Shealy v. Aiken County

• Citation: 535 S.E.2d 438,341 S.C. 448
• Decision Date: 24 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25173.,25173.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: Albert B. SHEALY, Petitioner, v. AIKEN COUNTY, Employer/Self-Insured, Respondent.

341 S.C. 448

535 S.E.2d 438

Albert B. SHEALY, Petitioner, v. AIKEN COUNTY, Employer/Self-Insured, Respondent.

No. 25173.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 21, 2000.

Decided July 24, 2000.

Rehearing Denied September 7, 2000.

Preston F. McDaniel, of McDaniel Law Firm, of Columbia, for petitioner.

F. Earl Ellis, Jr., and Daniel W. Hayes, both of Ellis, Lawhorne & Sims, P.A., of Columbia, for respondent.

TOAL, Chief Justice:

Albert B. Shealy ("Shealy") appeals the Court of Appeals' decision denying workers' compensation benefits for his psychological injuries allegedly caused by conditions of his employment as a "deep cover" undercover narcotics agent for the Aiken County Sheriffs Department ("Sheriffs Department").

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From 1981 to 1990, Shealy worked as a Lexington County deputy sheriff. Shealy developed depression and an alcohol problem that ultimately led to his departure from the Lexington County Sheriffs Department in May 1990. He received treatment for these problems and was alcohol free in November 1990 when he applied for a position in the Sheriff's Department. In November 1990, Aiken County Sheriff Carroll Heath, who was aware of Shealy's alcohol problem, hired Shealy to work as a "deep cover" undercover narcotics agent.

The Sheriffs Department hires deep cover agents to go to known drug locations, typically bars and nightclubs, to befriend drug dealers and other criminals in order to gain information, intelligence, and make drug buys, which are handed over to the police as evidence. The goal is for the deep cover agent to buy as much drugs as he can from the dealers and then slowly disappear. Deep cover work is extremely stressful and differs from regular police undercover work because the agent does not wear a wire, is not operating under police surveillance, does not have access to police back up, and does not carry police identification. According to Shealy, the stress involved with deep cover work was "extraordinary, it was more than I ever could imagine."

In August 1992, the Sheriffs Department assigned Shealy to infiltrate Rambler's Bar and Grill in Aiken because the employees and management were accused of illegal drug trafficking. Another deep cover agent, Stacey Coleman ("Coleman"), informed Shealy that Tony Kneese ("Kneese"), one of the alleged drug dealers, suspected Shealy was an undercover officer. According to Coleman, Kneese planned on taking Shealy "fishing." "Fishing" is a slang term that means killing someone and then disposing of the body in a pond or lake. According to Coleman's testimony:

The people were very well capable of committing a crime of murder. I know there were times he and I both purchased drugs from them and they were armed when we purchased drugs from them. Yes, they were very well capable of committing [sic] such as that.

As a way to prove to Kneese that he was not a police officer, Shealy handed Kneese his pistol and told him to go ahead and kill him if he thought Shealy was a cop. Although Kneese did not harm Shealy, Shealy still felt he was under a constant death threat after the confrontation. Shealy was also unable to work effectively as a deep cover agent after the confrontation with Kneese. His condition worsened after the confrontation and he began seeing a psychiatrist, Dr. Carol 0. Kinard.

Shortly after the encounter with Kneese, a new sheriff was elected for Aiken County. On Christmas Eve 1992, a representative from the Sheriffs Department informed Shealy that he would be terminated because the new sheriff intended to eliminate the deep cover narcotics program. According to Shealy, his dismissal was extremely stressful because he was still under death threats and he would lose both his permit to carry a weapon and the protection of law enforcement. On December 30, 1992, Shealy was admitted to Baptist Medical Center for depression, suicidal thoughts, post-traumatic stress disorder, and acute alcoholism.

Shealy has worked only sporadically since his release from Baptist Medical Center. He has been sober since July 1994, when he rejoined Alcoholics Anonymous. Dr. Kinard treated Shealy for several years and determined Shealy met the criteria for major depression recurrent, posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, alcoholism, and panic disorder with agoraphobia. In August 1995, Dr. Kinard indicated Shealy was unable to work in any gainful employment and would be unlikely to work in the foreseeable future. Dr. Scott, in performing an independent evaluation for the Social Security Administration, concurred in the diagnosis.

Although Shealy's job as a deep cover agent contributed to his medical conditions, Shealy admits to several other stressors in his life that may have contributed to his illness. In 1992, during the same time as the death threats and his termination from the Sheriffs Department, Shealy was also seeking a divorce from his second wife on the grounds of her infidelity, was in a bitter custody dispute over his son, and was declaring bankruptcy. Relying on these non-job stressors, the Full Commission made a factual determination that Shealy failed to meet his burden of proving that the conditions of his employment as a deep cover agent proximately cause his psychological injuries.

The Single Commissioner awarded Shealy benefits for aggravation of his preexisting alcoholism and psychological injury resulting from the extraordinary conditions of his employment. The Full Commission reversed on October 15, 1996. After a remand to the Full Commission for specific findings of facts and conclusions of law, the circuit court affirmed the Full Commission's decision. The circuit court found Shealy's job conditions were usual to his employment. Moreover, the circuit court held Shealy had failed to prove his psychological injuries were caused by unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. Shealy v. Aiken County, Op. No. 98-UP-573 (S.C.Ct.App. filed December 16, 1998).

The following issues are before this Court on appeal:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding the "unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment" standard is determined by reference to Shealy's particular employment and not to employment in general?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding Shealy's allegation of error in the reversal of the award for the aggravation of his preexisting alcoholism was not preserved for review?

3. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the issue of whether medical evidence had to be presented to prove unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment was not preserved for review?

LAW/ANALYSIS

The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") governs this Court's review of the Full Commission's decisions. See Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc. 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981)

. We can reverse or modify the Full Commission's decision in this case only if Shealy's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(d), (e) (Supp.1997). Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but such evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the Full Commission reached. Waters v. South Carolina Land Resources Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 467 S.E.2d 913 (1996).

In workers' compensation cases, the Full Commission is the ultimate fact finder. Hunter v. Patrick Constr. Co., 289 S.C. 46, 344 S.E.2d 613 (1986). The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Full Commission. Ford v. Allied Chem. Co., 252 S.C. 561, 167 S.E.2d 564 (1969). It is not the task of this Court to weigh the evidence as found by the Full Commission. Ellis v. Spartan Mills, 276 S.C. 216, 277 S.E.2d 590 (1981).

I. Unusual or Extraordinary Conditions of Employment

Shealy argues that under the standard for compensability that applies to mental-mental injuries,¹ the phrase "unusual or extraordinary conditions in employment" refers to conditions of employment in general, not to conditions extraordinary to the particular job in which the injury occurs. The Court of Appeals held compensability should be determined by unusual or extraordinary conditions of a complainant's employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals. However, we find the combination of death threats, gun incidents with violent drug dealers, high tension confrontations, fear of being uncovered, and loss of security as a police officer constitutes unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment when they occur over several months.

In determining whether a work-related injury is compensable, the Workers' Compensation Act is liberally construed toward the end of providing coverage rather than noncoverage in order to further the beneficial purposes for which it was designed. Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 306 S.C. 311, 411 S.E.2d 672 (Ct.App.1991). Any reasonable doubt as to the construction of the Act will be resolved in favor of coverage. Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit, 308 S.C. 18, 416 S.E.2d 639 (1992). A compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act is defined by S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-160 (1985),² which states in part:

"Injury" and "personal injury" shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident....

Mental or nervous disorders are compensable accidental injuries under the statute when "the emotional stimuli or stressors are incident to or arise from unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment." Powell v. Vulcan Materials, Co., 299 S.C. 325, 384 S.E.2d 725 (1989). In Powell, this Court held that courts should use...