his post-conviction application. We address each in turn.
Sheahan first contends that the district court erred by repeatedly denying his motions for appointment of replacement counsel on his application for post-conviction relief, and also by denying his motion for appointment of counsel on appeal. The state argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying replacement counsel for the post-conviction action. The state also urges this Court not to consider Sheahan's claim that he should have been appointed counsel on appeal, as Sheahan did not petition the Idaho Supreme Court for appointment of counsel.
If a post-conviction applicant is unable to pay for the expenses of representation, the trial court may appoint counsel to represent the applicant in preparing the application, in the trial court and on appeal. I.C. § 19-4904. However, there is no Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000); Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 902, 908 P.2d 590, 595 (Ct. App. 1995). The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). In determining whether to appoint counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904, the district court should determine if the applicant is able to afford counsel and whether the situation is one in which counsel should be appointed to assist the applicant. Charboneau, at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In its analysis, the district court should consider that applications filed by a pro se applicant may be conclusory and incomplete. See id. at 792-93, 102 P.3d at 1111-12. Facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist or because the pro se applicant does not know the essential elements of a claim. Id. Some claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of counsel. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). However, if an applicant alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims, counsel should be appointed. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007).
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
Sheahan's second court-appointed post-conviction attorney was granted leave to withdraw due to an inability to communicate with Sheahan or agree on a strategy for the case. Sheahan's third court-appointed post-conviction attorney was also granted leave to withdraw due to Sheahan's unwarranted disparaging complaints against counsel which irretrievably damaged the attorney-client relationship and in addition due to Sheahan's expressed intent to take legal positions that counsel believed to be unwise, frivolous, and not in Sheahan's best interests. Sheahan's subsequent motions for replacement counsel were denied on the basis that his two prior attorneys were allowed to withdraw for cause—a complete inability to work with Sheahan— and because his application for post-conviction relief was deemed to be frivolous. Our determination on the merits of Sheahan's post-conviction claims lead us to agree with the district court that Sheahan was not entitled to appointment of post-conviction counsel before the district court or on appeal. Additionally, we note that a criminal defendant may not compel the court to appoint a new attorney by refusing to cooperate with his existing attorney or by otherwise manufacturing his own conflict. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11, 909 P.2d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 1995). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sheahan's motions for appointment of counsel for his post-conviction and appellate cases.1
Sheahan appears to argue that the district court erred by issuing notices of intent to dismiss his application because he had not spent $500 granted to him by the district court for investigatory purposes, and because he was working on a second amended petition at the time the second notice of intent to dismiss was filed.
The procedure for dismissing an application for post-conviction relief is set out in I.C. § 19-4906(b). If a district court determines that claims alleged in an application do not entitle an applicant to relief, the district court must provide notice of its intent to dismiss and allow the applicant twenty days to respond with additional facts to support his claims. I.C. § 19-4906(b); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 536, 82 P.3d 445, 448 (2003). The district court's notice should provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its...
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