Shean v. Garcia
Decision Date | 15 April 2021 |
Docket Number | NO. 3:20-cv-750-MMH-PDB,3:20-cv-750-MMH-PDB |
Parties | DORA R. SHEAN, Plaintiff, v. ANA MARIA GARCIA ET AL., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Plaintiff Dora Shean has not seen four grandchildren since 2017, and her daughter's parental rights over the children have been terminated. In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ms. Shean, without a lawyer, sues the state court, two state judges, and "John Does I-IV" involved in shelter, dependency, termination-of-parental-rights, and adoption proceedings.
The named defendants—the Circuit Court of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Bay County, Florida; Circuit Judge Brantley Clark; and Circuit Judge Ana Maria Garcia—move to dismiss the claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). Doc. 19. They argue dismissal is warranted on six grounds. Doc. 19.
Instead of responding to the motion to dismiss, Ms. Shean moves to stay this case pending ongoing state-court proceedings. Docs. 20, 28. She also moves to recover $75 from each named defendant because of refusals to waive service of process. Doc. 20 at 3.
A court must construe a pleading drafted by a pro se litigant liberally and hold it to a less stringent standard than one drafted by a lawyer. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Liberal construction does not mean excusing noncompliance with procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). And liberal construction does not mean rewriting a deficient pleading or otherwise serving as de facto counsel. GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Instead, liberal construction means a court must "look beyond the labels used in a pro se party's complaint and focus on the content and substance of the allegations" to determine if a cognizable remedy is available. Torres v. Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 734 F. App'x 688, 691 (11th Cir. 2018).
Because Ms. Shean is pro se, the Court must liberally construe the complaint.
According to allegations in the complaint and other filings by Ms. Shean, the defendants—motivated by greed (an interest in obtaining funds for their locality) and revenge (an interest in retaliating against her for filing complaints against them)—violated the constitution and other laws in numerous ways, including by:
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1-4, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 31-33, 39-42, 44, 47-50; Doc. 16 at 29.
Ms. Shean alleges facts she contends make her the patently superior custodial choice over Ms. Legacy if considering the best interests of the children. For example, Ms. Shean alleges she had a long and deep relationship with the children, while Ms. Legacy did not; she had living arrangements suitable for the children, while Ms. Legacy did not; and she was biologically related to all four children, while Ms. Legacy was not. See, e.g., Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14, 17, 29, 30. Ms. Shean contends the defendants unfairly acted on an improperly administered test to find her daughter had molested the oldest girl, unfairly weighed against Ms. Shean that her son had been removed from her custody years ago, and treated Ms. Shean's longtime "paramour"—now husband—as the "fall guy" because of a drunken incident resolved years ago. Doc. 4-1 ¶ 16; Doc. 16 at 29, 40. Ms. Shean made the same or similar claims and allegations without success during the state-court proceedings. See Doc. 10-2 at 14-33.
In the prayer for relief, Ms. Shean asks this Court to (1) enter a nunc pro tunc order to September 2016 to address the original placement of the children with Ms. Legacy; (2) void all orders from the state-court proceedings; (3) force the children to return to Florida; (4) halt or reverse the adoption proceedings; (5) decline to provide immunity to the state-court judges; (6) require the state-court judges to represent themselves or hire their own lawyers;1 and (7)reweigh the best-interest-of-the-child factors and find adoption by Ms. Shean—not by Ms. Legacy—is in the children's best interest."2 Doc. 1 at 22-30.
The adoption was finalized on July 14, 2020—eight days after Ms. Shean filed the complaint here. Doc. 14-2 at 2. According to Ms. Shean, a petition for adoption she filed on March 7, 2018, in a separate but related state case remains pending. Doc. 16 at 41; Doc. 16-2 at 1-4.
In a forty-three-page response to an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction3 or transferred to another district,4 Ms. Shean quotes a law review article providing aconstitutional analysis of custody rights of grandparents and explains her reasons for suing:
Doc. 16 at 1-11, 21. Ms. Shean also filed website printouts to support a contention that people involved in the state-court proceedings were awarded important positions with an organization to which Ms. Legacy is tied. Doc. 16-3.
Ms. Shean sues under § 1983. See generally Doc. 1. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred."5 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) ( ).
In their motion to dismiss, the state-court judges and the state court argue dismissal with prejudice is warranted because: (1) the judges in their official capacities and the state court are not "persons" under § 1983; (2) the judges in their official capacities and the state court are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3) Ms. Shean lacks Article III standing to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief; (4) Ms. Shean fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; (5) the state judges in their individual capacities are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for damages; and (6) under the Youn...
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