Sheehy v. Williams

Decision Date25 November 2020
Docket NumberRecord Nos. 190802 & 191089
Citation850 S.E.2d 371
Parties Kerry Ann SHEEHY v. Rene WILLIAMS
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

Brandon H. Zeigler, Virginia Beach, (Erin C. McDaniel ; Parks Zeigler, on briefs), for appellant.

Kevin E. Martingayle, Virginia Beach, (Bischoff Martingayle, on brief), for appellee.

PRESENT: All the Justices

OPINION BY JUSTICE D. ARTHUR KELSEY

The trial court in this case entered a civil judgment against Kerry Ann Sheehy based upon a finding that she had violated Code § 8.01-40.4 by disseminating images of Rene Williams in a manner prohibited by Code § 18.2-386.2. Sheehy filed two appeals arguing that the judgment against her should be vacated.1

While these appeals were pending, the judgment amount was paid in full. Seeking a dismissal of both appeals, Williams contends that the voluntary-payment doctrine moots Sheehy's appeals of the now fully satisfied judgment. For the following reasons, we will retain jurisdiction over this appeal and temporarily remand the case to the trial court for factual findings on the voluntary-payment issue. Upon receiving the trial court's findings, we will rule upon Williams's motion to dismiss.

I.

The trial court entered a final judgment against Sheehy on May 24, 2019, in the amount of $50,845.18. Sheehy filed two notices of appeal, one before the entry of final judgment (April 23) and the other after the entry of final judgment (June 14). See supra note 1; infra note 9. Based upon proffers made by Williams on appeal, it appears that she has never filed any petition seeking execution of the judgment (such as a writ of fieri facias or garnishment, see Code §§ 8.01-466, -511) or a petition in equity seeking the judicial sale of Sheehy's real property, see Code §§ 8.01-458, -462. See Mot. to Dismiss Appeal As Moot Ex. C, at 1-2 [hereinafter Mot. to Dismiss]. Nor does the record reflect that Sheehy ever sought a stay of the execution of the judgment by filing a suspending bond or irrevocable letter of credit pursuant to Code § 8.01-676.1(C).

In July 2020, Sheehy entered into a contract to sell real property. See Br. Opp'n Appellee's Mot. to Dismiss Appeal As Moot at 1 [hereinafter Br. Opp'n]. During a title search prior to closing, a title company discovered the judgment in this case. In order "to obtain clear title," the title company required the judgment lien to be satisfied. Id. The buyer's attorney, who appears to have been acting as the closing attorney, asked Williams's counsel for "payoff information." Mot. to Dismiss, supra , Ex. C, at 1. In response, Williams's counsel sent to the buyer's attorney a letter dated August 12, which stated that the balance due on the final judgment was $54,673.19. Id. Ex. A, at 1.

Williams's counsel received a check for that exact amount dated August 14 drawn on the escrow account of the buyer's attorney. The memo line on the check stated: "Judgment Payoff." Id. Ex. B, at 1. Attached to the check, Williams's counsel also received a copy of his earlier letter to the buyer's attorney with a handwritten circle around the amount of the balance due. See id. Williams's counsel proffers to us that Sheehy's initials appear next to the circled payoff amount, thereby indicating her knowledge of and consent to the payment. See Oral Argument Audio at 13:10 to 13:23. Williams's counsel also proffers that he thereafter filed, and the circuit court clerk entered, a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to Code §§ 8.01-453 to -454. See Oral Argument Audio at 18:45 to 19:05.

On brief, Sheehy's counsel does not present facts that directly contradict these factual representations. Instead, he maintains simply that the check was issued "on behalf of the Buyers" and "was not made by [Sheehy] or on her behalf." Br. Opp'n, supra , at 2. The apparent implication is that Sheehy did not authorize or agree to the payment. During oral argument, we asked for a clarification of Sheehy's position on this issue: "The check from [the closing attorney's] trust account says ‘Judgment Payoff.’ It is in the exact amount of the monetary judgment that you are appealing. Did your client authorize that payment to be made?" Oral Argument Audio at 29:35 to 29:49. Sheehy's counsel replied: "As I sit here today, I do not know that. I was not involved in that real estate transaction in any regard, nor made aware of it." Id. at 29:53 to 30:01.

II.

The voluntary-payment doctrine has a rich history in Virginia law. The doctrine served as a check on causes of action "for money had and received" that arose out of the "indebitatus assumpsit" remedy recognized by English common law. Kent Sinclair, Sinclair on Virginia Remedies § 9-2, at 9-2 to -3 (5th ed. 2016). The premise of this doctrine was that, absent a showing of fraud or other misconduct, a claimant could not demand that a court return money to him that he had voluntarily paid to another. The doctrine has been applied in a variety of contexts, including a voluntary "[p]ayment of a judgment." Id. § 9-2, at 9-5 (footnote omitted).2 "The rule of voluntariness flows from the vigilance maxim." Id. "Every man is supposed to know the law; if one voluntarily makes a payment which the law would not compel him to make , he cannot afterwards assign his ignorance of the law as a reason why the state should furnish him with legal remedies to recover it." Id. (emphasis added). As Judge Burks has explained:

In order to render the payment compulsory so as to allow a suit to recover it back, the compulsion must have been illegal, unjust or oppressive, and usually the payment must have been made to emancipate the personal property of the payer from a duress illegally imposed upon it by the party to whom the money is paid, or to prevent a seizure by a party armed with apparent authority to seize the property.

Martin P. Burks, Common Law and Statutory Pleading and Practice § 226, at 386 (T. Munford Boyd ed., 4th ed. 1952).3

In the appellate context, the voluntary-payment doctrine recognizes that at some point, reviewing courts should declare litigation to be at an end when the litigants themselves — by their own voluntary actions — have effectively ended it. Despite the clarity of the concept, the line-drawing necessary to apply it has proven to be elusive. There appear to be as many approaches to this topic as there are courts. See generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Defeated Party's Payment or Satisfaction of, or Other Compliance with, Civil Judgment as Barring His Right to Appeal , 39 A.L.R.2d 153 (1955).

In Virginia, however, we have drawn a bright line: "Voluntary payment of a judgment deprives the payor of the right of appeal." Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Crewe Factory Sales Corp. , 254 Va. 355, 355, 492 S.E.2d 826 (1997) (citing Carlucci v. Duck's Real Est., Inc. , 220 Va. 164, 166, 257 S.E.2d 763 (1979) ). The antonym of voluntary — involuntary — does not mean inconvenient. If "the law would not compel him to make" the payment, Sinclair, supra , § 9-2, at 9-5, the party making the payment has made it voluntarily. Two cases, Citizens Bank & Trust Co. and Carlucci , bracket the Virginia rule for voluntariness in the appellate context.

In Citizens Bank & Trust Co. , a jury entered a monetary judgment against a defendant who later appealed. While the appeal was pending, the defendant forwarded to the plaintiff "a check in the full amount of the judgment." Citizens Bank & Trust Co. , 254 Va. at 355, 492 S.E.2d 826. The defendant had made this payment "before any proceedings were instituted to execute on the judgment" and had done so "in satisfaction of the trial court's judgment." Id. We dismissed the appeal because of the defendant's "[v]oluntary payment." Id. We cited an earlier case, Carlucci , to provide contrast. In that case, the defendant paid the judgment only after "the issuance by the plaintiff of an execution on its judgment and the filing by it of a suggestion in garnishment." Carlucci , 220 Va. at 166, 257 S.E.2d 763. "The payment of a judgment under such circumstances is not such a voluntary payment as causes a loss of the right of appeal by the judgment debtor." Id. (emphasis added). Together, Citizens Bank & Trust Co. and Carlucci demonstrate that, absent a showing of fraud or other tortious conduct by a judgment creditor, a payment of a civil judgment for a fixed monetary sum made by or on behalf of a judgment debtor with her knowledge and consent becomes involuntary only when the payment is made after the judgment creditor has initiated execution proceedings.4

In the present case, Sheehy does not claim that Williams initiated any execution-of-judgment proceedings to seize Sheehy's assets, to garnish her wages, to summons her for debtor's interrogatories, or to initiate the judicial sale of her real property.5 The only thing that Williams's counsel apparently did was reply to an uninvited request seeking "payoff information" for the judgment in order to close a private sales transaction. See Mot. to Dismiss, supra , Ex. C, at 1-2. The buyer's attorney forwarded to Williams's counsel a check for the payoff amount dated two days later with the notation "Judgment Payoff" and with what appear to be handwritten initials next to the circled amount of the judgment balance on the attached letter. See id. Ex. B, at 1.6

Williams argues that this payment was not coerced by a pending execution-of-judgment proceeding. According to Williams, the payment was nothing more than a voluntary payment made by a seller seeking to convey clean title to a buyer. A well-recognized Virginia practice treatise on real estate closings explains that

the purchaser must require that [the judgment] be satisfied of record prior to closing or that it be paid off at closing. The closing attorney should obtain the payoff amount from the judgment lienholder and oversee the seller's satisfaction of the lien. The attorney should also verify prior to closing that the lien has in fact been released of record. If the judgment is to be paid off at closing, the seller
...

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