Sheet Metal Div. Of Capitol v. Local Union 38
| Decision Date | 24 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-CV-1023.,98-CV-1023. |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.2d 195 |
| Parties | SHEET METAL DIVISION OF CAPITOL DISTRICT SHEET METAL, ROOFING & AIR CONDITIONING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.; Associated Sheet Metal and Roofing Contractors of Connecticut; and Sheet Metal Contractors Association of Northern New Jersey, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL UNION 38 OF THE SHEET METAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION and Sheet Metal & Roofing Employers Association of Southeastern New York, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Couch, White, Brenner, Howard & Fiegenbaum, LLP, Albany, NY (James F. Barriere, Leslie F. Couch, Joel M. Howard, III, of counsel), for Plaintiffs.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, New York City (Thomas W. Hylands, Fred N. Knopf, of counsel), Sullivan, Ward, Bone, Tyler & Asher, P.C., Southfield, MI (Anthony A. Asher, of counsel), for Defendant Sheet Metal & Roofing Employers Association of Southeastern New York, Inc.
Office of Jeffrey S. Dubin, Garden City, NY (Jeffrey S. Dubin, of counsel), for Defendant Local Union 38.
Plaintiffs Sheet Metal Division of Capitol District Sheet Metal, Roofing & Air Conditioning Contractors Association, Inc. ("Capitol District Sheet Metal"), Associated Sheet Metal and Roofing Contractors of Connecticut ("Connecticut Sheet Metal") and Sheet Metal Contractors Association of Northern New Jersey ("New Jersey Sheet Metal") (collectively "plaintiffs") brought the instant action on June 30, 1998, against Local Union 38 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association ("Local 38") and Sheet Metal & Roofing Employers Association of Southeastern New York, Inc. ("Local 38 SENY Contractors") (collectively "defendants"), alleging violations of (1) sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; (2) sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), (e); (3) the Donnelly Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340; (4) the Connecticut Antitrust Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-26 et seq.; and (5) the New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-1.
Plaintiffs now move for a declaratory judgment that Article II, Section 1 of defendants' collective bargaining agreement is void and unenforceable, or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing that provision. Defendant Local Union 38 cross-moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs are multi-employer bargaining agents representing union sheet metal contractors from various counties in upstate New York, Connecticut and New Jersey. The contractors are engaged in the business of fabricating sheet metal duct work and other sheet metal products for use on public and private construction projects throughout New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.1 Defendant Local 38 is an unincorporated association of union sheet metal workers covering various counties in the lower Hudson Valley and Connecticut.2 Defendant Local 38 SENY Contractors is a multi-employer bargaining agent representing sheet metal contractors in the geographical region represented by Local 38 in New York and Connecticut. Thus, defendant contractors are located in a geographic location different from plaintiffs.
The gravamen of the parties' dispute concerns a provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA" or "Agreement") entered into between Local 38 and Local 38 SENY Contractors, which provides:
To protect and preserve for the Building Trades employees covered by this Agreement all work they have performed and all work covered by the Agreement, and to prevent any device or subterfuge to avoid the protection and preservation of work; it is agreed that all the work requiring sketching and fabrication shall be performed by employees hereunder, either in the shop or on the job site within the geographical jurisdiction of [Local 38].
CBA, Art. II, § 1.
Plaintiffs allege that this provision violates the Sherman Act and NLRA by erecting a trade barrier around plaintiffs' geographical area by prohibiting union sheet metal contractors from buying and selling, and plaintiffs' contractors from providing, sheet metal sketched or fabricated outside defendants' geographical jurisdiction to project sites in defendants' jurisdiction. In response, defendants contend that the provision is a valid work preservation clause and falls within the construction industry proviso in section 8(e) of the NLRA and is therefore protected under the "nonstatutory exemption" of the Sherman Act. Defendants further argue that because the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") held the clause valid under section 8(e), it is therefore "presumptively exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act." Def. Local 38 SENY Contractors Mem. of Law at 1. Thus, the focus of the Court's inquiry is whether the clause provided in defendants' CBA restricting fabrication of sheet metal work to contractors located within a specific geographic location runs afoul of the Sherman Act and NLRA.
Defendant Local 38 SENY Contractors first argue that plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed on ripeness grounds because defendants have indicated that the disputed provision will not be enforced against plaintiffs, who are non-signatories to the CBA. See Def. Local 38 SENY Contractors Mem. of Law at 13. In response, plaintiffs argue that defendants' agreement to refrain from enforcing the clause is valid only during the pendency of the litigation, and that defendant Local 38 intends to enforce the provision as a permissible "work preservation" clause under the NLRA and Sherman Act. See Def. Local 38 Mem. of Law at 17. Moreover, plaintiffs argue that though they are not signatories to defendants' CBA, they are still bound by its terms and conditions. See Pl. Mem. of Law at 3; Def. Local 38 Mem. of Law at 12. Thus, the Court must first consider whether plaintiffs' challenge to the CBA provision is ripe for review.
Ripeness is a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts. See Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala, 144 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir.) (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 589, 142 L.Ed.2d 532 (1998); Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1998). In evaluating whether a declaratory judgment action is ripe, the Court must consider (1) "the fitness of the issues for judicial review, and (2) the injury or hardship to the parties of withholding judicial consideration." Nutritional Health Alliance, 144 F.3d at 225. Recognizing that the determination whether declaratory judgment actions are justiciable is "one of degree," the Supreme Court stated:
The difference between an abstract question and a "controversy" contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941).
Thus, whether particular facts are sufficiently immediate and real to make an actual controversy must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Hendrix v. Poonai, 662 F.2d 719, 721-22 (11th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 483 F.2d 603, 607 (5th Cir.1973)).
In some instances, a declaratory judgment is proper even though there are future contingencies that will determine whether a controversy ever actually becomes real. See GTE Directories Publishing Corp. v. Trimen America, Inc., 67 F.3d 1563, 1569 (11th Cir.1995) (citing 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 2757 (West 1983)); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 961 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir.1992) (). A controversy does not exist, however, in cases where the plaintiff's claim is based on an abstract question "based upon the possibility of a factual situation that may never develop." Hendrix, 662 F.2d at 722 (). Thus, the critical issue is whether "the case presents a sufficiently concrete case and controversy upon which relief properly may be fashioned." National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 566 n. 2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com'n v. National Basketball Ass'n, 484 U.S. 960, 108 S.Ct. 362, 98 L.Ed.2d 386 (1987).
Here, the parties have entered into a stipulation in which Local 38 has agreed to refrain from enforcing the clause pending the determination of plaintiffs' motions. Significantly, the stipulation provides that Local 38 may file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB against plaintiffs for violations of the CBA provision if the Court denies plaintiffs' motion. Local 38's argument that the present dispute is not ripe for the Court's review is belied by the express language in the stipulation which evinces Local 38's intent to enforce the provision to "create a level playing field for all contractors" and "preserve work for its members." Def. Local 38 Mem. of Law at 17. Thus,...
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