Sheehan v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority
| Decision Date | 10 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 76036-5.,76036-5. |
| Parties | Patrick J. SHEEHAN and James T. Reynolds, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Washington municipal corporation, Seattle Popular Monorail Authority, a Washington municipal corporation, and State of Washington, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
James Alexander Smith, James R. Hennessey, Jeffrey Walton Thomas, Smith & Hennessey PLLC, Jeffrey Walton Thomas, Thomas Law Offices, Seattle, for Appellants.
Paul J. Lawrence, Matthew J. Segal, Sarah Christine Johnson, Preston Gates & Ellis LLP, Ross Andrew Macfarlane, Seattle Monorail Project, Seattle, Cameron Gordon Comfort, Donald F. Cofer, Attorney General's Office, Revenue Division, Olympia, Desmond Leoron Brown, Sound Transit Union Station, Seattle, Jerald R. Anderson, Attorney General's Office, Olympia, for Respondents.
Hugh David Spitzer, Foster Pepper & Shefelman PLLC, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Association of Washington Cities and Washington State Transit Association.
Henry M. Aronson, Norman J. Bruns, Camden Michael Hall, Camden Hall PLLC, William Colwell Severson, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on behalf of A.H. Larson, Terrance Scott Wean, Lisa G. Olsen, John Speirs, Kenneth H. Torp, Arthur L. Wahl, B.L. Fox, Peter H. Nickerson.
¶ 1 Patrick Sheehan and James Reynolds (Appellants) seek reversal of the trial court's decision to dismiss, upon motion for summary judgment, all of their claims challenging the motor vehicle excise taxes (MVET) levied and collected by respondents Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) and Seattle Popular Monorail Authority (the Monorail) (collectively, the Authorities). Appellants also assign error to the trial court's decision to defer a ruling on their CR 23 motion for class certification until final disposition of the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. We hold that, contrary to the myriad arguments offered by Appellants, the taxes imposed by the Authorities are not illegal and that the trial court did not err in denying their motion for class certification on the basis that the motion was moot. We, therefore, affirm the trial court in all respects.
¶ 2 There is no dispute as to the underlying facts of this case. A background description of the MVET collected by Sound Transit and the Monorail is provided below.
¶ 3 Sound Transit was formed in 1993 pursuant to enabling legislation that authorized counties in the Puget Sound region to create transit authorities for the financing and operation of regional transit systems. See generally ch. 81.104 RCW; ch. 81.112 RCW. Pursuant to this legislation, King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties voted to establish Sound Transit to provide mass transportation services within a defined geographical district (Sound Transit District). To fund such services, RCW 81.104.140 authorizes a regional transit authority, such as Sound Transit, to collect revenue from several funding sources, including an excise tax on motor vehicles. Specifically, former RCW 81.104.160(1) (1998)1 permitted regional transit authorities to
submit an authorizing proposition to the voters, and if approved, [to] levy and collect an excise tax, at a rate approved by the voters, but not exceeding eighty one-hundredths of one percent on the value, under chapter 82.44 RCW, of every motor vehicle owned by a resident of the taxing district, solely for the purpose of providing high capacity transportation service.
The legislature authorized Sound Transit to contract with appropriate agencies "for administration of any tax authorized by ... [RCW] 81.104.160." RCW 81.104.190.
¶ 4 In November 1996, voters in the Sound Transit District approved a regional mass transportation plan, as well as a local MVET of 0.3 percent of the value of motor vehicles licensed within the Sound Transit District. Sound Transit's MVET was passed "to provide the local share of funding towards the $3.9 billion estimated cost of the system." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 251. Using its authority under RCW 81.104.190 to contract with state agencies for tax administration, Sound Transit reached an agreement with the Washington Department of Licensing (DOL) for the collection of its MVET.
¶ 5 The Monorail was formed in 2002 pursuant to enabling legislation authorizing the creation of transportation authorities that are charged with building, owning, operating, and maintaining a monorail system. See generally ch. 35.95A RCW. The Monorail may, with voter approval, "levy and collect a special excise tax not exceeding two and one-half percent on the value of every motor vehicle owned by a resident of the authority area for the privilege of using a motor vehicle." RCW 35.95A.080(1), (5). This special excise tax "will be collected at the same time and in the same manner as relicensing tab fees under RCW 46.16.0621 and 35.95A.090." RCW 35.95A.130. "Valuation of motor vehicles for purposes of the special excise tax ... must be consistent with chapter 82.44 RCW." Id. ().
¶ 6 In 2002, Seattle voters approved a measure providing for "an annual special excise tax not to exceed 1.4% on the value of every motor vehicle owned by a Seattle resident." CP at 42, 148. The Monorail thereafter pledged proceeds from the Monorail MVET to the long-term debt it issued to finance construction of the "Green Line" project from Ballard to West Seattle. Unlike Sound Transit's enabling legislation, the Monorail legislation specifically provides that DOL shall quarterly "remit special excise taxes collected on behalf of an authority, back to the authority, at no cost to the authority." RCW 35.95A.130.
¶ 7 Appellants are motor vehicle owners who reside within one or both of the Authorities' boundaries and have paid one or both of the vehicle taxes. In March 2004, Appellants filed a complaint in King County Superior Court alleging that both vehicle taxes were unconstitutional and statutorily unauthorized. Soon thereafter, Appellants moved for certification of a class of similarly situated taxpayers pursuant to CR 23. The Authorities opposed certification, arguing that consideration of the motion should be stayed pending the resolution of the Authorities' motion for summary judgment, which they filed simultaneously with their opposition to the class certification. Appellants subsequently filed a cross motion for summary judgment.
¶ 8 After oral argument regarding class certification, the trial court reserved its ruling on that issue pending a resolution of the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court then heard argument on the summary judgment motions, granted the Authorities' summary judgment motion, denied Appellants' summary judgment motion, dismissed all claims against the Authorities, and denied the pending class certification motion as moot. Appellants sought, and we granted, direct review in this court.2
¶ 9 1. Are the taxes imposed by the Authorities illegal under article VII, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution because (a) there is no provision for the taxing events in the enabling legislation, (b) they are invalid excise taxes, (c) they are collected annually, or (d) they are invalid licensing taxes?
¶ 10 2. Are the taxes imposed by the Authorities illegal because they are preempted under RCW 46.08.010?
¶ 11 3. Are the taxes imposed by the Authorities actually property taxes, prohibited by RCW 82.44.130 and RCW 84.36.595(2)?
¶ 12 4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by delaying a ruling on the plaintiffs' CR 23 motion for class certification until after the cross motions for summary judgment had been decided?
¶ 13 5. Are Appellants entitled to attorney fees?
¶ 14 At issue is the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Authorities as to Appellants' constitutional and statutory violation claims. "The standard of review of an order of summary judgment is de novo, and the appellate court performs the same inquiry as the trial court." Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 146 Wash.2d 291, 300, 45 P.3d 1068 (2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See CR 56(c).
¶ 15 Issues pertaining to constitutional limitations on local taxation and statutory interpretation are issues of law to be determined de novo. Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash.2d 540, 548-49, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003). The aim of statutory interpretation is "to discern and implement the intent of the legislature." State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). Where the meaning of a provision is "plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). A provision's plain meaning may be ascertained by an "examination of the statute in which the provision at issue is found, as well as related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found." Id. at 10, 43 P.3d 4 (). Only when the plain, unambiguous meaning cannot be derived through such an inquiry will it be "appropriate [for a reviewing court] to resort to aids to construction." Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth.
...improperly imposed. ¶ 2 This court has recently addressed several of the Appellants' arguments in Sheehan v. Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, 155 Wash.2d 790, 123 P.3d 88 (2005).1 Consistent with our decision in Sheehan, we hold that the MVET is an excise tax and that local t......
-
Sifferman v. Chelan Cnty.
...action claims. Our decision on the substantive issue renders this determination unnecessary.12 See Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. , 155 Wash.2d 790, 807, 123 P.3d 88 (2005) (holding that because the trial court's order dismissing the appellants’ substantive claims on summa......
-
Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island
...adoption of comparable statutes that do contain an express grant of moratoria authority. See Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth., 155 Wash.2d 790, 797, 123 P.3d 88 (2005). In 1992, the legislature expressly authorized moratoria under multiple statutes: chapter 35.63 RCW (planni......
-
Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC v. Dep't of Revenue
...previously paid" under .037(1). Standard of Review ¶11 We review summary judgment orders de novo. Sheehan v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 155 Wash.2d 790, 796-97, 123 P.3d 88 (2005). Taxes are presumed to be valid, and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the tax is incorrect. A......