Sheena H. ex rel. Russell H. v. Amfire, LLC.

• Decision Date: 10 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–0875.,13–0875.
• Citation: 235 W.Va. 132,772 S.E.2d 317
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: SHEENA H. for RUSSELL H., deceased, on behalf of the minor child, L.H., Petitioner v. AMFIRE, LLC., Respondent.

235 W.Va. 132

772 S.E.2d 317

SHEENA H. for RUSSELL H., deceased, on behalf of the minor child, L.H., Petitioner

v.AMFIRE, LLC., Respondent.

No. 13–0875.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted March 10, 2015.

Decided April 10, 2015.

Stephen P. New, Esq., Amanda J. Taylor, Esq., Beckley, WV, for Petitioner.

Robert J. Busse, Esq., Timothy E. Huffman, Esq., Jackson Kelly PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.

John H. Shumate, Jr., Esq., Attorney at Law, Mount Hope, WV, Guardian Ad Litem for L.H.

Opinion

Justice KETCHUM :

Petitioner, Sheena H. (“Ms. H.”), on the behalf of her six-year-old granddaughter (“L.H.”), appeals an order of the Workers' Compensation Board of Review, denying dependent's death benefits for the death of L.H.'s father, Russell H.¹ The Board of Review based its denial on Ms. H. not filing her application within six months after Mr. H's death.

Ms. H. argues that there was no indication that the death of L.H.'s father was work-related until eight months after his death, when the Chief Medical Examiner's autopsy report was completed and made available to her. She asserts that the time limitation on applying for death benefits begins to run when she could have learned that the death was work-related, not when the death occurred. Respondent (“Amfire”) contends that the time limitation on applying for death benefits begins to run on the date of the death and may never be tolled.

We reverse and remand the Board of Review's order. We find that the Legislature did not intend to completely bar a claim for dependent's death benefits when, due to the medical examiner's delay in preparing an autopsy report, there was no indication that an employee's death was work-related until eight months after the death. Furthermore, Ms. H. was a proper party to file a claim for dependent's death benefits under West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) [2010] on L.H.'s behalf. The Board of Review erred in finding otherwise.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 7, 2010, Russell H., a twenty-four-year-old coal miner, died in his sleep from a seizure. He left behind his mother, Ms. H., who is the petitioner, and a now six-year-old daughter, L.H., on whose behalf Ms. H. petitions this Court. L.H.'s mother (who never married Mr. H.) is not a party to this proceeding.

Mr. H. suffered a work-related injury on March 24, 2009, when a wrench fell from a coal mine's ceiling and hit him on the head. The injury left him unconscious for one minute and resulted in a golf-ball-size knot on his head. Even though he was transported to the local hospital, neither he, his employer, nor his treating physicians recognized the magnitude of Mr. H's injury. He did not stay in the hospital overnight. Rather, his treating physicians prescribed him pain medication and told him to return to the walk-in clinic for a follow up visit if he deemed it necessary. He did not seek additional medical treatment for this injury or for health-related issues arising out of the injury. Mr. H. returned to work a couple of days later, and in May 2009, his claim for temporary total disability benefits was closed because he was off work for less than three days.

Twenty-one months later (on December 7, 2010), Mr. H. died in his sleep. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed an autopsy on Mr. H. the following day, December 8, 2010. However, for unknown reasons, the autopsy report was not completed and made available to Mr. H's family until August 24, 2011 (more than eight months after his death). The autopsy report declared that Mr. H's 2010 death was the result of a traumatic seizure disorder that stemmed from the 2009 work-related injury. It stated: “[Mr. H.] died as a result of a seizure while sleeping; in the setting of a traumatic seizure disorder following a remote head injury

at work [.] ... [T]he manner of death is best certified as accident. ” (Emphasis added). The autopsy report did not establish when Mr. H. began to suffer from the seizure disorder. His death certificate was then amended to reflect that his cause of death was a “seizure” as a consequence of “traumatic seizure disorder.”

There is conflicting evidence as to whether the family knew at the time of the death that Mr. H. (who lived alone) suffered from seizures. The Chief Medical Examiner stated in the autopsy report that Mr. H's family “reported witnessed seizure activity.” By contrast, Ms. H. responded to an interrogatory that the family did not know he suffered from seizures. What is clear, however, is that there was no medical evidence at that time which linked Mr. H's death to his work-related injury.

Dependents of a deceased employee have six months to apply for death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.² Ms. H. (on L.H.'s behalf) applied for dependent's death benefits on February 24, 2012, exactly six months after she received the autopsy report and amended death certificate indicating that Mr. H's cause of death stemmed from a work-related injury.

On March 19, 2012, the employer's claims administrator rejected the application for benefits, finding: (1) it was filed more than six months after Mr. H's death; (2) Ms. H. was not the proper person to file the application on L.H.'s behalf because she was not L.H.'s legal guardian; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. H's work-related injury in March 2009 was a material contributing factor to his death in December 2010. Ms. H. protested the decision, but the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges affirmed the claims administrator on the ground that the application was filed more than six months after Mr. H's death. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review affirmed the Office of Judges.

By order of this Court, the parties addressed whether Ms. H's application for dependent's death benefits was timely and whether Ms. H. was a proper party to bring a claim for dependent's death benefits on L.H.'s behalf. This Court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent L.H.'s interests.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a question of law, we have held: “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Furthermore, we review de novo legal conclusions of the Workers' Compensation Board of Review. Johnson v. W.Va. Office of Ins. Comm'r., 226 W.Va. 650, 654, 704 S.E.2d 650, 654 (2010).

III.ANALYSIS

Dependents of a deceased employee have six months from the date of a work-related death to apply for death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The parties dispute two issues: (1) whether the time limitation for applying for death benefits may be tolled until a claimant could have reasonably learned that the death was work-related; and (2) whether Ms. H. (L.H.'s grandmother) is a proper party to apply for dependent's death benefits on L.H.'s behalf. We examine the parties' arguments in turn.

A. Statutory Deadline to Apply for Dependent's Benefits

In 1986, the Legislature adopted a six-month period in which claims may be filed for workers' compensation dependent's death benefits. The pertinent statute provides:

To entitle any employee or dependent of a deceased employee to compensation under this chapter, other than for occupational pneumoconiosis or other occupational disease, the application for compensation shall be ... [filed] within six months from and after the injury or death, as the case may be, and unless filed within the six months period, the right to compensation under this chapter is forever barred, such time limitation being hereby declared to be a condition of the right and hence jurisdictional [.]”

W.Va.Code § 23–4–15(a) [2010] (emphasis added).

Ms. H. argues that, despite the time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) being jurisdictional, there was no way of knowing that Mr. H's death was work-related until the autopsy report was completed and made available. She argues this is a narrow circumstance in which the time limitation for filing a claim may be tolled. Amfire responds that West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) does not specify an exception to its time limitation, and therefore, it may not be tolled under any circumstances, even when there was no indication that the decedent's death was work-related until eight months after the death had passed.

We have held that, “[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 8, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W.Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). “If the literal meaning of a statute is inconsistent with the meaning or intent of the legislature, or would lead to perverse results, the words of the statute must be interpreted to reflect the intention of the legislature.” Pryor v. Gainer, 177 W.Va. 218, 222, 351 S.E.2d 404, 408 (1986). See also Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W.Va. 36, 46, 537 S.E.2d 882, 892 (2000) ( “Although a provision's language may be plain, there nevertheless may arise circumstances in which the plain language does not speak completely on the subject to which it is addressed.”). In the same vein, we have said:

It is the duty of a court to construe a statute according to its true intent, and give to it such construction as will uphold the law and further justice. It is as well the duty of a court to disregard a construction, though apparently warranted by the literal sense of the words in a statute, when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity.

Syl. Pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[w]here a particular construction of a statute would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity will be made.” Syl. Pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938).

Therefore, our inquiry does not end just because West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) does not specify any exceptions to...