Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Carter 733
| Decision Date | 23 February 1981 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CIO,No. 80-,80- |
| Citation | 450 U.S. 949,67 L.Ed.2d 378,101 S.Ct. 1410 |
| Parties | SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, v. Ben CARTER 733 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in this case that an order of the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed was reviewable through a petition for a writ of mandamus. This conclusion is directly contrary to the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." Such manifest disregard of the language of Congress should in my opinion warrant at least review by this Court, if not summary reversal.
The complicated course of this litigation began in 1972, when respondent filed an action against petitioner International Union in state court. Petitioner did not answer the complaint but instead moved to dismiss it for improper service. This motion was denied and a default judgment eventually entered against petitioner. A state trial was held for the sole purpose of calculating damages. The judgment entered for respondent, however, was ultimately reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court on the ground that the International had not been properly served. Sheet Metal Workers' International Assn. v. Carter, 241 Ga. 220, 244 S.E.2d 860 (1978). When the action was reinstituted and petitioner was properly served, it removed the action to federal court. As early as pretrial conference it clearly developed that respondent's only claim was a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a, but respondent never moved to remand the case and the court did not do so sua sponte. The case proceeded to trial and the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages in favor of respondent. Petitioner then moved to have the judgment vacated and the case remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The District Court concluded that jurisdiction was lacking, set aside the verdict and judgment, and remanded the action to state court. The court then stated: Id., at 3a.
The Court of Appeals acceded to the wishes of the District Court. It granted respondent's petition for a writ of mandamus, vacated the remand order, and directed the District Court to consider if it had pendent jurisdiction of the state-law claim. It overcame to its satisfaction the seemingly clear prohibition of § 1447(d) on the ground that § 1447(c) required remand "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction," while the District Court ordered remand after final judgment. Relying on our decision in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), the court reasoned that the remand order was not within § 1447(c) and thus review was not prohibited by § 1447(d).
In Thermtron, however, the Court stated that "[i]f a trial judge purports to remand a case on the ground that it was removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction,' his order is not subject to challenge in the court of appeals by appeal, by mandamus, or otherwise." 423 U.S., at 343, 96 S.Ct., at 589. The District Court remanded this case precisely for the quoted reason. While Thermtron also stated that "[t]here is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to extend the prohibition against review to reach remand orders entered on grounds not provided by the statute," id., at 350, 96 S.Ct., at 592, this remand order was entered on grounds permitted by the statute and therefore comes under that portion of the Thermtron opinion stating that "we neither disturb nor take issue with the well-established general rule that § 1447(d) and its predecessors were intended to forbid review by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds permitted by the statute." Id., at 351-352, 96 S.Ct., at 593. See Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 414, n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 2428, 2433, n. 13, 53 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977) (); Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977) (). Nothing in Thermtron suggests a further exception to the clear prohibition of § 1447(d) based merely on the timing of the district judge's remand order.
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