Sheehan v. St. Peter's Catholic School

• Citation: 291 Minn. 1,188 N.W.2d 868
• Decision Date: 16 July 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42481,42481
• Parties: Margaret SHEEHAN, by her father and natural guardian, Charles Sheehan, and Charles Sheehan, individually, Respondents, v. ST. PETER'S CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 868

188 N.W.2d 868

291 Minn. 1

Margaret SHEEHAN, by her father and natural guardian Charles Sheehan, and Charles Sheehan individually, Respondents, v. ST. PETER'S CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Appellant.

No. 42481.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 16, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

Where an injury to a school child results from pebbles being thrown at her for several minutes by other students during a recess on a playing field, it was proper for the court to submit to the jury the questions of whether the injury was foreseeable and, if so, whether it was proximately caused by the school's failure to provide adequate supervision.

Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson and O. C. Adamson, II, and Robert Frisbee, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Dudley, Smith, Copeland & Belisle, St. Paul, for respondents.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and MURPHY, OTIS, KELLY, and ODDEN, JJ.

OPINION

OTIS, Justice.

The minor plaintiff, a student in defendant's school, has recovered an award of $50,000 against defendant for injury to her eye, occasioned by another student's throwing pebbles at her while she was a spectator on an athletic field. The issues are whether the injury was one which could reasonably be foreseen as a result of failure to supervise the students involved in the accident; if so, whether such lack of supervision was a proximate cause of the injury; and whether the court should have submitted to the jury the question of plaintiff's own negligence. The jury resolved the first two question in favor of plaintiff, and we affirm.

The accident occurred on the morning of May 6, 1966, when one of defendant's teachers escorted 20 eighth-grade girls to an athletic field during the morning recess. The children were directed to sit on a pole or log on the third-base line of a baseball field being used by eighth-grade boys. The teacher thereupon returned to the school building and did not reappear until after the accident. About 5 minutes after she left, some of the boys waiting to bat began pelting the girls with pebbles. Although the girls protested, the pebble throwing continued for 3 or 4 minutes until plaintiff was struck in the right eye, causing her to lose the sight of that eye.

The case was tried on the theory that defendant was negligent in failing adequately to supervise the children's activities. The court instructed the jury:

'* * * It is the duty of a school to use ordinary care and to protect its students from injury resulting from the conduct of other students under circumstances where such conduct would reasonably have been foreseen and could have been prevented by the use of ordinary care. There is no requirement of constant supervision of all the movements of pupils at all times.'

In addition, the court defined proximate cause. Defendant now argues that the essential elements of the cause of action are 'notice that a dangerous activity either has in the past or is about to occur and proof that additional supervision would have prevented the occurrence.' We are of the opinion that the weight of authority does not sustain such a notice requirement.

1. The principal cases on which defendant relies are Wilber v. City of Binghamton, 271 App.Div. 402, 66 N.Y.S.2d 250, affirmed, 296 N.Y. 950, 73 N.E.2d 263; Ohman v. Board of Education, 300 N.Y. 306, 90 N.E.2d 474; Nestor v. City of New York, 28 Misc.2d 70, 211 N.Y.S.2d 975; Woodsmall v. Mount Diablo Unified School Dist. 188 Cal.App.2d 262, 10 Cal.Rptr. 447. Those decisions turned on the fact that the injuries were inflicted suddenly and without warning and in such a manner the courts felt supervision would not have prevented them. The Nestor case characterized the action of the student who inflicted the injury as 'sudden, impulsive, and spontaneous' (28 Misc.2d 73, 211 N.Y.S.2d 978) so that even more vigilant supervision would not have averted the accident. The injury in Woodsmall was the result of 'one of those events which could occur equally as well in the presence of the teacher as during her absence.' 188 Cal.App.2d 265, 10 Cal.Rptr. 450. The Ohman decision also hinged on the fact that, in the opinion of the majority, injury to plaintiff's eye by a lead pencil thrown by another classmate could not have been averted by the teacher's presence. 300 N.Y. 310, 90 N.E.2d 475.

The dissent in Ohman has been much quoted for reaching an opposite result. Judge Conway there stated (300 N.Y. 314, 90 N.E.2d 478):

'* * * Children have a known proclivity to act impulsively without thought of the possibilities of danger. It is precisely this lack of mature judgment which makes supervision so vital. The mere presence of the hand of authority and discipline normally is effective to curb this youthful exuberance and to protect the children against their own folly.'

The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this view in Titus v. Lindberg, 49 N.J. 66, 75, 228 A.2d 65, 70. That case also involved inadequate supervision on school property, and the court permitted recovery against both the school and the child who inflicted the injury. ¹ In Cirillo v. City of Milwaukee, 34 Wis.2d 705, 150 N.W.2d 460, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff had been injured during an unsupervised gym period. Mr. Justice Wilkie quoted Judge Conway as follows (34 Wis.2d 714, 150 N.W.2d 464):

'An ordinary layman, without any special knowledge or training, must, in some instances, anticipate subsequent conduct of children by which they may harm themselves. Whether such subsequent conduct...