Sheckles v. State
| Decision Date | 23 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 22A01-9701-PC-7,22A01-9701-PC-7 |
| Citation | 684 N.E.2d 201 |
| Parties | Darrell L. SHECKLES, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Darrell L. Sheckles appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He presents the following issues:
I. Whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it denied Sheckles' discovery motion.
II. Whether the post-conviction court erred when it summarily denied Sheckles' petition for post-conviction relief, although said petition raises an issue of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.
We affirm.
On direct appeal of Sheckles' convictions, our supreme court noted the procedural history of the case:
After a trial by jury, appellant Darell Leroy Sheckles was found guilty of felony-murder, criminal recklessness, and two counts of robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The three latter offenses were merged into a judgment of conviction for felony-murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1(2) (Burns 1979 Repl.). A prison sentence of sixty years was imposed by the court.
Sheckles v. State, 501 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ind.1986). The evidence revealed that Sheckles had attempted to collect a loan by means of force inside a bar. A gun battle ensued between Sheckles and the bartender, and one of the patrons of the bar sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the head. Our supreme court affirmed Sheckles' conviction. See id.
Sheckles eventually filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, Sheckles claimed that trial counsel was deficient in his failure to request a ballistics expert to help him prepare a defense and that appellate counsel was ineffective in his failure to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. During the post-conviction proceedings, Sheckles attempted to obtain certain information from the State by means of discovery. The post-conviction court denied the attempts at discovery and then summarily denied the petition for post-conviction relief.
The post-conviction petitioner bears the burden to establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Nelson v. State, 664 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. On review of the judgment of a post-conviction court, the appellate court considers only the evidence and reasonable inferences which support the judgment. Id. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Id. A post-conviction petitioner who has been denied relief is in the position of one who has received a negative judgment and will obtain a reversal only where the evidence is undisputed and leads inevitably to a conclusion opposite that of the post-conviction court. Id. The petitioner will not carry his burden unless he can affirmatively demonstrate that his substantive rights have been prejudiced. Id.
Sheckles first claims that the post-conviction court erroneously denied his motion for a discovery order. He linked his motion for discovery to his claim that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel's failure to request the services of a ballistics expert. Sheckles asserted that, "to present adequate proof on the issue at a post-conviction relief hearing, counsel must have a ballistics expert review the evidence gathered in the crime investigation and presented at trial." Sheckles therefore requested an order for the production and inspection of "all police reports, investigative reports, ballistics tests and reports, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, and other documents" as well as "any and all bullets, casings, and other tangible evidence relevant to a ballistics assessment of this case ..."
As discussed more fully below, Sheckles has presented no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the performance of trial counsel prejudiced his defense. Inasmuch as Sheckles has tied his motion for discovery to his claim that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel but has presented no genuine issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, we cannot conclude that the post-conviction court erroneously denied the motion for discovery.
Sheckles claims the post-conviction court improperly denied his petition without first having held an evidentiary hearing. The post-conviction rules contain the following provision:
(f) If the pleadings conclusively show that petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court may deny the petition without further proceedings.
(g) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the petition when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court may ask for oral argument on the legal issue raised. If an issue of material fact is raised, then the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as soon as reasonably possible.
Ind.Post-Conviction Rule 1(4).
A post-conviction court is permitted to summarily deny a petition for relief if the pleadings and the record conclusively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Howard v. State, 576 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind.1991). Where the post-conviction court is able to read the petition as well as consult the record and determine that there is no factual issue in dispute, a summary denial of a petition for post-conviction relief is proper. See id. See also, Mullen v. Tucker, 510 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) ().
To establish the ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner must first show that counsel's performance was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See Wilson v. State, 565 N.E.2d 761, 765 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, that is, a trial where the result is reliable. Id.
Sheckles claims that trial counsel should have requested a ballistics expert to help him prepare a defense. Sheckles bases his claim upon the premise that the fatal gunshot wound came from the bartender's gun, not from his own gun.
Sheckles' felony-murder charge was based upon the underlying felony of attempted robbery. Sheckles, 501 N.E.2d at 1054. Robbery is a "Class A felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant." Ind.Code 35-42-5-1. We note that the responsibility for any bodily injury which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery rests on the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of who inflicts the injury, so long as it is a natural and probable consequence of the events and circumstances surrounding the robbery or attempt. Moon v. State, 275 Ind. 651, 419 N.E.2d 740, 741-742 (1981) ().
Nonetheless, Sheckles received...
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