Sheeder v. Eastern Express, Inc., Civ. A. No. 73-1040.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-1040.
• Citation: 375 F. Supp. 655
• Parties: Barry L. SHEEDER, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN EXPRESS, INC., a corporation, and Joint Area Council 40 Joint Area Grievance Committee, Western Pennsylvania Motor Carriers Association, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

375 F. Supp. 655

Barry L. SHEEDER, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN EXPRESS, INC., a corporation, and Joint Area Council 40 Joint Area Grievance Committee, Western Pennsylvania Motor Carriers Association, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 73-1040.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

April 26, 1974.

H. Reginald Belden, Jr., Greensburg, Pa., for plaintiff.

Martin Lubow, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION AND DECREE

SNYDER, District Judge.

This proceeding began as a Complaint in Equity in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. In the original action the Plaintiff requested injunctive relief from the Court which would reinstate the Plaintiff to his position at Eastern Express, Inc. (Eastern), damages for wages and other fringe benefits lost by the Plaintiff from the date of his alleged wrongful discharge, and punitive damages for the wrongful discharge; he further sought that the Joint Council Committee be required to hold a hearing on the grievance filed by the Plaintiff.

On December 15, 1972, the Plaintiff, while operating a tractor-trailer rig within the scope of his employment for the Defendant Eastern, was apparently involved in an accident. On January 20, 1973, the State Police charged Sheeder with violating the Motor Vehicle Code of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in failing to exhibit his operator's license and registration number to the operator of the other vehicle, and in failing to immediately stop his vehicle at the place and scene of the accident in which he was allegedly involved. On January 15, 1973, after some investigation by Eastern representatives, Sheeder was informed by Eastern that his services were terminated, effective January 16, 1973.

The Plaintiff instituted a grievance procedure under the Collective Bargaining Agreement which finally led to a hearing before the Joint Area Grievance Committee (composed of representatives of the Employer and the Union) on March 14, 1973.

The following appears in the Findings of the Joint Council Committee:

"Union Position: The Grievant, Barry L. Sheeder, claimed he was unjustly discharged on 1/16/73 for a hit and run accident on Rt. 22 at Cresson, Pa. Driver not convicted of a hit and run accident as of this date.

Employer Position: The Company stated the Grievant struck a parked tractor trailer unit with his trailer resulting in $1,000 damage. Grievant didn't report accident, and had been stopped three times by the State Police notifying him of an accident.

Decision: The Committee ruled that, based on the facts presented, the claim of the Union is denied."

The Complaint alleges that at the hearing the Plaintiff was informed that if additional evidence concerning the guilt or innocence of the Plaintiff came to the attention of Local 30 that the Local Union would again request review by the Defendant. The Plaintiff here was tried by a jury in Cambria County, Pennsylvania, on June 21, 1973, and a verdict of not guilty was rendered by the jury. The Plaintiff immediately contacted representatives of Local 30, who informed the Joint Council Committee that Sheeder proposed to present new evidence concerning his innocence, i. e., the not guilty verdict. A hearing was scheduled by the Joint Council Committee for August 9, 1973, and Sheeder alleges that the Committee still "failed, neglected and refused to hear any evidence concerning the innocence of the plaintiff on the criminal charges upon which their previous decision was based; thereby exhausting plaintiff's administrative remedies." He claims that this action of the Joint Council Committee was without due process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by which action he was caused to suffer monetary damages.

I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

Plaintiff in this case has filed a Motion to Remand and takes the position that the Federal District Court has no jurisdiction as this is an action essentially for the unlawful discharge of an employee.

Under the Act of June 25, 1948, Chapter 646, 62 Stat. 937 (28 U.S.C. § 1441), actions are removable generally:

"(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties . . ."

The Defendants contend that the Federal District Court does have jurisdiction because the action is founded on a claim arising under the laws of the United States, i. e., it is based upon and requires an interpretation of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185). This Section provides as follows:

"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

The effect of this Section, both jurisdictionally and substantively, is very clearly set forth in a footnote by District Judge Frank A. Kaufman writing for the Circuit in Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Company, 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004, 88 S.Ct. 562, 19 L.Ed.2d 599, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 1059, 88 S.Ct. 768, 19 L.Ed.2d 862 (at p. 76):

"7. It is completely clear that section 301(a) is both jurisdictional and substantive—that it gives federal courts jurisdiction while at the same time authorizing them `to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of * * * collective bargaining agreements * * *.' Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 915, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). The substantive law to be applied in suits under section 301(a) `is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.' Id. at 456, 77 S.Ct. at 918, accord, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 174, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Jurisdiction of state courts over suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements is not, however, divested by section 301(a). Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962). The jurisdiction of state and federal courts over suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts is concurrent. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11 L. Ed.2d 370 (1964); Local 174 etc. v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962). Where, however, litigation brought in a state court is `within the purview of § 301(a),' the substantive law which the state court must apply is federal. Local 174 etc. v. Lucas Flour Co., supra, 369 U.S. at 102-104, 82 S. Ct. 571. `The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.' Id. at 103, 82 S.Ct. at 576. There is no doubt that a suit, such as the instant one, which charges the employer with a breach of the collective bargaining contract in wrongfully discharging employees and which charges the union with a violation of the duty of fair representation is a suit within the purview of section 301(a) and which is thus governed by substantive federal law. Vaca v. Sipes, supra; Humphrey v. Moore, supra; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L. Ed.2d 246 (1962). Since any suit within the purview of section 301(a) will involve questions of federal labor law, a party to such a suit may petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See, e. g., Local 174, etc. v. Lucas Flour Co., supra, 369 U.S. at 98, 82 S.Ct. 571."

Having determined that jurisdiction is concurrent in both the State Court and the Federal Court, we must then rule upon the Motion to Remand in the light of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which reads as follows:

"§ 1441. Actions removable generally

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.

(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction. June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 937."

The argument that because there is concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter removal to the Federal Court is improper and therefore remand would be appropriate, cannot be accepted in the present situation before this Court. Under Section 1441, authority for removal is found when the State Court action could have originally been brought in Federal Court. As stated in Swift &...