Sheets v. Huben, 74
| Decision Date | 02 December 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 74,74 |
| Citation | 354 Mich. 536,93 N.W.2d 168 |
| Parties | Dorothy SHEETS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph HUBEN and Victoria Huben, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Earl T. Glocheski, Grand Rapids, for defendants and appellants, Seraphin S. Orlik, Grand Rapids, of counsel.
Floyd H. Skinner and Alphonse Lewis, Jr., Grand Rapids, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
The question in this case is whether a certain instrument in the form of a deed of conveyance was intended as a deed or as a mortgage. The circumstances leading to the execution of the instrument are these: Mrs. Dorothy Sheets, the plaintiff, was purchasing certain property on land contract, subject to a mortgage. She had previously invested at least $1,500 in the property. She had made a down payment of $1,300, had made monthly payments, upon principal, totalling $478, and, in addition, had made substantial improvements. Financial difficulties, however, had come upon her because of an industrial accident. Her income had shriveled and she fell behind in her payments. During this difficult period she was befriended by her neighobors, Mr. and Mrs. Huben, the defendants before us.
Conversations were had with the Hubens in an effort to ameliorate her financial difficulties. (Mr. Huben was an accountant with the Federal Housing Administration.) An attorney was consulted and the instrument before us drafted. It was a warranty deed, with reservation of life interest, Mrs. Sheets assuming and to continue the mortgage payments. (The land contract blance was liquidated simultaneously therewith.) Mrs. Sheets insists that the transaction was a loan of money to help her in her temporary difficulties, the property merely standing as security for repayment thereof. She alleges that she was ill and 'was willing to have defendants secure their money out of the house.' She insists that 'this paper I signed was to protect all of us in case of my death so they wouldn't lose their money and I wouldn't lose my home and I had money to pay Mr. Huben.' She admits that she signed a paper in the lawyer's office. It was read to her, her injury having affected her sight. 'I wrote my name,' she testified, 'on Exhibit 1 fairly straight by following the pen with my hand and fingers.' Some question arises in our minds as to the efficacy of the reading since she was hard of hearing to the degree that, 'to somewhat conserve time' her testimony at the trial of the case before us was taken by deposition but this factor need not be explored as it does not control decision. In short, as she puts it, 'The lawyer wanted to know what I wanted; I told him I wanted a paper that would protect Mr. Huben and Mr. Huben's mother in case of my death and I wanted something that would protect me equally, that I could get my home back, and as long as I did owe them money it would protect them.' The Hubens are equally emphatic that the transaction was not a loan, with security, but an absolute conveyance. It was plaintiff's idea, Mr. Huben said, 'That we had helped her in various ways and means and that she had arrived on an agreement upon which I could purchase the house, and she could reserve her life estate on it.' It is somewhat revealing of the true nature of what the parties intended that a second mortgage was contemplated, and the idea discarded. 'I don't like second mortgages anyway,' testified the attorney who drew the instrument. 'They cause too much trouble.'
Following the discussion referred to, Mrs. Sheets signed the aforementioned warranty deed to the Hubens, with reservation in the following terms:
"Reserving and excepting unto the said grantor, Dorothy L. Sheets a life estate with the power and complete use and enjoyment of the said premises, with the said grantor to assume and make payments of $41.74 on that certain mortgage on the said premises held by General American Life Insurance Company, St. Louis, Missouri, during her life time, and at her death, if there be any indebtedness owed on the said mortgage, then the payments on the same are to be assumed and paid by the grantees."
In return, Mr. Huben paid the amount due on the land contract of $750.06, together with other items, $1,106.97 in all.
Subsequent to the execution of the instrument, Mrs. Sheets left for Chicago, confiding to Mr. Huben the collection of rental from the premises and the making of necessary disbursements with respect thereto. Unfortunately, difficulties ensued between the parties. One...
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